In this paper the author seeks to shed light on the political and philosophical context of the second half of 20th century in which he intellectually came of age. In his intellectual and political development the author distinguishes three main phases. He characterizes the first phase of his development as Praxis, revisionist, dissident Marxism and reformist communism. The second phase was post-Marxism and post-communism, while in the last decade of the 20th century the author defines his theoretical views as non-Marxist. (...) The author defines his latest philosophical-political standpoint as social democratic which, after his own self-understanding, comes closest to West European social democracy.. Autor u ovom radu pokusava da osvetli politicki i filozofski kontekst druge polovine XX veka u kome je intelektualno delovao i sazrevao. U svom intelektualnom i politickom razvitku on razmatra tri glavne faze. Prvu fazu svog razvitka autor karakterise kao praksisticki, revizionisticki, disidentski marksizam i reformisticki komunizam. Drugu fazu predstavlja postmarksizam i postkomunizam, a u poslednjoj deceniji XX veka autor svoje teorijsko stanoviste odredjuje kao nemarksisticko. Svoje najnovije filozofsko-politicko stanoviste autor smatra socijal-eko-demokratskim koje je po njegovom vlastitom samorazumevanju najblize zapadnoevropskoj socijaldemokratiji. (shrink)

U prvom, nacelnom delu, autor polazi od toga da jedna mala zemlja, kao sto je nasa, ne moze realisticki ocekivati jednakost, pa cak ni punu ravnopravnost u odnosima sa SAD kao planetarno dominantnom silom. Zato se, prema njemu prema SAD moramo odnositi pragmaticno. To za njega ne znaci da nema nikakvih sansi da sa uspehom otvoreno i odlucno postavimo pitanje i nasih nacionalno-drzavnih interesa i prava kad nastojimo da ih sto vise uskladimo sa interesima i pravima te najmerodavnije i najsilodavnije (...) zemlje. Ekstremni pragmaticari kod nas potcenjuju opasnost principijelisticke reakcije dobrog dela naroda ako snishodljivo preteruju sa popustanjem i prilagodjavanjem. Za nas je najrelevantniji slucaj i najbolji primer za ugled Grcka. U nasim odnosima sa SAD, prema autoru, cesto dolazi do nesporazuma izmedju ostalog i zbog sustinskih razlika u shvatanjima nacije i religije kao i njihovog odnosa sa drzavom. Tim razlikama i nesporazumima posvecena su dva preostala dela ovog teksta. (shrink)

This article argues the main following points. (1) Communism was fatefully dependent upon the action or inaction of its top leaders because of the vulnerability of the hyper-centralized power and hyper-centralized defense of the ruling class and the ruling party. No one was really able to seriously predict the historical contingencies such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin that played a decisive role. The most that social scientists and analysts could safely claim was that communism had become unsuccessful and problematical to such (...) an extent that force alone could maintain it. However, given the overall history of communism, who could have anticipated that such force would not be used. (2) The United States is toiling now in an overwhelmingly difficult and dangerous transition, not only from a ‘superpower’ to ‘merely’ a big power, but from a totalistic and laissez-faire capitalism to a limited and state-regulated capitalism. It is the most efficacious way of production and primary distribution. However, unless capitalism, national and global, becomes regulated and combined with some kind of socialism (solidarism) that is yet to be established, global crises will keep recurring. The best chance for enlightened socialist (solidaristic) humanism lies in secondary distribution based on equality and justice as its fundamental principles. (3) The very term ‘superpower’ suggests a kind of superhuman, almost divine power. The United States does not have such power because (among other things) apocalyptic weapons are at the disposal of some considerably weaker states (in every other respect). (4) The possibility of the self-destruction of humankind has become the over-determination of all other over-determinations in history. It follows that auto-apocalypse must be separated from the categorical and epochal dichotomy between modernity/ modernism and postmodernity/postmodernism and given an absolute priority, both theoretical and practical. This break should be characterized as post-postmodernity and reflection upon it as post-postmodernism. We are in vital need of a total anti-apocalyptic turnaround in overall thought, sensitivity, activity and organization. Unfortunately, it can now safely be predicted that more and more states and societies, even those founded on (internal) freedoms and desirous to maintain them, will become transformed into states and societies focused on the struggle for survival in the face of auto-apocalyptic threats. I believe that confronted more and more with such threats liberalism will actually, and later probably also explicitly, yield the place of the fundamental operative (unlike declarative) view of the world, ideology, imagology, and principle of social organization — to humankind existentialism. We have entered an existentialist ‘end of history’ instead of the proclaimed liberalistic ‘end of history’. (shrink)

As the military dictatorship was being imposed on Poland, Enrico Berlinguer declared: “The model set in motion by the October revolution has run out of steam.” I would add: “The Yugoslav model of that archetype (otherwise progressive and meaningful), symbolized by Stalin's break with Tito in 1948 even though it actually began with Tito's break with Stalin a year or two later, ran out of steam in terms of its ability to generate innovation among the people and to motivate and (...) mobilize them as early as the end of the 1960s.” Ever since then, the Yugoslav system has been caught in a vicious circle. (shrink)