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  1. S. C. Coval (2010). A Critique of the Liberal Idea of a Person: The Contradiction Within Equalitarian Ethical Theory. Edwin Mellen Press.
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  2. S. C. Coval (1986). Law and its Presuppositions: Actions, Agents, and Rules. Routledge & K. Paul.
    I THE CONCEPT OF ACTION Among the most basic of legal concepts of concern to the practitioners of law at all levels we find those of defence, culpability, ...
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  3. S. C. Coval & J. C. Smith (1982). Rights, Goals, and Hard Cases. Law and Philosophy 1 (3):451 - 480.
    Rights have two properties which prima facie appear to be inconsistent. The first is that they are conditional in the sense that one some occasions it is always justifiable for someone to act in a way which appears to be inconsistent with someone else's rights, such as when the defence of necessity applies. The second is that rights are indefeasible in the sense that they are not subject to being defeated our outweighed by utilitarian or policy considerations. If we view (...)
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  4. S. C. Coval (1966). Scepticism and the First Person. London, Methuen.
    Originally published in 1966. This book considers the perceived asymmetries between the self and others, or between self and things. An indepth analysis of scepticism, dualism, belief, knowledge and semantics. A topic which is central to both epistemology but also the whole of contemporary philosophy.
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  5. S. C. Coval (1965). Demonstrative Without Descriptive Conventions. Philosophy 40 (154):334 - 343.
    I TRY to do the following things in this paper. I. To show briefly how one might argue for the mutual dependence of our demonstrative and descriptive conventions as they now stand. II. To suggest that this duality of convention may be a dispensable, though in some ways desirable, aspect of language and that if one of these conventions is non-essential it is our descriptive conventions. III. To show something of the philosophical implications of such a ‘non-word’ language. Perhaps not (...)
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  6. S. C. Coval (1964). Persons and Criteria in Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (3):406-409.
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  7. S. C. Coval (1964). Pronouns and Persons.
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