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  1. Sanford C. Goldberg (2013). Anonymous Assertions. Episteme 10 (2):135-151.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...)
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  2. Sanford C. Goldberg (2013). Inclusiveness in the Face of Anticipated Disagreement. Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.
    This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic (...)
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  3. Sanford C. Goldberg (2012). Epistemic Extendedness, Testimony, and the Epistemology of Instrument-Based Belief. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.
    In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a crucial (...)
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  4. Sanford C. Goldberg (2010). The Epistemology of Silence. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oup Oxford. 243--261.
     
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  5. Sanford C. Goldberg (2009). Reliabilism in Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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  6. Sanford C. Goldberg (2008). Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, (...)
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  7. Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification. Nos 41 (2):178�203.
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  8. Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Semantic Externalism and Epistemic Illusions. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 235--252.
     
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  9. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301�314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...)
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  10. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Testimony as Evidence. Philosophica 78.
    Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
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  11. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):118-138.
    Many people agree that a proper epistemological treatment of testimonial knowledge will regard testimonial warrant—the total truth-conducive support enjoyed by a belief grounded on a piece of testimony —as socially diffuse, in the sense that it is not something that supervenes on the proper functionality of the hearer’s cognitive resources together with the reasons she has for accepting the testimony. After arguing for such a view, I go on to identify a challenge many people think flows from an acknowledgment of (...)
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  12. Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). (Nonstandard) Lessons From World-Switching Cases. Philosophia 32 (1-4):85-131.
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  13. Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.
    Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory (...)
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  14. Sanford C. Goldberg (2004). Review of Maria Frapolli (Ed.), Esther Romero (Ed.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (1).
  15. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  16. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). On Our Alleged A Priori Knowledge That Water Exists. Analysis 63 (1):38-41.
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  17. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts? In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
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  18. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
    In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
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  19. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.
    Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are.
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  20. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Mentalistic Explanation and Mental Causation. Manuscrito 25 (3):199-216.
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  21. Sanford C. Goldberg (2001). Testimonially Based Knowledge From False Testimony. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):512-526.
    Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
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  22. Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Department of Philosophy 1427 Paterson Office Tower University of Kentucky Lexington, KY 40506-0027. Communication and Cognition 33 (3/4):249-286.
     
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  23. Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  24. Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). The Semantics of Interlocution. Communication and Cognition. Monographies 33 (3-4):249-286.
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  25. Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Semantic Intentions. Analysis 60 (267):260-264.
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  26. Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165-201.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), (...)
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  27. Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999).
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  28. Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Knowledge of Content: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 59 (263):212-217.
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  29. Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self‐Ascription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-219.
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  30. Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception. Minds and Machines 7 (4):515-529.
    Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some (...)
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