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Search results for 'SCIENTIFIC COGNITIVISM' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jason Boaz Simus (2008). Aesthetic Implications of the New Paradigm in Ecology. Journal of Aesthetic Education 42 (1):63-79.score: 90.0
    Here I explore the aesthetic implications of this new paradigm, the central implication being that scientific cognitivism, when combined with the new paradigm in ecology, may require updating the qualities associated with positive aesthetics. After reviewing Allen Carlson's defense of both scientific cognitivism and the positive aesthetics thesis, I show how the significantly different conceptual framework that the new paradigm in ecology provides will require equally significant adjustments to how we aesthetically appreciate nature. I make two (...)
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  2. John Pickering (1995). Buddhism and Cognitivism: A Postmodern Appraisal. Asian Philosophy 5 (1):23 – 38.score: 42.0
    Abstract Cognitivism, presently the major paradigm of psychology, presents a scientific account of mental life. Buddhism also presents an account of mental life, but one which is integral with its wider ethical and transcendental concerns. The postmodern appraisal of science provides a framework within which these two accounts may be compared without inheriting many of the assumed oppositions between science and religion. It is concluded that cognitivism and Buddhism will have complementary roles in the development of a (...)
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  3. Mario Alai (2004). A.I., Scientific Discovery and Realism. Minds and Machines 14 (1):21-42.score: 42.0
    Epistemologists have debated at length whether scientific discovery is a rational and logical process. If it is, according to the Artificial Intelligence hypothesis, it should be possible to write computer programs able to discover laws or theories; and if such programs were written, this would definitely prove the existence of a logic of discovery. Attempts in this direction, however, have been unsuccessful: the programs written by Simon's group, indeed, infer famous laws of physics and chemistry; but having found no (...)
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  4. Paul D. Thorn (2013). Cognitivist Probabilism. In Vit Punochar & Petr Svarny (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2012. College Publications. 201-213.score: 42.0
    In this article, I introduce the term “cognitivism” as a name for the thesis that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs about truth-valued propositions. The thesis (of cognitivism) that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs is equivocal, inasmuch as different sorts of equivalence may be postulated between degrees of belief and full beliefs. The simplest sort of equivalence (and the sort of equivalence that I discuss here) identifies having a given degree of belief with (...)
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  5. John Haugeland (1978). The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.score: 42.0
    Cognitivism in psychology and philosophy is roughly the position that intelligent behavior can (only) be explained by appeal to internal that is, rational thought in a very broad sense. Sections 1 to 5 attempt to explicate in detail the nature of the scientific enterprise that this intuition has inspired. That enterprise is distinctive in at least three ways: It relies on a style of explanation which is different from that of mathematical physics, in such a way that it (...)
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  6. Joseph Rouse (1998). New Philosophies of Science in North America — Twenty Years Later. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29 (1):71-122.score: 36.0
    This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice (...)
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  7. John Stewart (2001). Radical Constructivism in Biology and Cognitive Science. Foundations of Science 6 (1-3):99-124.score: 36.0
    This article addresses the issue of objectivism vs constructivism in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the objectivism vs constructivism issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is closely (...)
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  8. Christopher Winch (1998). The Philosophy of Human Learning. Routledge.score: 30.0
    Christopher Winch launches a vigorous Wittgensteinian attack on both the "romantic" Rousseauian and the "scientific" cognitivist traditions in learning theory. These two schools, he argues, are more closely related than is commonly realized.
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  9. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2008). The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophia 36 (4):509-529.score: 30.0
    It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach (...)
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  10. Glenn Parsons (2002). Nature Appreciation, Science, and Positive Aesthetics. British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (3):279-295.score: 30.0
    Scientific cognitivism is the idea that nature must be aesthetically appreciated in light of scientific information about it. I defend Carlson's traditional formulation of scientific cognitivism from some recent criticisms. However, I also argue that if we employ this formulation it is difficult to uphold two claims that Carlson makes about scientific cognitivism: (i) it is the correct analysis of the notion of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, and (ii) it justifies the idea (...)
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  11. Allen Carlson (2007). The Requirements for An Adequate Aesthetics of Nature. Environmental Philosophy 4 (1/2):1-13.score: 30.0
    This essay presents a methodological framework for assessing the adequacy of philosophical accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature. The framework involves five requirements, each of which is labeled after a philosopher who has defended it. They are called Ziff's Anything Viewed Doctrine, Budd's As Nature Constraint, Berleant's Unified Aesthetics Requirement, Hepburn's Serious Beauty Intuition, and Thompson's Objectivity Desideratum. The conclusion of the essay is that most contemporary treatments of the aesthetics of nature fail to comply with one or more (...)
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  12. S. Shapshay (2013). Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the Neglect of the Sublime. British Journal of Aesthetics 53 (2):181-198.score: 30.0
    Discussion of sublime response to natural environments is largely absent from contemporary environmental aesthetics. This is due to the fact that the sublime seems inextricably linked to extravagant metaphysical ideas. In this paper, I seek to rehabilitate a conception of sublime response that is secular, metaphysically modest and compatible with the most influential theory of environmental aesthetics, Allen Carlson’s scientific cognitivism. First, I offer some grounds for seeing the environmental sublime as a distinctive and meaningful category of contemporary (...)
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  13. Allen Carlson (2010). Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the Requirements of Environmentalism. Environmental Values 19 (3):289 - 314.score: 30.0
    Since aesthetic experience is vital for the protection of nature, I address the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmentalism. I first review two traditional positions, the picturesque approach and formalism. Some environmentalists fault the modes of aesthetic appreciation associated with these views, charging they are anthropocentric, scenery-obsessed, superficial, subjective, and/or morally vacuous. In light of these apparent failings of traditional aesthetics of nature, I suggest five requirements of environmentalism: that aesthetic appreciation of nature should be acentric, environment-focused, serious, objective and (...)
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  14. Jason Simus (2008). Aesthetic Implications of the New Paradigm in Ecology. Journal of Aesthetic Education 42 (1):63-79.score: 30.0
    Here I explore the aesthetic implications of this new paradigm, the central implication being that scientific cognitivism, when combined with the new paradigm in ecology, may require updating the qualities associated with positive aesthetics. After reviewing Allen Carlson's defense of both scientific cognitivism and the positive aesthetics thesis, I show how the significantly different conceptual framework that the new paradigm in ecology provides will require equally significant adjustments to how we aesthetically appreciate nature. I make two (...)
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  15. John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Paul G. Keil & Amanda J. Barnier (2010). The Psychology of Memory, Extended Cognition, and Socially Distributed Remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):521-560.score: 24.0
    This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, (...)
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  16. Timothy Schroeder, Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2010). Moral Motivation. In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of motivation itself, and use that discussion to sketch four possible theories of distinctively moral motivation: caricature versions of familiar instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist theories about morally worthy motivation. To test these theories, we turn to a wealth of scientific, particularly neuroscientific, evidence. Our conclusions are that (1) although the scientific evidence does not at present mandate a unique philosophical conclusion, it does present formidable obstacles to a number of (...)
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  17. Thomas Mormann (2007). Carnap's Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):127 - 146.score: 24.0
    Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally (...)
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  18. Thomas Mormann (2006). Carnap's Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism. Journal of General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):127 - 146.score: 24.0
    Abstract. Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were con-sidered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values were banished to the realm of meaning-less me-taphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive (...)
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  19. William R. Uttal (2004). Dualism: The Original Sin of Cognitivism. L. Erlbaum Associates.score: 24.0
    Directed to scholars and senior-level graduate students, this book is an iconoclastic survey of the history of dualism and its impact on contemporary cognitive psychology. It argues that much of modern cognitive or mentalist psychology is built upon a cryptodualism--the idea that the mind and brain can be thought of as independent entities. This dualism pervades so much of society that it covertly influences many aspects of modern science, particularly psychology. To support the argument, the history of dualism is extended (...)
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  20. Danilo Zolo (1990). Reflexive Epistemology and Social Complexity: The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):149-169.score: 24.0
    According to the article, Neurath's reflexive epistemology—expressed by the metaphor of the ship in need of reconstruction on the open sea—represents a philosophical alternative to the classical and contemporary forms of scientific realism and ethical cognitivism, including Popper's falsificationism. Against Quine's reductive interpretation of Neurath's boat argument as the basis for a 'naturalized epistemology,' the article maintains that the metaphor suggests the idea of an insuperable situation of linguistic and conceptual circularity. This prevents any attempt at self-foundation in (...)
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  21. John F. Post (2006). Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing From Below. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):1–27.score: 24.0
    David Papineau’s model of scientific reduction, contrary to his intent, appears to enable a naturalist realist account of the primitive normativity involved in a biological adaptation’s being “for” this or that (say the eye’s being for seeing). By disabling the crucial anti-naturalist arguments against any such reduction, his model would support a cognitivist semantics for normative claims like “The heart is for pumping blood, and defective if it doesn’t.” No moral claim would follow, certainly. Nonetheless, by thus “pressing from (...)
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  22. John Bolender (1998). Real Algorithms: A Defense of Cognitivism. Philosophical Inquiry 20 (3-4):41-58.score: 24.0
    John Searle dismisses the attempt to understand thought as a form of computation, on the grounds that it is not scientific. Science is concerned with intrinsic properties, i.e. those features which are not observer relative, e.g. science is concerned with mass but not with beauty. Computation, according to Searle, presupposes the property of following an algorithm, but algorithmicity is normative, by reason of appealing to function, and hence not intrinsic. I argue that Searle's critique presupposes the folk notion of (...)
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  23. Thomas Aastrup Rømer (2012). Imagination and Judgment in John Dewey's Philosophy: Intelligent Transactions in a Democratic Context. Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (2):133-150.score: 24.0
    In this essay, I attempt to interpret the educational philosophy of John Dewey in a way that accomplishes two goals. The first of these is to avoid any reference to Dewey as a propagator of a particular scientific method or to any of the individualist and cognitivist ideas that is sometimes associated with him. Secondly, I want to overcome the tendency to interpret Dewey as a naturalist by looking at his concept of intelligence. It is argued that ‘intelligent experience’ (...)
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  24. John Bickle (1995). Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.score: 24.0
    The need for representations and computations over their contents in psychological explanations is often cited as both the mark of the genuinely cognitive and a source of skepticism about the reducibility of cognitive theories to neuroscience. A generic version of this anti-reductionist argument is rejected in this paper as unsound, since (i) current thinking about associative learning emphasizes the need for cognitivist resources in theories adequate to explain even the simplest form of this phenomena (Pavlovian conditioning), and yet (ii) the (...)
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  25. Michele Merritt (2013). Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.score: 24.0
    Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë (2009), has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts (...)
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  26. Malcolm Parker (2013). Overstating Values: Medical Facts, Diverse Values, Bioethics and Values-Based Medicine. Bioethics 27 (2):97-104.score: 24.0
    Fulford has argued that (1) the medical concepts illness, disease and dysfunction are inescapably evaluative terms, (2) illness is conceptually prior to disease, and (3) a model conforming to (2) has greater explanatory power and practical utility than the conventional value-free medical model. This ‘reverse’ model employs Hare's distinction between description and evaluation, and the sliding relationship between descriptive and evaluative meaning. Fulford's derivative ‘Values Based Medicine’ (VBM) readjusts the imbalance between the predominance of facts over values in medicine. VBM (...)
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  27. K. McGee (2005). Enactive Cognitive Science. Part 1: History and Research Themes. Constructivist Foundations 1 (1):19--34.score: 24.0
    Purpose: This paper is a brief introduction to enactive cognitive science: a description of some of the main research concerns; some examples of how such concerns have been realized in actual research; some of its research methods and proposed explanatory mechanisms and models; some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science; and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Enactive cognitive science is an approach to the study of mind that seeks to explain how the structures (...)
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  28. Lenny Moss (1995). Genes and Generalizations: Darden's Strategies and the Question of Context. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 10 (4):483-488.score: 24.0
    In her recent book Lindley Darden has endeavored to reclaim for philosophy an active role in the elaboration of good science. She has done this, not by holding up some set of rational standards derived from outside of scientific practice, but rather by delving into the history of science and coming out with a set of scientific strategies. Unconcerned about whether any particular strategy wasin fact employed in a given historical case her project depends upon two claims, first (...)
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  29. Paulo Abrantes (2010). Kuhn e a noção de exemplar. Principia 2 (1):61-102.score: 24.0
    In thts paper I argue that Kuhn's analysis of the role played by `exemplars' in normal science should be considered one of his most important contributions to the Philosophy of Science. The paper makes a detailed analysis of the relationship between the various elements of a 'disciplinary matrix´— empirical generalizations, models and exemplars — starting with Kuhn's views as exposed in various of his books and papers. Kuhn's analysis is investigated in the context of the discussions, in the 50s and (...)
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  30. Paulo Abrantes (2007). Models and the Dynamics of Theories. Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 9 (2).score: 24.0
    : This paper gives a historical overview of the ways various trends in the philosophy of science dealt with models and their relationship with the topics of heuristics and theoretical dynamics. First of all, N. Campbell’s account of analogies as components of scientific theories is presented. Next, the notion of ‘model’ in the reconstruction of the structure of scientific theories proposed by logical empiricists is examined. This overview finishes with M. Hesse’s attempts to develop Campbell’s early ideas in (...)
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  31. T. C. Meyering (1996). Philosophical Psychology in Historical Perspective: Review Essay of J.-C. Smith (Ed.), Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):381 – 390.score: 24.0
    Historiography of science faces a preliminary question of strategy. A continuist conception of the history of science poses research problems different from those of a dynamic conception, which acknowledges that not only our theoretical knowledge but also the explananda themselves may change under the influence of new scientific insights. Whereas continuist historiography may advance our understanding of (the historical background of) current theoretical problems, dynamic historiography may also make a creative contribution to the progress of present-day research. This f (...)
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  32. Daniel H. Weiss (2013). Embodied Cognition in Classical Rabbinic Literature. Zygon 48 (3):788-807.score: 24.0
    Challenging earlier cognitivist approaches, recent theories of embodied cognition argue that the human mind and its functions are best understood as intimately bound up with the human body and its physiological dimensions. Some scholars have suggested that such theories, in departing from some core assumptions of the Western philosophical tradition, display significant similarities to certain non-Western traditions of thought, such as Buddhism. This essay extends such parallels to the Jewish tradition and argues that, in particular, classical rabbinic thought presents a (...)
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  33. Noah J. Efron & Menachem Fisch (1991). Science Naturalized, Science Denatured: An Evaluation of Ronald Giere's Cognitivist Approach to Explaining Science. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 13 (2):187 - 221.score: 24.0
    Ronald Giere and others aspire to 'naturalize science' by examining scientific activity as they would any other natural phenomenon — scientifically. Giere aims to fashion a theory of science that is naturalistic, realistic, and evolutionary, and to thus carve for himself a niche between foundationalist philosophies of science (positing abstract criteria of rationality) on the one hand, and relativist sociologies of science on the other. Giere's approach is appealing because it allows that science is a human endeavor pursued by (...)
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  34. Avrum Stroll (1989). Wittgenstein's Nose. In Brian McGuinness & Rudolf Haller (eds.), Wittgenstein in Focus--Im Brennpunkt: Wittgenstein. Rodopi. 395-413.score: 24.0
    J.J. Gibson claims that one who is looking at Niagara Falls is seeing it directly, whereas one who is looking at a picture of Niagara Falls is seeing it indirectly or mediately. Gibson's cognitivist critics claim that all perception is mediated and that "external objects" are never seen directly. Each side takes the debate to be a scientific issue. But following Wittgenstein's "nose" for detecting philosophical intrusions into what do not appear to be philosophical debates, the author shows how (...)
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  35. Brad Allenby (2005). Technology at the Global Scale: Integrative Cognitivism and Earth Systems Engineering Management. In M. Gorman, R. Tweney, D. Gooding & A. Kincannon (eds.), Scientific and Technological Thinking. Erlbaum. 303--344.score: 24.0
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  36. H. G. Callaway (1993). Open Transcendentalism and the Normative Character of Methodology. Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:1-24.score: 24.0
    After setting out some basic elements in Henri Lauener's open transcendentalism, in comparison with related views in Quine and Davidson, the two views surveyed converge on a moderately holistic, normative cognitivism in Lauener's philosophy of science. Though resisting similar conclusions in the name of anti-naturalism, Lauener's "open transcendentalism" is plausibly constmed as a non-reductive naturalism, with important implications for the normative determination of meanings. At the last Lauener's criticism is yet to come to terms with central questions of the (...)
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  37. Leszek Nowak (1993). O płynności teorii naukowej. Na marginesie książki Andrzeja Klawitera „Postawa badawcza i struktura wyboru teoretycznego”. Filozofia Nauki 4.score: 24.0
    The author, starting from the critical review of Andrzej Klawiter's book (in Polish) „Research attitude and the structure of theoretical choice”, comes to consider questions concerning the opposition act/product in science and the problem of scientific interpretation. The considerations give him an occasion to formulate some rules of canonical scientific text formation (i.e. rules of cognitivism, clarity, contradiction, logical consistency, completness and consistency of interpretation).
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  38. Monika Walczak (2004). Wartościujący wymiar kategorii racjonalności nauki. Roczniki Filozoficzne 52 (2):347-365.score: 24.0
    The paper is an attempt to reflect on the valuing dimension of the category of the rationality of science, ontological and epistemological problems. Such problems should be solved should rationality be deemed a valuing category. Taking into consideration the discussions on the valuing character of the categories in ethics (good, evil) and the significance of moral judgements as the point of departure, I am posing a question about the importance of expressions with regard to the rationality of science, expressions treated (...)
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  39. James Franklin (2000). Diagrammatic Reasoning and Modelling in the Imagination: The Secret Weapons of the Scientific Revolution. In Guy Freeland & Anthony Corones (eds.), 1543 and All That: Image and Word, Change and Continuity in the Proto-Scientific Revolution. Kluwer.score: 21.0
    Just before the Scientific Revolution, there was a "Mathematical Revolution", heavily based on geometrical and machine diagrams. The "faculty of imagination" (now called scientific visualization) was developed to allow 3D understanding of planetary motion, human anatomy and the workings of machines. 1543 saw the publication of the heavily geometrical work of Copernicus and Vesalius, as well as the first Italian translation of Euclid.
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  40. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):61-79.score: 18.0
    In this three-part paper, my concern is to expound and defend a conception of science, close to Einstein's, which I call aim-oriented empiricism. I argue that aim-oriented empiricsim has the following virtues. (i) It solve the problem of induction; (ii) it provides decisive reasons for rejecting van Fraassen's brilliantly defended but intuitively implausible constructive empiricism; (iii) it solves the problem of verisimilitude, the problem of explicating what it can mean to speak of scientific progress given that science advances from (...)
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  41. Michael Devitt (2011). Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):285-293.score: 18.0
    Stanford, in Exceeding Our Grasp , presents a powerful version of the pessimistic meta-induction. He claims that theories typically have empirically inequivalent but nonetheless well-confirmed, serious alternatives which are unconceived. This claim should be uncontroversial. But it alone is no threat to scientific realism. The threat comes from Stanford’s further crucial claim, supported by historical examples, that a theory’s unconceived alternatives are “radically distinct” from it; there is no “continuity”. A standard realist reply to the meta-induction is that past (...)
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  42. James Ladyman (2011). Structural Realism Versus Standard Scientific Realism: The Case of Phlogiston and Dephlogisticated Air. Synthese 180 (2):87 - 101.score: 18.0
    The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the (...)
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  43. Mahesh Ananth (2010). The Scientific Study of Consciousness: Searle’s Radical Request. Psyche 16 (2):59-89.score: 18.0
    John Searle offers what he thinks to be a reasonable scientific approach to the understanding of consciousness. I argue that Searle is demanding nothing less than a Kuhnian-type revolution with respect to how scientists should study consciousness given his rejection of the subject-object distinction and affirmation of mental causation. As part of my analysis, I reveal that Searle embraces a version of emergentism that is in tension, not only with his own account, but also with some of the theoretical (...)
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  44. Hans Halvorson (2012). What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.score: 18.0
    According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view -- if taken seriously as a formal explication -- leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are truly distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are truly equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view -- as currently formulated -- threatens (...)
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  45. Jamin Asay (2013). Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.score: 18.0
    This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen’s account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine’s account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, (...)
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  46. Gabriele Contessa (2010). Scientific Models and Fictional Objects. Synthese 172 (2):215 - 229.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I distinguish scientific models in three kinds on the basis of their ontological status—material models, mathematical models and fictional models, and develop and defend an account of fictional models as fictional objects—i.e. abstract objects that stand for possible concrete objects.
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  47. Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.score: 18.0
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus . But (...)
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  48. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen: Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities.
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  49. Marc Lange (2013). Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):255-261.score: 18.0
    It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also (...)
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  50. Nicholas Maxwell, Scientific Metaphysics. PhilSci Archive.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that physics makes metaphysical presuppositions concerning the physical comprehensibility, the dynamic unity, of the universe. I argue that rigour requires that these metaphysical presuppositions be made explicit as an integral part of theoretical knowledge in physics. An account of what it means to assert of a theory that it is unified is developed, which provides the means for partially ordering dynamical physical theories with respect to their degrees of unity. This in turn makes it possible (...)
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