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  1. Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall, Inductive Rules, Background Knowledge, and Skepticism.
    This essay defends the view that inductive reasoning involves following inductive rules against objections that inductive rules are undesirable because they ignore background knowledge and unnecessary because Bayesianism is not an inductive rule. I propose that inductive rules be understood as sets of functions from data to hypotheses that are intended as solutions to inductive problems. According to this proposal, background knowledge is important in the application of inductive rules and Bayesianism qualifies as an inductive rule. Finally, I consider a (...)
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  2. Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2011). What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.
    This article argues that a successful answer to Hume's problem of induction can be developed from a sub-genre of philosophy of science known as formal learning theory. One of the central concepts of formal learning theory is logical reliability: roughly, a method is logically reliable when it is assured of eventually settling on the truth for every sequence of data that is possible given what we know. I show that the principle of induction (PI) is necessary and sufficient for logical (...)
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  3. Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2010). A New Approach to Argument by Analogy: Extrapolation and Chain Graphs. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):1058-1069.
    In order to make scientific results relevant to practical decision making, it is often necessary to transfer a result obtained in one set of circumstances—an animal model, a computer simulation, an economic experiment—to another that may differ in relevant respects—for example, to humans, the global climate, or an auction. Such inferences, which we can call extrapolations, are a type of argument by analogy. This essay sketches a new approach to analogical inference that utilizes chain graphs, which resemble directed acyclic graphs (...)
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  4. Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2010). Naturalism and the Enlightenment Ideal : Rethinking a Central Debate in the Philosophy of Social Science. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
    The naturalism versus interpretivism debate the in philosophy of social science is traditionally framed as the question of whether social science should attempt to emulate the methods of natural science. I show that this manner of formulating the issue is problematic insofar as it presupposes an implausibly strong unity of method among the natural sciences. I propose instead that what is at stake in this debate is the feasibility and desirability of what I call the Enlightenment ideal of social science. (...)
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