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Susan Dimock [16]S. Dimock [1]
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Profile: Susan Dimock (York University)
  1. Susan Dimock (2013). Actio Libera in Causa. Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (3):549-569.
    The actio libera in causa doctrine, as originally formulated by various Enlightenment philosophers, concerns the imputation of responsibility to actors for actions unfree in themselves, but free in their causes. Like our Enlightenment counterparts, contemporary philosophers of criminal law, as well as most Western legal systems (both common law and civil), allow that persons can be responsible for acts that are not free when performed, provided they were free in their causes. The actio libera doctrine allows us to impute unfree (...)
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  2. Susan Dimock (2013). Criminalizing Dangerousness: How to Preventively Detain Dangerous Offenders. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-24.
    I defend a form of preventive detention through the creation of an offence of ‘being a persistent violent dangerous offender’ (PVDO). This differs from alternative proposals and actual habitual offender laws that impose extra periods of incarceration on offenders after they have completed the sentence for their most recent crime(s) or as a result of a certain number of prior convictions (as in three strikes laws). I, instead, would make ‘being a persistent violent dangerous offender’ an offence itself. Persons to (...)
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  3. Susan Dimock (2013). Seeking Security. Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms Sullivan G.R. And Dennis Ian, Editors Oxford and Portland Or: Hart Publishing, 2012. Isbn 978-1-84946-166-5. [REVIEW] Dialogue:1-3.
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  4. Susan Dimock (2012). Intoxication and the Act/Control/Agency Requirement. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):341-362.
    Doug Husak has argued, persuasively I think, that there is no literal ‘act requirement’ in Anglo-American law. I begin by reviewing Husak’s reasons for rejecting the act requirement, and provide additional reasons to think he is right to do so. But Husak’s alternative, the ‘control condition’, I argue, is inadequate. The control requirement is falsified by the widespread practice of holding extremely intoxicated offenders liable for criminal conduct they engage in even if they lack control over their conduct at the (...)
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  5. Susan Dimock (2011). What Are Intoxicated Offenders Responsible For? The “Intoxication Defense” Re-Examined. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):1-20.
    I provide a brief history of the common law governing the criminal liability of intoxicated offenders, and the codification and application of the intoxication rules in Canada. I argue that the common law and its statutory application in Canada violate a number of principles of criminal justice. I then argue that the rules cannot be saved by attempts to subsume them under principles of prior fault. I end with a modest proposal for law reform.
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  6. Susan Dimock (2009). The Responsibility of Intoxicated Offenders. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3):339-368.
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  7. Susan Dimock (2008). Why All Feminists Should Be Contractarians. Dialogue 47 (02):273-.
    ABSTRACT: In this article I defend the view that all feminists should be contractarians. Indeed, I argue that feminists should be Hobbesian or rational-choice contractarians at that. The argument proceeds by critically examining some of the main reasons why feminists have been resistant or even hostile to contractarian moral theory, and showing that the criticisms are misguided against Hobbesian versions of the theory. I conclude with a brief positive argument to the effect that contractarianism provides a plausible explanation of what (...)
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  8. Susan Dimock (2008). Reasonable Women in the Law. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2):153-175.
    Standards of reasonableness are pervasive in law. Whether a belief or conduct is reasonable is determined by reference to what a ?reasonable man? similarly situated would have believed or done in similar circumstances. Feminists rightly objected that the ?reasonable man? standard was gender?biased and worked to the detriment of women. Merely replacing the ?reasonable man? with the ?reasonable person? would not be sufficient, furthermore, to right this historic wrong. Rather, in a wide range of cases, feminist theorists and legal practitioners (...)
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  9. Susan Dimock (2003). Introduction. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):301-311.
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  10. Susan Dimock (2003). Two Virtues of Contractarianism. Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):395-414.
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  11. Susan Dimock (2000). Liberal Neutrality. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2/3):189-206.
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  12. Susan Dimock & Jan Narveson (2000). Introduction. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2/3):151-166.
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  13. Susan Dimock (1999). Defending Non-Tuisms. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):251 - 273.
    Hobbes's central insight about ethics was that it should not be understood to require that we make ourselves a prey for others. It is this insight that both varieties of contractarianism [Hobbesian and Kantian] respect. Consider a relationship between two human beings that exists for reasons of either love or duty; let us also suppose that it is a relationship that can be instrumentally valuable to both parties. In order for that relationship to receive our full moral endorsement, we must (...)
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  14. Susan Dimock (1998). Against the Ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos XI). Review of Metaphysics 52 (1):177-180.
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  15. S. Dimock (1997). Retributivism and Trust. Law and Philosophy 16 (1):37-62.
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  16. Susan Dimock (1992). Calling All Knaves: Hume on Moral Motivation. Eidos 10 (2):179-197.
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  17. Susan Dimock (1992). Donald Livingston and Marie Martin, Eds., Hume as Philosopher of Society, Politics and History Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 12 (2):112-116.
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