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Stephen Darwall [84]Stephen L. Darwall [35]S. Darwall [2]
  1. Stephen Darwall (forthcoming). On Sterba's Argument From Rationality to Morality. Journal of Ethics:1-10.
    James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons (Morality as Compromise) and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, but then hold that their respective reasons always outweigh. Against this, (...)
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  2. Stephen Darwall (2014). Agreement Matters: Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. Philosophical Review 123 (1):79-105.
    Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of moral rightness (...)
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  3. Stephen Darwall (2013). Review: Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy. [REVIEW] Legal Theory 19 (1):89-99.
  4. Stephen Darwall (2013). Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics Ii. Oup Oxford.
    Stephen Darwall expands upon his argument for a second-personal framework for morality, in which morality entails mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He explores the role of the framework in relation to cultural ideas of respect and honor; the development of "modern" moral philosophy; and interpersonal relations.
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  5. Stephen Darwall (2013). Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I. Oup Oxford.
    Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy.
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  6. Stephen Darwall (2013). Morality and Principle. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. 168.
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  7. Stephen Darwall (2012). Bi-Polar Obligation. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.
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  8. Stephen Darwall (2012). Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (3):296-325.
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  9. Stephen Darwall (2012). Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2):213-238.
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  10. Stephen Darwall (2011). Authority, Accountability, and Preemption. Jurisprudence 2 (1):103-119.
    Joseph Raz's 'normal justification thesis' is that the normal way of justifying someone's claim to authority over another person is that the latter would comply better with the reasons that apply to him anyway were he to treat the former's directives as authoritative. Darwall argues that this provides 'reasons of the wrong kind' for authority. He turns then to Raz's claim that the fact that treating someone as an authority would enable one to comply better with reasons that apply to (...)
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  11. Stephen Darwall (2011). Being With. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):4–24.
    What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in (...)
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  12. Stephen Darwall (2011). Egoism and Morality. In Desmond M. Clarke & Catherine Wilson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. Oup Oxford.
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  13. Stephen Darwall (2011). Justice and Retaliation. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):315-341.
    Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mill's writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mill's view is that the ?natural? sentiment of resentment or ?vengeance? that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ?nothing moral in it,? and so must be disciplined or moralized (...)
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  14. Stephen Darwall (2011). The Development of Ethics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1):131-147.
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  15. Stephen Darwall (2010). Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second‐Personal. Ethics 120 (2):257-278.
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  16. Stephen Darwall (2010). “But It Would Be Wrong”. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):135-157.
    Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of (...)
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  17. Stephen Darwall (2010). Morality and its Critics. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
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  18. Stephen Darwall (2010). Moral Obligation: Form and Substance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):31-46.
    Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation not (...)
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  19. Stephen Darwall (2010). Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):216-228.
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  20. Stephen Darwall (2010). Review of K. E. Løgstrup (Author 1st Book), Svend Andersen (Editor 2nd Book), Kees Van Kooten Niekerk (Editor 2nd Book), Beyond the Ethical Demand (Book 1); and, Concern for the Other: Perspectives on the Ethics of K. E. Løgstrup (Book 2). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  21. Stephen Darwall (2010). Reply to Schapiro, Smith/Strabbing, and Yaffe. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):253-264.
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  22. Stephen Darwall (2010). Responsibility Within Relations. In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oup Oxford.
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  23. Stephen Darwall (2009). Authority and Second Personal Reasons for Acting. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  24. Stephen Darwall (2009). Eine Antwort auf Monika Betzler, Sebastian Rödl und Peter Schaber. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1):173-179.
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  25. Stephen Darwall (2009). The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen Darwall. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):118-138.
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  26. Stephen Darwall (2009). Why Kant Needs the Second-Person Standpoint. In Thomas E. Hill (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  27. Stephen Darwall (2008). Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter.
  28. Stephen Darwall (2007). How is Moorean Value Related to Reasons for Action? In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
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  29. Stephen Darwall (2007). Moral Obligation and Accountability. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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  30. Stephen Darwall (2007). Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson. Ethics 118 (1):52-69.
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  31. Christine M. Korsgaard, R. Jay Wallace, Gary Watson, Stephen Darwall & David Shoemaker (2007). 10. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (Pp. 176-181). In Laurie DiMauro (ed.), Ethics. Greenhaven Press.
     
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  32. S. Darwall (2006). Précis of Welfare and Rational Care. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):579 - 584.
  33. Stephen Darwall (2006). Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2):193–214.
  34. Stephen Darwall (2006). How Should Ethics Relate to (the Rest of) Philosophy? : Moore's Legacy. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 1-20.
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  35. Stephen Darwall (2006). Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 282--320.
  36. Stephen Darwall (2006). Review: Reply to Feldman, Hurka, and Rosati. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 130 (3):637 - 658.
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  37. Stephen Darwall (2006). Reply to Feldman, Hurka, and Rosati. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 130 (3):637 - 658.
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  38. Stephen Darwall (2006). Reply to Griffin, Raz, and Wolf. Utilitas 18 (4):434-444.
  39. Stephen Darwall (2006). The Foundations of Morality. In Donald Rutherford (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 221--49.
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  40. Stephen Darwall (2006). The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will. Ethics 116 (2):263-284.
    It is a commonplace that ‘autonomy’ has several different senses in contemporary moral and political discussion. The term’s original meaning was political: a right assumed by states to administer their own affairs. It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘autonomy’ came (in English) to refer also to the conduct of individuals, and even then there were, as now, different meanings.1 Odd as it may seem from our perspective, one that was in play from the beginning was Kant’s notion of (...)
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  41. Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
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  42. Stephen Darwall, George Sher, Michael Ridge, François Schroeter & Christian List (2006). 10. Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Pp. 435-440). [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (2).
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  43. Stephen Darwall (2005). Berkeley's Moral and Political Philosophy. In Kenneth Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press. 311.
  44. Stephen Darwall (2005). Virtue Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):589 – 597.
  45. Stephen Darwall (2004). Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2):43 - 59.
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  46. Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, concluding that neither the (...)
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  47. Stephen Darwall (2003). How Should Ethics Relate to (the Rest of) Philosophy? Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (s):1-20.
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  48. Stephen Darwall (2003). Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value. Ethics 113 (3):468-489.
    Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists like (...)
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  49. Stephen Darwall (2003). Review: Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436 - 443.
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