Este articulo tiene el objetivo de cuestionar los sentidos del aula de filosofia, sobre todo en la educaciön secundaria. Para eso, parte de la definiciön de filosofia expuesta por Deleuze y Guattari en Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, donde la senala como una actividad de creaciön de conceptos, hace critica a las concepciones del aula de filosofia como momentos de reflexion, de contemplaciön o incluso de diälogos, una vez que ninguna de estas tareas se hace especfficamente filosöfica. Para garantizar esa especificidad, (...) intenta caracterizar el aula de filosofia como un "taller de conceptos", un espacio donde el maestro y los alumnos se hacen creadores de conceptos, alrededor de problemas vividos, tomando como herramientas los conceptos histöricamente producidos. (shrink)
In this article we explore ethical issues arising in a study of home Internet use by low-income families. We consider questions of our responsibility as educational researchers and discuss the ethical implications of some unanticipated consequences of our study. We illustrate ways in which the principles of research ethics for use of human subjects can be ambiguous and possibly inadequate for anticipating potential harm in educational research. In this exploratory research of personal communication technologies, participants experienced changes that were personal (...) and relational. These unanticipated changes in their way of being complicated our research relationships, testing the boundaries of our commitment to the principle of trustworthiness and forcing us to reevaluate our responsibilities. (shrink)
The National Science Foundation's (NSF) role in, and influence on, the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) can best be understood through an examination of the NSF's history. Because of the NSF's weakened position at its founding in 1950 and obstacles faced throughout its history, the NSF developed a discursive strategy that focuses on making a causal link between support for basic science and societal benefits, and an operational strategy focused on growing its constituency through infrastructural support. The hallmarks of both of (...) these strategies are present in the NNI. (shrink)
This paper aims at discussing some contributions, limitations and opportunities that efficiency and equity studies could make to form a better understanding of ethical issues involved in health technology assessment (HTA). Prenatal detection of Down syndrome is used as a case study for further discussions regarding efficiency and equity, as well as other ethical principles including beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy. The development and use of adequate methods and the need for context appraisal are two imperative issues in this field of (...) knowledge. The analysis of ethical implications in HTA should account for both. Economic evaluation methodologies have great potential in the assessment of some key ethical principles such as efficiency and equity but are of limited use concerning other fundamental principles. Social and individual values play a prominent role in this respect. (shrink)
A distinction is made between two definitions of animal cognition: the one most frequently employed in cognitive sciences considers cognition as extracting and processing information; a more phenomenologically inspired model considers it as attributing to a form of the outside world a significance, linked to the state of the animal. The respective fields of validity of these two models are discussed along with the limitations they entail, and the questions they pose to evolutionary biologists are emphasized. This is followed by (...) a presentation of a general overview of what might be the study of the evolution of knowledge in animals. (shrink)
A bibliographical search through the major libraries of Italy has revealed a large and various collection of writings of logic published during the 19th century before the rise of Peano and his school (from the 1880son). A survey of current findings is provided.
In this paper we propose an approach to vagueness characterised by two features. The first one is philosophical: we move along a Kantian path emphasizing the knowing subject’s conceptual apparatus. The second one is formal: to face vagueness, and our philosophical view on it, we propose to use topology and formal topology. We show that the Kantian and the topological features joined together allow us an atypical, but promising, way of considering vagueness.
This quote from Silvio Berlusconi is part of the speech he held on April 18, 1994 during the celebrations for AC Milan’s third consecutive scudetto under his management. Suppose we take this claim seriously: what is the logic at play when soccer is linked to other spheres of life? In particular, in what ways is a team a metaphor for its patrons?
We propose a formal representation of objects , those being mathematical or empirical objects. The powerful framework inside which we represent them in a unique and coherent way is grounded, on the formal side, in a logical approach with a direct mathematical semantics in the well-established field of constructive topology, and, on the philosophical side, in a neo-Kantian perspective emphasizing the knowing subject’s role, which is constructive for the mathematical objects and constitutive for the empirical ones.
We show that the variety of Heyting algebras has finitary unification type. We also show that the subvariety obtained by adding it De Morgan law is the biggest variety of Heyting algebras having unitary unification type. Proofs make essential use of suitable characterizations (both from the semantic and the syntactic side) of finitely presented projective algebras.
We show that (contrary to the parallel case of intuitionistic logic, see [7], [4]) there does not exist a translation fromS42 (the propositional modal systemS4 enriched with propositional quantifiers) intoS4 that preserves provability and reduces to identity for Boolean connectives and.
Upshot: Jehane Barton Burns (now Jehane Kuhn) worked with Ernst von Glasersfeld in the 1960’s on semantic analysis for machine translation at Silvio Ceccato’s Centro di Cibernetica at the University of Milan. Among subsequent formative experiences, she lists Italian travels with Howard Burns, historian of architecture (who first told her about Vico), and a decade in the Office of Charles and Ray Eames (where Constraints was a talismanic word). She and Thomas Kuhn married in 1982; she still considers the English (...) language her raison d’être. (shrink)
By using some classical reasoning we show that any countably presented formal topology, namely, a formal topology with a countable axiom set, is spatial.
In this paper we study the logic of relational and partial variable sets, seen as a generalization of set-valued presheaves, allowing transition functions to be arbitrary relations or arbitrary partial functions. We find that such a logic is the usual intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic first order logic without Beck and Frobenius conditions relative to quantifiers along arbitrary terms. The important case of partial variable sets is axiomatizable by means of the substitutivity schema for equality. Furthermore, completeness, incompleteness and independence results are (...) obtained for different kinds of Beck and Frobenius conditions. (shrink)
Aquí lo que me interesa es, primero, distinguir dos problemas de justificación con respecto a la inferencia inductiva: por un lado, el de una justificación persuasiva de este tipo de inferencia y, por otro lado, el de una justificación explicativa de tal inferencia. En segundo lugar, intento mostrar que el argumento de Ramsey-de Finetti a favor de las reglas inductivas de la lógica bayesiana no es capaz de proporcionar una justifi-cación persuasiva de estas reglas. Finalmente, propongo una justificación explicativa para (...) las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas en términos de un argumento trascendental de inspiración kantiana y de estilo davidsoniano.Here, I am interested, firstly, in distinguishing two justification problems concerning inductive inference: on the one hand, the problem of a persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, the problem of an explicative justification of this sort of inference. Secondly, I intend to show that Ramsey-de Finetti’s argument in favor of Bayesian inductive rules cannot provide a persuasive justification for these rules. Finally, I propose an explicative justification for Bayesian conditionalization rules in terms of a transcendental argument of Kantian inspiration and Davidsonian style. (shrink)
By means of models in toposes of C-sets (where C is a small category), necessary conditions are found for the minimum quantified extension of a propositional (intermediate, modal) logic to be complete with respect to Kripke semantics; in particular, many well-known systems turn out to be incomplete.
A. M. Pitts in [Pi] proved that HA op fp is a bi-Heyting category satisfying the Lawrence condition. We show that the embedding $\Phi: HA^\mathrm{op}_\mathrm{fp} \longrightarrow Sh(\mathbf{P_0,J_0})$ into the topos of sheaves, (P 0 is the category of finite rooted posets and open maps, J 0 the canonical topology on P 0 ) given by $H \longmapsto HA(H,\mathscr{D}(-)): \mathbf{P_0} \longrightarrow \text{Set}$ preserves the structure mentioned above, finite coproducts, and subobject classifier, it is also conservative. This whole structure on HA op (...) fp can be derived from that of Sh(P 0 ,J 0 ) via the embedding Φ. We also show that the equivalence relations in HA op fp are not effective in general. On the way to these results we establish a new kind of duality between HA op fp and a category of sheaves equipped with certain structure defined in terms of Ehrenfeucht games. Our methods are model-theoretic and combinatorial as opposed to proof-theoretic as in [Pi]. (shrink)
We characterize (both from a syntactic and an algebraic point of view) the normal K4-logics for which unification is filtering. We also give a sufficient semantic criterion for existence of most general unifiers, covering natural extensions of K4.2⁺ (i.e., of the modal system obtained from K4 by adding to it, as a further axiom schemata, the modal translation of the weak excluded middle principle).
By using algebraic-categorical tools, we establish four criteria in order to disprove canonicity, strong completeness, w-canonicity and strong w-completeness, respectively, of an intermediate propositional logic. We then apply the second criterion in order to get the following result: all the logics defined by extra-intuitionistic one-variable schemata, except four of them, are not strongly complete. We also apply the fourth criterion in order to prove that the Gabbay-de Jongh logic D1 is not strongly w-complete.
Context: Meeting Ernst von Glasersfeld for the first time in 1985, when about 70% of his work had still to be conceived, written and published, was a great stroke of fortune for me; it was based on my collaboration with Silvio Ceccato that had started in 1981 and it profoundly influenced my contributions to radical constructivism in the following 25 years of our friendship. Problem: Presenting the details of how it all began can shed a light on the development of (...) constructivist ideas. Method: Anecdotes from 1979 to 1985 about how I came to meet Silvio Ceccato in Milan in 1981 and the influence of these events on preparing the 1985 meeting with Ernst von Glasersfeld, also in Milan. Results: The article describes the timeline of 50 years of publications by von Glasersfeld, an anecdote about a connection between Ceccato and the University of Zurich in the 60s, the attempt to present Ceccato’s ideas as compatible and complementary with the neuroscience discourse in 1985, von Glasersfeld’s opinion about this attempt, and this attempt’s potential influence on the emergence of a new concept in neuroscience, “EEG microstates.” Implications: The events and facts reported in the article help us to understand some aspects of an early phase in the development of radical constructivism, especially the relationship between Ceccato, von Glasersfeld and other members of the Italian Operational School such as Bruna Zonta, Felice Accame, and the author himself. (shrink)
We prove that if a modal formula is refuted on a wK4-algebra ( B ,□), then it is refuted on a finite wK4-algebra which is isomorphic to a subalgebra of a relativization of ( B ,□). As an immediate consequence, we obtain that each subframe and cofinal subframe logic over wK4 has the finite model property. On the one hand, this provides a purely algebraic proof of the results of Fine and Zakharyaschev for K4 . On the other hand, it (...) extends the Fine-Zakharyaschev results to wK4. (shrink)
The notion of a minimal form is defined as an extension of the notion of a normal form in λ-β-calculus and its meaning is discussed in a computational environment. The features of the Knuth-Gross reduction strategy are used to prove that to possess a minimal form, for a generic term, is a semidecidable predicate.
We present and study the category of formal topologies and some of its variants. Two main results are proven. The first is that, for any inductively generated formal cover, there exists a formal topology whose cover extends in the minimal way the given one. This result is obtained by enhancing the method for the inductive generation of the cover relation by adding a coinductive generation of the positivity predicate. Categorically, this result can be rephrased by saying that inductively generated formal (...) topologies are coreflective into inductively generated formal covers. The second result is that unary formal covers are exponentiable in the category of inductively generated formal covers and hence, thanks to the coreflection, unary formal topologies are exponentiable in the category of inductively generated formal topologies. From a localic point of view the exponentiability of unary formal topologies means that algebraic dcpos are exponentiable in the category of open locales. But, the coreflection theorem states that open locales are coreflective in locales and hence, as a consequence of well-known impredicative results on exponentiable locales, it allows to prove that locally compact open locales are exponentiable in the category of open locales. (shrink)
The philosophy of mathematics of the later Wittgenstein is normally not taken very seriously. According to a popular objection, it cannot account for mathematical necessity. Other critics have dismissed Wittgenstein's approach on the grounds that his anti-platonism is unable to explain mathematical objectivity. This latter objection would be endorsed by somebody who agreed with Paul Benacerraf that any anti-platonistic view fails to describe mathematical truth. This paper focuses on the problem proposed by Benacerraf of reconciling the semantics with the epistemology (...) for mathematics. It is claimed that there is a way of solving Benacerrafs problem along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein's later remarks on mathematics. This will require demonstrating that a satisfactory conception of mathematical objectivity can be extracted from his mature philosophy. (shrink)
Upshot: Paul Braffort was in charge of the research department GRISA (Groupe de Recherches sur l’Information Scientifique Automatique) in EURATOM when Ernst von Glasersfeld joined Silvio Ceccato’s group in the early 1960s. With these responsibilities he provided the initial funding for the work on language analysis that later Ernst brought to the US. In his essay Braffort describes von Glasersfeld’s professional involvements in France and Italy.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p49 The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based (...) on the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account. (shrink)
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p229 Tanto no Tratado da Natureza Humana como na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano , Hume mostra-se convencido de que “não há acaso no mundo”, e que “aquilo que o vulgo chama de acaso não passa de uma causa secreta e escondida”. Essa tese desempenha papel crucial em sua análise do livre-arbítrio e, conseguintemente, da responsabilidade moral; é também um elemento importante em sua discussão sobre os milagres. No entanto, o próprio Hume ofereceu, no Tratado , um argumento convincente para (...) mostrar que o princípio de causalidade, segundo o qual tudo o que começa a existir tem uma causa, não pode ser conhecido a priori , por intuição ou demonstração. Logo, essa “opinião tem necessariamente de provir da observação e experiência”. O presente trabalho examina essa tese, mostrando, inicialmente, qual era a proposta de Hume para fundar na experiência o princípio de causalidade, e depois qual, de fato, teria sido o mais robusto fundamento para esse princípio: a mecânica newtoniana. Explica-se, por fim, como esse fundamento empírico indireto e o próprio argumento de Hume foram solapados pela física quântica, no século XX. (shrink)
This article aims to defend Locke against Quine’s charge, made in his famous “two dogmas” paper, that Locke’s theory of knowledge is badly flawed, not only for assuming the dogmas, but also for adopting an “intolerably restrictive” version of the dogma of reductionism. It is shown here that, in his analysis of the epistemological status of scientific laws, Locke has effectively transcended the narrow idea-empiricism which underlies this version of reductionism. First, in order to escape idealism, he introduced the notion (...) of “sensitive knowledge of the particular existence of finite beings without us,” broadening thus his initial definition of knowledge in terms of the “perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas” — a definition compatible with Quine’s interpretation. Secondly, after showing that we can have virtually no a priori knowledge of universal truths about substances, Locke extended the notion of “sensitive knowledge” to the particular propositions of “coexistence” in substances, appealing to the notion of “probability” for treating their inductive generalizations and, in particular, the phenomenological laws of science. Finally, acknowledging the essential presence of hypothetical, nonphenomenological laws in science, he anticipated much of the contemporary views on their role and nature, including, remarkably, a mild version of the epistemological holism championed by Quine. (shrink)
In his influential criticism of scientific realism, Bas van Fraassen assumes that this doctrine is incompatible with empiricism, according to which the sole ultimate basis of knowledge is experience. This claim has been generally accepted in the contemporary literature in philosophy of science. Thus, the very distinction between scientific realism and empiricism is often forgotten, the term 'empiricism' being now widely used to designate a range of anti-realist positions, such as van Fraassen's "constructive empiricism". In this paper it is argued, (...) first, that empiricism, in the traditional and proper sense of the word, is a thesis about the problem of the foundations of knowledge, and should therefore be clearly distinguished from anti realism, which concems the issue of the extension of knowledge. It is then conceded that the main arguments for scientific realism do indeed require that extra-empirical characteristics of scientific theories, such as simplicity and explanatory power, should be ascribed epistemic weight. Although this point lends support to van Fraassen's claim, it is indicated here that his constructive empiricism is threatened by the same kind of epistemological objections which he raises against his opponents. Like some other scientific anti-realists, van Fraassen avowedly embraces realism concerning ordinary material objects; but it is not clear that this form of anti-realism remains tenable when explanatory power, simplicity, etc are regarded as merely pragmatic, non-epistemic virtues. (shrink)
The central aim of this article is to discuss Russell's analysis of the notion of cause. In his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in 1912, Russell put forward several theses on causality in general, and specially on its role in science. He claimed that although vague references to causal laws are often found in the beginnings of science, "in the advanced sciences... the word 'cause' never occurs". Furthermore, Russell maintained that even in philosophy the word 'cause' is "so inextricably (...) bound up with rnisleading associations" that it would be desirable to promote its "complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary". These positions are rendered particularly strong by Russell' s explicit adhesion to the regular sequence view of causation, which he attributed to Hume. Essentially the same opinions were repeated in a series of lectures delivered in Boston two years later. After a systematic exposition of the main theses advanced by Russell on these two occasions, we trace their origin to his general conception of science. Then we examine the substantial changes that Russell's views on causality underwent several decades later. We remark that these changes seem to be intimately associated with the adoption of a new episternological position conceming the nature of our knowledge of the external world, involving some clear elements of realism and natwralism. (shrink)
Salomón de la Selva (1893-1959) was a Nicaraguan writer/activist who authored many books of verse in Spanish, but only one in English: TropicalTown, And Other Poems (1918). Published in New York by John Lane–and regarded by Silvio Sirias as the first book of English verse published in the U.S.by a Latin American–Tropical Town exhibits a curious dynamic of avantgarde impulse: radically subversive in invoking counter-politics resisting U.S. colonial transnationalism, yet tending toward inherited, traditional aesthetic forms of poetry meant to legitimize (...) Selva’s Latin American identity with an impression of authority that contiguous Modernist experimental poetries could not. Through its sympathy for the U.S. immigrant’s nostalgia for homeland, coupled with express disapproval of U.S. international affairs, Tropical Town leaves a poetic record that challenges presuppositions about the integral relationships between ethos, aesthetics, and consciousness vis-à-vis assumed understandings of what constitutes radical poetry in the Modernist moment. (shrink)
This is just a brief description of the people involved and activities that occurred during a full-day pre-conference event that included a winery tour, a luncheon, apanel discussion of management systems, and a wine tasting. We completed a facility tour at Gallo’s Frei Ranch Winery that highlighted the environmental performance opportunities that exist for wine production. The rest of the day’s schedule was held at MacMurray Ranch. There was a panel that featured presentations and discussions about Gallo of (...) Sonoma’s sustainability management systems, the Benziger Family Winery’s Biodynamic vineyard practices, and the application of environmental management systems in the wine industry and other industries. (shrink)
The quantified extension of a canonical prepositional intermediate logic is complete with respect to the generalization of Kripke semantics taking into consideration set-valued functors defined on a category.
