It is generally assumed that in early modern Britain, chivalry—allegedly typified by the Crusades—was considered a negative or even ridiculous ideology until its rehabilitation by the pre-Romantic movement. However, this paper argues that Hume and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers had already shown a deep interest in its historical role and influence on modern civilization. That Hume shared a broad interest in chivalry with contemporary philosophers does not undermine the novelty of his thought on this topic. In fact, the pioneering and (...) unique aspects of his contributions can be clarified by setting them in context. (shrink)

Demonstrates the uniqueness of Hume as an Enlightenment thinker, illustrating how his 'spirit of scepticism' often leads him into seemingly paradoxical positions. This book will be of interest to Hume scholars, intellectual historians of 17th- to 19th-century Europe and those interested in the Enlightenment more widely.

The significance of Hume's positive attitude towards luxury might have been overemphasized by his commentators. In fact, arguments in favor of "moderate" luxury had already been entertained before the emergence of Hume's position. Therefore to argue that Hume's argument entailed the defense of moderate luxury is not to identify in it anything particularly unique. Thus, the first aim of this paper is to clarify the nature of Hume's contribution to the ongoing luxury debates. This does not consist merely of an (...) assertion of the compatibility of moral virtue with the enjoyment of luxury, but lies rather in Hume's emphasis on two aspects of the beneficial interaction between morality and luxury. First, the historical process of the introduction of luxury is regarded by Hume as fostering new morals peculiar to the commercial age; and secondly, the enjoyment of luxury is seen as a condition favorable to the maintenance of morals. The second aim of this paper is to shed some new light on an aspect of Hume's thought that, so far, has been relatively neglected, namely, his distinction between "innocent" and "vicious" forms of luxury, as well as his acknowledgement of the possibility of the emergence of the latter, as well as the former, in the modern commercial world. However, this does not necessarily lead us to a more pessimistic interpretation of Hume's view of luxury than those accepted thus far; only to the awareness of how difficult and delicate, in Hume's view, is the maintenance of the balance between the interlinked concepts of industry, knowledge, and humanity. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that in early modern Britain, chivalry—allegedly typified by the Crusades—was considered a negative or even ridiculous ideology until its rehabilitation by the pre-Romantic movement. However, this paper argues that Hume and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers had already shown a deep interest in its historical role and influence on modern civilization. That Hume shared a broad interest in chivalry with contemporary philosophers does not undermine the novelty of his thought on this topic. In fact, the pioneering and (...) unique aspects of his contributions can be clarified by setting them in context. (shrink)

In the biographies of David Hume, Horace Walpole’s name has been memorialised as the author of a forged letter assuming the identity of the King of Prussia. However, in the letter, Walpole’s scorn was directed against not only Rousseau, but also other French philosophes and, possibly, even Hume. Walpole drew a line between himself and the ‘pedants and pretended philosophers’, although he sometimes blurred the distinction between the two by considering an author or ‘man of letters’ synonymous with a ‘philosopher’. (...) Walpole broached his lifelong stricture on modern pretentious philosophers to Hume in one of his letters, just after the Concise Account was published. Walpole’s thorough contempt for French philosophers appeared to Hume as a Rousseauian, anti-philosophical stance. In his reply, Hume attempted to advocate his thesis of intellectual improvement and moral cultivation. Meanwhile, in another letter written around the same time, Hume kept away from Turgot’s sanguine view of human progress. The distance that Walpole maintains between himself and the philosophers—through the Hume-Rousseau affair—casts a long shadow on his evaluations of Hume and his historical works, and leads to their differing assessments of the standpoint of philosophers in the age of lumières. (shrink)

This article argues that Bernard Mandeville's ideas were more likely to have influenced Jeremy Bentham's writings than previously believed. The conventional interpretation of Mandeville as a forerunner of the Hayekian “theory of spontaneous order” has obscured Mandeville and Bentham's shared emphasis on legal and interventionist solutions for the issues of prostitution and prisoners. This influence is evinced by focusing on some of Mandeville's minor works, which anticipated some of Bentham's arguments. It is unlikely that Bentham directly knew of Mandeville's minor (...) works, but his reformist and interventionist bent was consistent and discernible in the Fable, which Jeremy Bentham read in his youth. (shrink)

Hume scholarship in the history of economic thought has advanced since Eugene Rotwein’s 1955 collection Writings on Economics: David Hume, later reprinted with a new introduction by Margaret Schabas. However, as Schabas and Carl Wennerlind correctly observe, “There is as yet no monograph in English devoted to a comprehensive study of Hume’s economics, let alone one that connects this body of thought to his philosophical tenets”. Hence the motivation for the two eminent historians of economic thought, both of whom have (...) specialized in Hume for a long time, finally to put out an excellent and readable book on Hume’s economic thought.Chapter 1, a survey on Hume’s biography, claims... (shrink)

As its title suggests, this work provides a wide-ranging discussion and interpretation of David Hume’s political philosophy. McArthur’s main arguments are threefold. First, the watershed between civilized and barbarous societies for Hume lies in the establishment of the rule of law. According to the author, what Hume called a “civilized monarchy,” though falling short of the ideal republic, can be regarded as a civilized form of government. This is because Hume believed that, with the exception of the monarch him- or (...) herself, people could be governed by the rule of law in such a political system. Second, McArthur coins the term ‘precautionary conservatism’ to define Hume’s political standpoint. This is an attempt to bridge the division between those commentators who define the philosopher as liberal, on one hand, and those who style him a conservative, on the other. The author notes that Hume regarded liberty as a universal ideal and espoused a doctrine of mankind’s natural rights, an element of Hume’s thought that has often been underplayed in conservative interpretations. Finally, McArthur not only pays due attention to the significance of commerce for Hume as a driving force of civilization; he also makes it clear that Hume’s support for luxury is backed up by his keen awareness of the importance of constitution in preserving manners. Unlike what. (shrink)

Hume's repeated mentions of the vicissitudes of civilization have thus far been neglected, overlooked, or misinterpreted by Hume scholars. Although his references to the “death” or “ruin” of a nation are somewhat hyperbolic, his cyclical view of history was neither mere rhetoric nor necessarily pessimistic. This paper aims to show that Hume's notion of historical fluctuations was deeply connected with his understanding of the universality of human nature. It also placed Hume in a strategic position from which he could criticize (...) both those who believed in the possibility of perpetual progress and those who forecast the successive decline of the human world. To explore Hume's position in more detail, we must first examine the reasons his argument was often misunderstood, especially in the context of the “rich country–poor country” debate. We also need to examine how Hume's view of the cyclical nature of history, consistently held, can be reconciled with his status as one of the champions of modern civilization. (shrink)

Many Hume scholars have partially anticipated the essential links between his magnum opus—the History of England—and other writings, but we lacked an appropriate theoretical framework. According to Andrew Sabl,2 the key to the breakthrough is provided by “coordination theory.” The approach to Hume’s work through the lens of twentieth-century political theories has been preceded, to take one example, by Russell Hardin, who envisions Hume’s notion of convention as a prototype of game theory. Hardin also mentions coordination theory in relation to (...) game theory,3 but it is Sabl who elucidates its comprehensiveness and significance, and successfully grasps the essential features of Hume as a political theorist. The most... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:David HumeRyu SusatoChristopher J. Berry. David Hume. New York: Continuum, 2009. Pp. xiv + 176. ISBN 978-0-826-42980-7, Cloth, $130.00In this book Professor Berry concisely and convincingly demonstrates two points: the various reasons “why Hume’s thought has indeed been frequently read as a contributor to or progenitor of conservatism” (154), and why the author nonetheless disagrees with this assessment. According to Berry, to identify some—or in fact many—elements or (...) strains of conservative thoughts in Hume’s writings is one thing and to classify him as a conservative thinker another. Berry picks up four major themes of analysis: Hume’s theories of causation and of justice, his economic thought, and his remarks on superstition. Rather than constituting distinct elements of the philosopher’s thought, these strands are seen as closely intertwined. As for the first two, Berry argues that Hume’s theories of causation and justice are solidly founded upon his emphasis on custom and habit, and he perceives here “the clear connection between Hume’s epistemology and his political and moral philosophy” (43). Despite accepting this, Berry claims that overall Hume is not a conservative philosopher. The focal point of Berry’s argument is Hume’s criticism of superstition: he contends that Hume’s term ‘superstition’ has a wider sense, indicating bad customs. This means that, despite his emphasis on custom and habit in epistemology and politics, Hume neither accepts nor justifies every historically well established custom. For example, he criticizes many mercantilist laws (such as usury and sumptuary laws), which according to Berry’s reading, can be regarded as based on a kind of economic superstition. On this point, Hume can be more easily depicted as a liberal rather than a conservative thinker.Precisely because of the book’s close focus on the issue of Hume’s alleged conservatism, the question “What, then, is Hume?” is discussed only in negative ways. Berry demonstrates his sympathy for J. B. Stuart’s interpretation of Hume as a liberal, but, as both admit, Hume is clearly not a liberal in terms of adopting a rights-based philosophy (48–49, 98). If Hume is considered to be a liberal, therefore, the issue remains of what kind of liberal he is. Although such an investigation might be inappropriate given the nature of this series, readers might still wish that Berry had addressed the issue more clearly.The extent to which some elements of the philosophy that Berry depicts are peculiar to Hume is not clear. Although Hume’s writings contain the harshest criticisms of religious superstition among Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, he shared his basic stance with many of his friends. Hume’s criticism of superstition, that is bad customs, should therefore be re-grounded in the context of the Scottish Enlightenment. Moreover, Berry never indicates whether he believes that [End Page 240] Hume’s views on good customs or manners were nothing but eighteenth-century prejudices, as McIntyre says in After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press, 1985, p. 231). If they were not the prejudices of a particular time but more universal, how can we distinguish Hume’s emphasis on pain and pleasure in his moral theory and his criteria of good manners from those of, say, Jeremy Bentham?I would suggest some alternative strategies to refute or challenge the common depiction of Hume as a conservative. One is to question the theoretical framework behind our own understanding of Hume’s thought. The connection between Hume’s skeptical understanding of causation in epistemology and his (allegedly) conservative politics has been reiterated since the nineteenth century. Furthermore, scholars have consistently linked Hume’s liberalistic defense of commerce to his theory of justice. As Berry claims, this packaging of Hume’s various strands of thought has been justified by what Hayek calls the theory of spontaneous order. This theory explains and justifies Hume’s claims about the superiority of unintended social institutions produced by self-interested individuals over those based on human rational design. For Hayek, the epitome of the former is the free-market economy, while the latter category includes the idea of a planned economy and models based upon the theory of... (shrink)

In this book Professor Berry concisely and convincingly demonstrates two points: the various reasons “why Hume’s thought has indeed been frequently read as a contributor to or progenitor of conservatism” (154), and why the author nonetheless disagrees with this assessment. According to Berry, to identify some—or in fact many—elements or strains of conservative thoughts in Hume’s writings is one thing and to classify him as a conservative thinker another. Berry picks up four major themes of analysis: Hume’s theories of causation (...) and of justice, his economic thought, and his remarks on superstition. Rather than constituting distinct elements of the philosopher’s thought, these strands are seen as closely intertwined. As for the first two, Berry argues that Hume’s theories of causation and justice are solidly founded upon his emphasis on custom and habit, and he perceives here “the clear connection between Hume’s epistemology and his political and moral philosophy” (43). Despite accepting this, Berry claims that overall Hume is not a conservative philosopher. The focal point of Berry’s argument is Hume’s criticism of superstition: he contends that Hume’s term ‘superstition’ has a wider sense, indicating bad customs. This means that, despite his emphasis on custom and habit in epistemology and politics, Hume neither accepts nor justifies every historically well established custom. For example, he criticizes many mercantilist laws (such as usury and sumptuary laws), which according to Berry’s reading, can be regarded as based on a kind of economic superstition. On this point, Hume can be more easily depicted as a liberal rather than a conservative thinker. (shrink)