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Profile: Samuel Schindler (University of Aarhus)
  1. Samuel Schindler (2013). Theory-Laden Experimentation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):89-101.
    The thesis of theory-ladenness of observations, in its various guises, is widely considered as either ill-conceived or harmless to the rationality of science. The latter view rests partly on the work of the proponents of New Experimentalism who have argued, among other things, that experimental practices are efficient in guarding against any epistemological threat posed by theory-ladenness. In this paper I show that one can generate a thesis of theory-ladenness for experimental practices from an influential New Experimentalist account. The notion (...)
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  2. Samuel Schindler (2013). The Kuhnian Mode of HPS. Synthese 190 (18):4137-4154.
    In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ronald Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the naturalistic (...)
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  3. Samuel Schindler (2013). Mechanistic Explanation: Asymmetry Lost. In Karakostas and Dieks (ed.), “Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems”. Springer
    In a recent book and an article, Carl Craver construes the relations between different levels of a mechanism, which he also refers to as constitutive relations, in terms of mutual manipulability (MM). Interpreted metaphysically, MM implies that inter-level relations are symmetrical. MM thus violates one of the main desiderata of scientific explanation, namely explanatory asymmetry. Parts of Craver’s writings suggest a metaphysical interpretation of MM, and Craver explicitly commits to constitutive relationships being symmetrical. The paper furthermore explores the option of (...)
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  4.  31
    Samuel Schindler (2014). Novelty, Coherence, and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):62-69.
    Predictivism is the view that successful predictions of “novel” evidence carry more confirmational weight than accommodations of already known evidence. Novelty, in this context, has traditionally been conceived of as temporal novelty. However temporal predictivism has been criticized for lacking a rationale: why should the time order of theory and evidence matter? Instead, it has been proposed, novelty should be construed in terms of use-novelty, according to which evidence is novel if it was not used in the construction of a (...)
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  5.  37
    Samuel Schindler (2014). Explanatory Fictions—for Real? Synthese 191 (8):1741-1755.
    In this article I assess Alisa Bokulich’s idea that explanatory model fictions can be genuinely explanatory. I draw attention to a tension in her account between the claim that model fictions are explanatorily autonomous, and the demand that model fictions be justified in order for them to be genuinely explanatory. I also explore the consequences that arise from Bokulich’s use of Woodward’s account of counterfactual explanation and her abandonment of Woodward’s notion of an intervention. As it stands, Bokulich’s account must (...)
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  6. Samuel Schindler (2013). History and Philosophy of Science: Coherent Programme at Last? [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (2):457-460.
  7.  53
    Samuel Schindler (2008). Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):619-658.
    In this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to discuss not only Crick and Watson's well-known model (...)
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  8.  15
    Samuel Schindler (2007). Rehabilitating Theory: Refusal of the 'Bottom-Up' Construction of Scientific Phenomena. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):160-184.
    In this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward’s data/phenomena distinction, which in a similar way to Cartwright’s construal of the model of superconductivity —although in a different domain—argues for a ‘bottom-up’ construction of phenomena from data without the involvement of theory. I criticise Bogen and Woodward’s account by analysing their melting point of lead example in depth, which is usually cited in the literature to illustrate the data/phenomenon distinction. Yet, the main focus of this paper lies on Matthias Kaiser’s (...)
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  9.  14
    Samuel Schindler (2016). A Theory of Everything. Review of Richard Dawid: String Theory and the Scientific Method. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 83 (3):453-8.
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  10.  41
    Samuel Schindler (2008). Use-Novel Predictions and Mendeleev's Periodic Table: Response To. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):265-269.
    In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J. . Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use-novel predictions did indeed contribute to (...)
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  11. Samuel Schindler (2011). Bogen and Woodward's Data-Phenomena Distinction, Forms of Theory-Ladenness, and the Reliability of Data. Synthese 182 (1):39-55.
    Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness, which has it that our observations are (...)
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    Samuel Schindler (forthcoming). Theoretical Fertility McMullin-Style. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-23.
    A theory’s fertility is one of the standard theoretical virtues. But how is it to be construed? In current philosophical discourse, particularly in the realism debate, theoretical fertility is usually understood in terms of novel success: a theory is fertile if it manages to make successful novel predictions. Another, more permissible, notion of fertility can be found in the work of Ernan McMullin. This kind of fertility, McMullin claims, gives us just as strong grounds for realism. My paper critically assesses (...)
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  13.  9
    Samuel Schindler, Kuhnian Theory-Choice, the GWS Model, and the Neutral Current.
    In the Kuhnian view of theory choice, theories, as a matter of empirical fact, often score differently well with regard to the standard theoretical virtues. The case I discuss in this paper, however, is a case in which there was one theory which was more virtuous than all its competitors. In such cases practitioners’ disparate weighting preferences, which Kuhn is so keen to emphasise, make no difference to theory choice: practitioners’ choices will converge on one theory despite their different weighting (...)
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    Samuel Schindler (2009). Conceptions of Causality. Metascience 18 (2):301-305.
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    Samuel Schindler (2014). A Matter of Kuhnian Theory-Choice?: The GWS Model and the Neutral Current. Perspectives on Science 22 (4):491-522.
    In a widely received paper on theory choice, Kuhn made three central claims. First, as a matter of empirical fact, different theories tend to score differently with regard to what Kuhn considered to be the standard set of theoretical virtues, i.e., empirical accuracy, internal and external consistency, scope, simplicity, and fertility. Whereas some theories will for instance be more empirically accurate than others, other theories will have greater external coherence with our background theories. Second, hardly ever does a theory’s being (...)
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    Samuel Schindler (2015). Scientific Discovery: That-Whats and What-Thats. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    In this paper I defend Kuhn’s view of scientific discovery, which involves two central tenets, namely that a scientific discovery always requires a discovery-that and a discovery-what, and that there are two kinds of scientific discovery, resulting from the temporal order of the discovery-that and the discovery-what. I identify two problems with Kuhn’s account and offer solutions to them from a realist stance. Alternatives to Kuhn’s account are also discussed.
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  17.  1
    Samuel Schindler (2011). Invariance, Mechanisms and Epidemiology. In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Springer 137--140.
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