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Sanford C. Goldberg [43]Sanford Goldberg [37]Stanley Goldberg [11]Steven Goldberg [7]
Sander M. Goldberg [6]Sandy Goldberg [5]S. C. Goldberg [5]S. Goldberg [4]

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Profile: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)
Profile: Stephen Goldberg (American River College)
Profile: Susan Goldberg (Hamilton College)
  1.  47
    Sanford Goldberg (2010). Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world.
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  2.  43
    Sanford Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part 1 he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part 2 he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics (...)
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  3. Sanford C. Goldberg (2015). Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech. Oxford University Press.
    Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He argues that this type of speech act is answerable to an epistemic, context-sensitive norm. On this basis he shows the philosophical importance of assertion for key debates in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and ethics.
     
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  4.  15
    Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Can Asserting That P Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position ? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this possibility may go some distance towards explaining several aspects of our (...)
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  5.  84
    Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
    In this paper I will be arguing that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. My argument for this result will involve making two claims. The uncontroversial claim is this: S should have known that p when another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, the satisfaction of these expectations would require that (...)
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  6.  42
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2012). Epistemic Extendedness, Testimony, and the Epistemology of Instrument-Based Belief. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.
    In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a crucial (...)
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  7.  28
    Sandy Goldberg (2011). The Division of Epistemic Labor. Episteme 8 (1):112-125.
    In this paper I formulate the thesis of the Division of Epistemic Labor as a thesis of epistemic dependence, illustrate several ways in which individual subjects are epistemically dependent on one or more of the members of their community in the process of knowledge acquisition, and draw conclusions about the cognitively distributed nature of some knowledge acquisition.
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  8.  93
    Sanford Goldberg (2005). Testimonial Knowledge Through Unsafe Testimony. Analysis 65 (288):302–311.
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  9. Sanford Goldberg (2006). Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press 127--44.
     
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  10.  58
    Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson (2006). Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
    One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony--whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...)
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  11.  6
    Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Epistemic Justification Revisited in Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  12.  66
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability1. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...)
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  13.  51
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification. Noûs 41 (2):178-203.
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  14.  81
    Sanford Goldberg (ed.) (2007). Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents eleven specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and ...
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  15.  38
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2008). Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, (...)
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  16.  50
    Sandy Goldberg (2015). Epistemic Entitlement and Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
    The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not epistemically entitled. The burden of the argument is to show that there is a plausible construal of the notions of epistemic entitlement (...)
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  17.  43
    Sanford Goldberg (2006). An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for 'Empty' Natural Kind Terms. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):147-168.
    Several authors (Boghossian 1998; Segal 2000) allege that 'empty' would-be natural kind terms are a problem for anti-individualistic semantics. In this paper I rebut the charge by providing an anti-individualistic semantics for such terms.
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  18.  61
    Andrew Pessin & Sanford Goldberg (eds.) (1996). The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's "the Meaning of `Meaning" ". M. E. Sharpe.
    This volume will acquaint novice philosophers with one of the most important debates in twentieth-century philosophy, and will provide seasoned readers with a ...
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  19. S. Goldberg (2012). A Novel (and Surprising) Argument Against Justification Internalism. Analysis 72 (2):239-243.
    A variant 'evil demon' case is used to argue against internalism about doxastic justification. The argument is not merely novel but surprising, since evil demon cases have long been used by internalists against externalist accounts of doxastic justification.
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  20.  32
    S. Goldberg (2009). The Social Virtues: Two Accounts. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (4):237-248.
    Social (epistemic) virtues are the virtues bound up with those forms of inquiry involved in social routes to knowledge. A thoroughly individualistic account of the social virtues endorses two claims: (1) we can fully characterize the nature of the social virtues independent of the social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2) even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge are those (...)
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  21.  63
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2001). Testimonially Based Knowledge From False Testimony. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):512-526.
    Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
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  22. Sanford C. Goldberg (2010). The Epistemology of Silence. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. OUP Oxford 243--261.
     
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  23.  70
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
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  24.  51
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.
    Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are.
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  25.  68
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  26.  81
    Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  27.  27
    Sanford Goldberg (2013). Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):168-186.
    The process of education, and in particular that involving very young children, often involves students' taking their teachers' word on a good many things. At the same time, good education at every level ought to inculcate, develop, and support students' ability to think for themselves. While these two features of education need not be regarded as contradictory, it is not clear how they relate to one another, nor is it clear how (when taken together) these features ought to bear on (...)
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  28.  53
    Sanford Goldberg (2007). How Lucky Can You Get? Synthese 158 (3):315-327.
    In this paper, I apply Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology to the case of knowledge through testimony. I claim that Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and reflective luck provides a nice taxonomy of testimony cases, that the taxonomic categories that emerge can be used to suggest precisely what epistemic statuses are transmissible through testimony, and that the resulting picture can make clear how testimony can actually be knowledge-generating.
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  29.  50
    S. C. Goldberg (2004). Radical Interpretation, Understanding, and the Testimonial Transmission of Knowledge. Synthese 138 (3):387 - 416.
    In this paper I argue that RadicalInterpretation (RI), taken to be a methodological doctrine regarding the conditions under which an interpretation of an utterance is both warranted and correct, has unacceptable implications for the conditions on (ascriptions of) understanding. The notion of understanding at play is that which underwrites the testimonial transmission of knowledge. After developing this notion I argue that, on the assumption of RI, hearers will fail to have such understanding in situations in which we should want to (...)
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  30.  20
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts? In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press
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  31.  30
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). (Nonstandard) Lessons From World-Switching Cases. Philosophia 32 (1-4):85-131.
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  32.  14
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2013). Anonymous Assertions. Episteme 10 (2):135-151.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...)
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  33.  10
    Sanford Goldberg (2013). Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion1. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press 167.
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  34. Sanford C. Goldberg (2009). Reliabilism in Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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  35.  61
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  36.  93
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). On Our Alleged A Priori Knowledge That Water Exists. Analysis 63 (1):38-41.
  37.  37
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2014). Interpersonal Epistemic Entitlements. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):159-183.
    In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology (...)
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  38.  20
    E. Corazza, H. Douglas, J. L. Dowell, J. Franklin, A. S. Gillies, S. C. Goldberg, D. K. Heikes, C. Liu, C. Ortiz Hill & M. W. Pelczar (2004). Cling, AD, 101. Synthese 137 (477).
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  39.  41
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2011). The Metasemantics of Memory. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):95-107.
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  40.  51
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.
    Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory (...)
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  41.  81
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self‐Ascription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-219.
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  42.  55
    Sanford Goldberg (2009). Experts, Semantic and Epistemic. Noûs 43 (4):581-598.
    In this paper I argue that the tendency to defer in matters semantic is rationalized by our reliance on the say-so of others for much of what we know about the world. The result, I contend, is a new and distinctly epistemic source of support for the doctrine of attitude anti-individualism.
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  43. Sanford Goldberg (2008). Metaphysical Realism and Thought. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):149 - 163.
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  44. Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Semantic Intentions. Analysis 60 (267):260-264.
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  45.  25
    Sanford Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51 - 79.
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  46.  27
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Testimony as Evidence. Philosophica 78.
    Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
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  47.  4
    S. C. Goldberg (2003). On Our Alleged a Priori Knowledge That Water Exists. Analysis 63 (1):38-41.
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  48.  83
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165-201.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), (...)
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  49.  84
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Knowledge of Content: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 59 (263):212-217.
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  50.  86
    Sanford Goldberg (2010). Comments on Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):138-150.
    Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony. (...)
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