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Sherrilyn Roush [21]S. Roush [3]Sherri Roush [3]Sherry Roush [2]
  1. Sherrilyn Roush, Fallibility and Authority in Science.
    Over the centuries since the modern scientific revolution that started with Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, two things have changed that have required reorientation of our assumptions and re-education of our reflexes. First, we have learned that even the very best science is fallible; eminently successful theories investigated and supported through the best methods, and by the best evidence available, might be not just incomplete but wrong. That is, it is possible to have a justified belief that is false. (...)
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  2. Sherrilyn Roush, Fallibility and Authority.
    Over the centuries since the modern scientific revolution that started with Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, two things have changed that have required reorientation of our assumptions and re-education of our reflexes. First, we have learned that even the very best science is fallible; eminently successful theories investigated and supported through the best methods, and by the best evidence available, might be not just incomplete but wrong. That is, it is possible to have a justified belief that is false.
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  3. Sherrilyn Roush, Sensitivity and Closure.
    From the mid-1980‘s to the early 2000‘s the wide-ranging resources of the concept we now call sensitivity , which Robert Nozick used to give an analysis of the concepts of knowledge and evidence , went largely unappreciated in epistemology. This was in part because these resources were upstaged by a glamorous implication the condition has for skepticism, and in part because of loss of faith in the project of giving a theory of knowledge at all, due to the failure time (...)
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  4. Sherrilyn Roush, Skepticism About Reasoning.
    Less discussed than Hume’s skepticism about what grounds there could be for projecting empirical hypotheses is his concern with a skeptical regress that he thought threatened to extinguish any belief when we reflect that our reasoning is not perfect. The root of the problem is the fact that a reflection about our reasoning is itself a piece of reasoning. If each reflection is negative and undermining, does that not give us a diminution of our original belief to nothing? (...)
     
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  5. Sherri Roush, Randomized Controlled Trials and the Flow of Information.
    Nancy is ultimately most concerned about how to determine the relevance of evidence to implementation of evidence-based policy guidelines, in other words, the transferability of study results to a population different from the one that was studied and in which procedures or conditions are not the same as those in the study. And she is concerned about the privileged position Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are given in the ranking schemes for evidence-based policy, because as she sees it RCTs do not (...)
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  6. Sherrilyn Roush, Love Science.
    The late Berkeley philosopher Paul Feyerabend took perhaps the most permissive attitude possible towards “fringe” or “marginal” science. This flowed from a more general view about how science works best in promoting both knowledge and happiness. He argued that in order to maximize the empirical testability of our theories – a goal even a falsificationist like Karl Popper should love – we must compare them not just to observations, but to other incompatible, even apparently falsified, theories. Methodologically, this is clearly (...)
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  7. Sherrilyn Roush (2013). Justification and the Growth of Error. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):527-551.
    It is widely accepted that in fallible reasoning potential error necessarily increases with every additional step, whether inferences or premises, because it grows in the same way that the probability of a lengthening conjunction shrinks. As it stands, this is disappointing but, I will argue, not out of keeping with our experience. However, consulting an expert, proof-checking, constructing gap-free proofs, and gathering more evidence for a given conclusion also add more steps, and we think these actions have the potential to (...)
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  8. Tommaso Campanella & Sherry Roush (2011). Selected Philosophical Poems of Tommaso Campanella: A Bilingual Edition. University of Chicago Press.
    For this volume, Sherry Roush has selected Campanella’s best and most idiosyncratic poems, which are masterpieces of sixteenth-century Italian lyrics, displaying a questing mind of great, if unorthodox, brilliance, and showing ...
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  9. Sherri Roush (2010). Closure On Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):243-256.
    It is received wisdom that the skeptic has a devastating line of argument in the following. You probably think, he says, that you know that you have hands. But if you knew that you had hands, then you would also know that you were not a brain in a vat, a brain suspended in fluid with electrodes feeding you perfectly coordinated impressions that are generated by a supercomputer, of a world that looks and moves just like this one. You would (...)
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  10. Sherrilyn Roush (2010). Closure On Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):243-256.
    It is received wisdom that the skeptic has a devastating line of argument in the following. You probably think, he says, that you know that you have hands. But if you knew that you had hands, then you would also know that you were not a brain in a vat, a brain suspended in fluid with electrodes feeding you perfectly coordinated impressions that are generated by a supercomputer, of a world that looks and moves just like this one. You would (...)
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  11. Sherrilyn Roush (2010). Optimism About the Pessimistic Induction. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
    How confident does the history of science allow us to be about our current well-tested scientific theories, and why? The scientific realist thinks we are well within our rights to believe our best-tested theories, or some aspects of them, are approximately true.2 Ambitious arguments have been made to this effect, such as that over historical time our scientific theories are converging to the truth, that the retention of concepts and claims is evidence for this, and that there can be no (...)
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  12. Sherrilyn Roush (2010). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Survival. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):255-278.
    Abstract: Knowledge requires more than mere true belief, and we also tend to think it is more valuable. I explain the added value that knowledge contributes if its extra ingredient beyond true belief is tracking . I show that the tracking conditions are the unique conditions on knowledge that achieve for those who fulfill them a strict Nash Equilibrium and an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in what I call the True Belief Game. The added value of these properties, intuitively, includes preparedness (...)
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  13. Sherrilyn Roush (2009). Précis of Tracking Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):213-222.
    In Tracking Truth I undertook a broader project than is typical today toward questions about knowledge, evidence, and scientific realism. The range of knowledge phenomena is much wider than the kind of homely examples—such as ‘‘She has a bee in her bonnet’’—that are often the fare in discussions of knowledge. Scientists have knowledge gained in sophisticated and deliberate ways, and non-human animals have reflexive and rudimentary epistemic achievements that we can easily slip into calling ‘‘knowledge.’’ What is it about knowledge (...)
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  14. Sherrilyn Roush (2009). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):240-247.
    Reply to Goldman I would like to thank Alvin for a spirited, and gentlemanly, debate we’ve had on these issues, which is extended further here. Alvin is exactly right that if we make his assumption about maximum specificity and deduceability (which I have doubts about), then on my view of knowledge Sphere Guy doesn’t know there’s a sphere in front of him. This may sound silly when we focus on his tactile access to the sphere in the actual world, but (...)
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  15. Sherrilyn Roush (2009). Randomized Controlled Trials and the Flow of Information: Comment on Cartwright. Philosophical Studies 143 (1):137--145.
    The transferability problem—whether the results of an experiment will transfer to a treatment population—affects not only Randomized Controlled Trials but any type of study. The problem for any given type of study can also, potentially, be addressed to some degree through many different types of study. The transferability problem for a given RCT can be investigated further through another RCT, but the variables to use in the further experiment must be discovered. This suggests we could do better on the epistemological (...)
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  16. Sherrilyn Roush (2009). Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual. Episteme 6 (3):251-268.
    I develop a general framework with a rationality constraint that shows how coherently to represent and deal with second-order information about one's own judgmental reliability. It is a rejection of and generalization away from the typical Bayesian requirements of unconditional judgmental self-respect and perfect knowledge of one's own beliefs, and is defended by appeal to the Principal Principle. This yields consequences about maintaining unity of the self, about symmetries and asymmetries between the first- and third-person, and a principled way of (...)
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  17. Sherry Roush (2009). Catherine E. Léglu and Stephen J. Milner, Eds., The Erotics of Consolation: Desire and Distance in the Late Middle Ages. (The New Middle Ages.) New York and Basingstoke, Eng.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Pp. Viii, 241; Black-and-White Figures. $79.95. [REVIEW] Speculum 84 (3):746-747.
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  18. Sherrilyn Roush (2007). Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. Oxford University Press.
    Sherrilyn Roush defends a new theory of knowledge and evidence, based on the idea of "tracking" the truth, as the best approach to a wide range of questions about knowledge-related phenomena. The theory explains, for example, why scepticism is frustrating, why knowledge is power, and why better evidence makes you more likely to have knowledge. Tracking Truth provides a unification of the concepts of knowledge and evidence, and argues against traditional epistemological realist and anti-realist positions about scientific theories and for (...)
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  19. Sherrilyn Roush (2005). Testability and Candor. Synthese 145 (2):233 - 275.
    On analogy with testimony, I define a notion of a scientific theory’s lacking or having candor, in a testing situation, according to whether the theory under test is probabilistically relevant to the processes in the test procedures, and thereby to the reliability of test outcomes. I argue that this property identifies what is distinctive about those theories that Karl Popper denounced as exhibiting “reinforced dogmatism” through their self-protective behavior (e.g., psychoanalysis, Hegelianism, Marxism). I explore whether lack of candor interferes with (...)
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  20. Sherrilyn Roush, Peter Achinstein & Positive Relevance Defended (2005). Positive Relevance: A Defense and a Challenge. In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  21. W. Goldfarb & Sherrilyn Roush (2004). REVIEWS-Deductive Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):570-572.
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  22. Sherrilyn Roush (2004). Deductive Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):570-573.
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  23. Sherrilyn Roush (2004). Discussion Note: Positive Relevance Defended. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):110-116.
    This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is redundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left without motivation for his account of evidence, which uses (...)
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  24. Sherrilyn Roush (2004). Testability and the Unity of Science. Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):555 - 573.
  25. S. Roush (2003). Copernicus, Kant, and the Anthropic Cosmological Principles. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (1):5-35.
    In the last three decades several cosmological principles and styles of reasoning termed 'anthropic' have been introduced into physics research and popular accounts of the universe and human beings' place in it. I discuss the circumstances of 'fine tuning' that have motivated this development, and what is common among the principles. I examine the two primary principles, and find a sharp difference between these 'Weak' and 'Strong' varieties: contrary to the view of the progenitors that all anthropic principles represent a (...)
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  26. Bradley Monton & Sherri Roush, Gott's Doomsday Argument.
    Physicist J. Richard Gott uses the Copernican principle that “we are not special” to make predictions about the future lifetime of the human race, based on how long the human race has been in existence so far. We show that the predictions which can be derived from Gott’s argument are less strong than one might be inclined to believe, that Gott’s argument illegitimately assumes that the human race will not last forever, that certain versions of Gott’s argument are incompatible with (...)
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  27. S. Roush (2001). The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science. Philosophical Review 110 (1):85-87.
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  28. S. Roush (1998). Alternate Possibilities and Their Entertainment. Philosophy 73 (4):559-571.
    In this paper it is argued that Frankfurt's and Strawson's defenses of compatibilism are insufficient due to neglected features of the role of alternate possibilities in assigning moral responsibility. An attempt is made to locate more adequately the genuine source of tension between free will and determinism, in a crowding phenomenon in the view of an action which our concept of responsibility has not grown up coping with. Finally, an argument is made that due to the nature of belief we (...)
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