Online research in philosophy

I argue that the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), as an organization and through its individual members, can and should be a far greater ally in the prevention of violence against women. Specifically, I argue that we need to pay attention to obstetrical practices that inadvertently contribute to the problem of violence against women. While intimate partner violence is a complex phenomenon, I focus on the coercive control of women and adherence to oppressive gender norms. Using physician response (...) to alcohol use during pregnancy and court-ordered medical treatment as examples, I show how some obstetrical practices mirror the attitudes of abusive men insofar as they try to coercively control women's behavior through manipulation and violence. To be greater allies in the prevention of violence against women, obstetricians should stop participating in practices that inadvertently perpetuate violence against women. (shrink)

Using the moral work on trust and lying, I argue that allowing or encouraging children to believe you are their biological parent when you are not is a breach of trust in the parent-child relationship. While other approaches focus on specific harms or the rights of the child, I make a virtue theory argument based on our understanding of trust, lies, and the nature of the parent-child relationship. Drawing heavily on Nancy Potter's virtue theory of trustworthiness, I consider the nature (...) of trust in the parent-child relationship and what this means for being a trustworthy parent. (shrink)

In “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” Natalie Stoljar asks whether a procedural or a substantive approach to autonomy is best for addressing feminist concerns. In this paper, I build on Stoljar’s argument that feminists should adopt a strong substantive approach to autonomy. After briefly reviewing the problems with a purely procedural approach, I begin to articulate my own strong substantive theory by focusing specifically on the problem of internalized oppression. In the final section, I briefly address some of the concerns (...) raised by procedural theorists who are leery of a substantive approach. (shrink)

The reflection on science seems to be linked today with the concept of hypermodernity which refers to a society of excesses without any global alternative model. In this article, my aim is to show how the modernisation of our societies was connected with scientific development, and what place science may be expected to occupy in hypermodern societies—societies built around the notion of risk. After presenting the concept of hypermodernity, I propose an analysis of the inherent risks involved by the development (...) of technology in our societies, and what limits may be desirable in order to prevent an excessive or partial valorisation of a “society of knowledge,” a notion itself not without its problems. Finally, I remind of the possible contribution humanities and social sciences can make to maintain balance in what is today called a knowledge economy. (shrink)

The balance between births and deaths in an age-structured population is strongly influenced by the spatial distribution of sub-populations. Our aim was to describe the demographic process of a fish population in an hierarchical dendritic river network, by taking into account the possible movements of individuals. We tried also to quantify the effect of river network changes (damming or channelling) on the global fish population dynamics. The Salmo trutta life pattern was taken as an example for.We proposed a model which (...) includes the demographic and the migration processes, considering migration fast compared to demography. The population was divided into three age-classes and subdivided into fifteen spatial patches, thus having 45 state variables. Both processes were described by means of constant transfer coefficients, so we were dealing with a linear system of difference equations. The discrete case of the variable aggregation method allowed the study of the system through the dominant elements of a much simpler linear system with only three global variables: the total number of individuals in each age-class. (shrink)

This essay introduces the work of Andre Comte-Sponville to an English audience by explaining his ethical position. Comte-Sponville calls this position “cynicism,” and intends it as a correction of the excesses of both relativism and dogmatism. The distinction critical for understanding cynicism is that between value and truth, which are here used to explain all three: cynicism, dogmatism, and relativism.

Dans cet article, nous nous efforçons de présenter synthétiquement la philosophie d’Andre Comte-Sponville. Pour ce faire, nous nous intéressons d’abord à la distinction capitale qu’il effectue entre valeur et vérité. Refusant à la fois le dogmatisme (oú la vérité vaut) et la sophistique (oú la valeur est vraie), André Comte-Sponville prône une position cynique pour laquelle la vérité est sans valeur et les valeurs sont sans vérité. Ensuite, délaissant la théorie pour la pratique, nous évoquons une autre distinction, tout aussi (...) importante, qui oppose l’ethique et la morale. L’etude conjointe de ces deux distinctions, théorique et pratique, nous permet alors de montrer que la philosophie de Comte-Sponville ne saurait se réduire à ce que Luc Ferry appelle de la “moraline”, à savoir du moralisme médiatique, mais qu’elle exige au contraire une vertu exigeante et austère, loin des bons sentiments dont on l’affuble trop souvent en France.This article will seek to present synthetically Andre Comte-Sponville’s philosophy. It will first consider the capital distinction he establishes between value and truth. Refusing both dogmatism (where truth is valued) and sophistry (where value is truth), Andre Comte-Sponville advocates a cynical position for which truth has no value, and values are without truth. Then, moving from theory to practice, we will bring up another distinction - just as important - which opposes ethics and morals. The combined study of both these distinctions, theoretical and practical, allows to show that Comte-Sponville’s philosophy cannot be reduced to what Luc Ferry calls “moraline”, that is, media moralism, but that it requires on the contrary a demanding and austere virtue, far from the good sentiments that are too often attributed to it in France. (shrink)

Contre Regis Débray qui ne voit en Tocqueville qu’une figure emblématique de la démocratie et non un républicain, cet article cherche à réhabiliter le républicanisme tocquevillien. Cela implique d’emblée de comprendre, il est vrai, I’importance réelle accordée par Tocqueville à I’analyse de la démocratie, mais ceci non pas dans le but de l’encenser mais parce que tout indique - et même la Providence divine - qu’elle est amenée à s’imposer en Europe tout comme elle I‘a fait prioritairement aux États-Unis. Après (...) avoir étudié en détail cette analyse de la démocratie, nous montrerons que Tocqueville cherche aussi bien à en vanter les merites qu’à en relever les défauts, qu’il ne dissimule guère. Il s’agira dès lors pour lui de faire triompher I’esprit républicain sur I’esprit égalitariste, ce qui nous amènera à mettre en valeur son attachement réel aux valeurs républicaines, attachement qui, bien qu’exigeant et profond, ne pourra néanmoins transcender les bornes idéologiques de son siècle.In this paper I argue, against Regis Debray who sees in Tocqueville someone who is merely representative of democracy, that Tocqueville was indeed a true republican. This presupposes an adequate understanding of Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy; indeed democracy is important for Tocqueville not so much because it is the best regime but one which is destined to impose itself across Europeas it had already done in the United States. After examining Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy, I will show that he is as keen to point out its merits as to underscore its faults. It will be a matter for him to show the superiority of republicanism over egalitarianism. We will thus see that Tocqueville’s attachment to republican ideals is sincere even though it cannot transcend the ideological limits of his time. (shrink)

We set out a doctrine about truth for the statements of mathematics?a doctrine which we think is a worthy competitor to realist views in the philosophy of mathematics?and argue that this doctrine, which we shall call ?mathematical relativism?, withstands objections better than do other non-realist accounts.