In classical India, Jain philosophers developed a theory of viewpoints ( naya-vāda ) according to which any statement is always performed within and dependent upon a given epistemic perspective or viewpoint. The Jainas furnished this epistemology with an (epistemic) theory of disputation that takes into account the viewpoint in which the main thesis has been stated. The main aim of our paper is to delve into the Jain notion of viewpoint-contextualisation and to develop the elements of a suitable logical system (...) that should offer a reconstruction of the Jainas’ epistemic theory of disputation. A crucial step of our project is to approach the Jain theory of disputation with the help of a theory of meaning for logical constants based on argumentative practices called dialogical logic . Since in the dialogical framework the meaning of the logical constants is given by the norms or rules for their use in a debate, it provides a meaning theory closer to the Jain context-sensitive disputation theory than the main-stream formal model-theoretic semantics. (shrink)
In her book Fiction and Metaphysics (1999) Amie Thomasson, influenced by the work of Roman Ingarden, develops a phenomenological approach to fictional entities in order to explain how non-fictional entities can be referred to intrafictionally and transfictionally, for example in the context of literary interpretation. As our starting point we take Thomasson’s realist theory of literary fictional objects, according to which such objects actually exist, albeit as abstract and artifactual entities. Thomasson’s approach relies heavily on the notion of ontological dependence, (...) but its precise semantics has not yet been developed. Moreover, the modal approach to the notion of ontological dependence underlying the Artifactual Theory has recently been contested by several scholars. The main aims of this paper are (i) to develop a semantic approach to the notion of ontological dependence in the context of the Artifactual Theory of fiction, and in so doing bridge a number of philosophical and logical gaps; (ii) to generalize Thomasson’s categorial theory of ontological dependence by reconstructing ontological categories of entities purely in terms of different structures of ontological dependence, rather than in terms of the basic kinds of entities the categorical entities depend on. (shrink)
The work of Hugh MacColl (1837?1909) suffered the same fate after his death as before it:despite being vaguely alluded to and in part even commended, on the whole it has remained an unknown quantity. Even worse, those of his ideas which have played a decisive role in the history of logic have been credited to his successors; this is especially the case with the definition of strict implication and the first formal development of formal modal logic. This paper takes an (...) initial step towards a rectification of this unfortunate misrepresentation, presenting a bibliography of MacColl?s most significant publications with particular regard to their reception. (shrink)
El objetivo principal de este trabajo es plantear la controversia entre Descartes y Leibniz en torno a las verdades eternas como constituyente de diversos diálogos incluyendo los contralógicos: diálogos en los cuales Descartes y Leibniz representan perspectivas distintas en relación con las elecciones posibles para la determinación de normas de racionalidad. Cada uno de estos diálogos tiene un aspecto universal o monológico (determinado por la estrategia de ganancia), y un aspecto eminentemente contextual y dialógico determinado por el nivel de juego. (...) Finalmente, afirmo que una noción de racionalidad que contenga tanto el aspecto contextual como el universal, no es una lógica específica en forma dialógica sino un cuadro de racionalidad normativa. Lo que, según creo, está relacionado con la idea de la construcción dinámica de una lengua universal perfectible, discutida por Olga Pombo. La idea general es que la noción misma de racionalidad de Leibniz es fondateur de discursivité, si usamos la expresión que Marcelo Dascal toma de la boca de Foucault. The main aim of the present paper is to understand the debate between Descartes and Leibniz about eternal truths as providing the structure of several possible dialogues involving counter-logicals conditionals. According to this analysis the positions of Descartes and Leibniz are understood as constituting dual and dynamic perspectives in relation to the availability of some specific choices that should provide norms of rationality. Each of these dialogues has both a universal, monological aspect (given by the winning strategy) and a contextual, dialogical one (given by the play level). I conclude with the suggestion that a notion of rationality that contains both the universal and the contextual aspects does not yield a specific logic, but rather a frame of normative rationality. The conception of such a frame seems to be closely linked to the notion of a universal perfectible language discussed by Olga Pombo. The central idea is that the Leibniz's notion of rationality is a fondateur de discursivité if we use Marcelo Dascal's quote of Foucault. (shrink)
It may be tempting to think that given Nagel’s much-discussed bat argument in “What Is It Like to be a Bat?” (henceforth the Bat article), Nagel qua Nagel has conceived an argument against the very idea of physicalism. For example, Tye (1986 p. 7) argues that Nagel’s argument from the Bat-Phenomenology Analogy shows that the physicalist account of the mental phenomenon is incomplete. Churchland (1995 p. 196) conceives Nagel in a similar manner: “[from the Bat Argument] Nagel concludes that conscious (...) phenomena cannot be given a purely physical explanation”. McCullough (1988 pp. 2-3), without regret, is more direct on the issue: Nagel is against physicalism because the state of what-it-is-likeness “escapes the scientific net”. The same goes with Pereboom who argues that Thomas Nagel advances an argument that shows physicalist account of the phenomenal states are “inadequate” (1994 p. 314). The most recent article dealing with the Bat argument also makes it clear that physicalism does not feature in friendly terms in Nagel’s thinking (Nagasawa 2004). While Nagasawa claims to offer a new approach to Nagel’s Bat argument in that Aquinas’ seemingly disconnected argument about the divine omnipotence can answer Nagel’s resistance to physicalism, it is quite clear that Nagel is still being treated as an anti-physicalist. Now, of course, it’s fallacious to say that all these philosophers are alike in their takes on Nagel’s alleged anti-physicalist outlook but I hope it is uncontroversial to say here that they seem to share a common view of Nagel: On Nagel’s account of conscious mental states, physicalism is false because it fails to explain exactly what it is like to be in those states. In this essay, I wish to argue that Nagel’s treatment of physicalism as demonstrated in the Bat article is much more philosophically subtle than his detractors thought him to be. From the outset, let me begin by stating that Nagel is not characteristically a foe of physicalism as most of philosophers make him to be but Nagel in the Bat article could seem beproposing three challenges to physicalism as follows: (P1) physicalism is false, (P2) physicalism is unintelligible and (P3) physicalism remains to be made intelligible. (shrink)
L’herméneutique coranique de Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) repose sur la recherche méthodique du sens objectif du texte. Inspiré par l’herméneutique romantique, telle qu’on peut la trouver chez E. Betti et qui nécessite pour le lecteur d’établir un lien intérieur avec l’esprit de l’auteur, Rahman considère que c’est l’intention divine qui est garante de l’objectivité du sens du Coran. L’empathie avec l’auteur est rendue possible par une conception historique de la révélation, selon laquelle la parole, qui est amenée par un (...) Esprit intérieur et immatériel, passe par le filtre de la conscience prophétique. La méthode historiciste d’interprétation de Rahman, qu’il appelle herméneutique du « double mouvement », repose sur les deux critères d’objectivité que sont le contexte historique de la révélation et la prise en compte de la totalité du livre sacré. Ainsi, l’interprète doit, dans un premier temps, aller à la période de révélation pour, à partir des circonstances particulières, comprendre les finalités objectives du texte, identifiées à l’intention divine. Puis, il doit appliquer ces principes, qui sont moraux et non juridiques, au présent en s’éloignant du sens littéral. Rahman illustre son propos en essayant de montrer que le souci de l’intention divine permet de voir que le Coran s’oppose à la polygamie et à l’esclavage, qui vont contre le principe moral d’une société juste et égalitaire. (shrink)
Né le 4 février 1917 dans un village des environs de Damiette, ‘Abd al-Rahman Badai s'est éteint au Caire, où il avait étudié puis enseigné – à l'Universitél – avant de joindre l'Université d'Héliopoplis. ‘A. Badawi nous laisse une oeuvre monumentale, plus de cent-vingt livres en arabe et cinq autres en français. Mondialement connu, son impact sur l'histoire de la philosophie grecque, sur l'histoire de la philosophie islamique et sur la pensée arabe au cours de la seconde moitié du (...) XXe siècle, est immense et incontestable. Travailleur solitaire et acharné, il n'a jamais été égalé pour ses connaissances tant linguistiques que philosophiques et historiques, et surtout pour l'étendue des champs du savoir qu'il a pu couvrir. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: 1. Professor Chattopadhyaya As I Know Him -- Kireet Joshi -- 2. On DP. Chattopadhyaya's Picture of Interdisciplinary -- Rajendra Prasad -- 3. The Humanization of Transcendental Philosophy: Notes -- Towards an Understanding of DP. Chattopadhyaya -- R Sundara Rajan -- 4. Freedom-East and West: A Tribute to -- DP. Chattopadhyaya -- Fred Dallmayr -- 5. Traditional Culture and Secularism -- R Balasubramanian -- 6. Induction and Doubt -- PK Sen -- 7. The Culture of Science (...) -- Jayant V. Narlikar -- 8. An Essay on DP. Chattopadhyaya's Challenge to -- Classical Rationalism -- Ramakant Sinari -- 9. Laws, Theory and Metaphors -- AV. Afonso -- 10. Scepticism, Relativism and Absolutism -- Sibajiban Bhattacharyya -- 11. Reunderstanding Human Rights -- Ioanna Kucuradi & Bhagat:Oinam -- 12. On Relations between Science, Technology, -- Philosophy and Culture -- Evandro Agazzi -- 13. Mathematics and Culture: -- CK Raju -- 14. "Dialectical Dynamism" of DP. Chattopadhyaya -- Marietta Stepaniants -- 15. Social Processes and Creativity: Indian Context -- A. Rahman -- 16. A Constructive Critique of RG. Collingwood -- JS. Grewal -- 17. Narration and Indian Perspective -- Vidya Niwas Misra -- 18. Rethinking the Discourse of History -- Ravinder Kumar -- 19. Some Salient Features in DP. Chattopadhyaya's -- Reflections; on Aesthetics -- Kalyan Bagchi -- 20. The Past Beckons -- B. V. Subbarayappa -- 21. The Critique of Historicism -- JN. Mohanty -- 22. Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy on Culture -- GC. Pande -- 23. The Subjective and the Objective in History: -- Chattopadhyaya's Interpretation Revisited -- Bhuvan Chandel -- 24. Towards Realizing the Right to Development: -- The Elements of a Programme -- Arjun Sengupta -- 25. Time, Truth and Transcendence -- Daya Krishna -- A Short IntelllectualAutobiography ofDP. Chattopadhyaya -- Publications of DP. Chattopadhyaya -- Contributors. (shrink)