Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be (...) equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it. (shrink)
The issues addressed in this commentary include: (1) the appropriate conceptualization of “appraisal”; (2) the nature and unfolding of emotional episodes over time; (3) the interrelationships between the dynamic elements of the appraisal process and their effects on other emotion components, as well as repercussions on ongoing appraisal in a recursive process; and (4) the use of brain research to constrain and inform models of emotion.
We have conducted an experimental study of V-type electromagnetically induced transparency in sodium. Its principles are elucidated by a simple model. Measurements show decreased fluorescence and absorption depending on the detuning of the driving and probe fields, which is in agreement with the results of numerical simulation.
The affective events theory proposes that the evaluation of distributive and procedural justice map onto primary and secondary appraisal sequence, respectively. However, self-serving biases suggest that one dimension (outcome favorability) can bias the other (procedural fairness). For the first time, we investigated the emotional correlates of this phenomenon. Participants performed a choice task between pairs of competing gambles against a virtual opponent. Conflicts (when the participant selected the same gamble as his virtual opponent) were resolved by a neutral arbitrator who (...) either confirmed the participant’s choice (“pro-self”) or attributed his gamble to the virtual opponent (“pro-competitor”). Trials in which the participant and his virtual opponent selected different gambles (“no-conflict”) served as a control condition. Emotional reactions to the outcomes of the gambles were measured using self-reports, skin conductance responses and facial electromyography (zygomaticus, corrugator and frontalis).In no-conflict trials, effects of counterfactual thinking and social comparison resulted in (i) increased happiness as well as SCR and zygomaticus activity for wins compared to losses (valence effect) and for high compared to low gains (magnitude effect), and (ii) increased anger, regret, disappointment and envy for losses compared to wins (valence effect). More importantly, compared to no-conflict trials and to pro-self awards with similar outcomes, pro-competitor awards increased subjective reports of anger for unfavorable outcomes, and increased happiness and guilt for favorable outcomes. Although the outcomes were independent from the arbitrators’ decisions, and both the arbitrators’ decisions and the outcomes were kept equally likely, individuals tended to attribute their outcomes to unfair arbitrators, reacting emotionally, especially when the modification of their initial choice for a gamble led to a negative outcome. (shrink)
Mental time travel refers to the ability of an organism to project herself backward and forward in time, using episodic memory and imagination to simulate past and future experiences. The evolution of mental time travel gives humans a unique capacity for prospection: the ability to pre-experience the future. Discussions of mental time travel treat it as an instance of explicit prospection. We argue that implicit simulations of past and future experience can also be used as a way of gaining information (...) about the future to shape preferences and guide behaviour. (shrink)
The distinction between the positive and the negative is fundamental in our emotional life. In appraisal theories, in particular in the component process model of emotion (Scherer, 1984, 2010), qualitatively different types of valence are proposed based on appraisals of (un)pleasantness, goal obstructiveness/conduciveness, low or high power, self- (in)congruence, and moral badness/goodness. This multifaceted conceptualization of valence is highly compatible with the frequent observation of mixed feelings in real life. However, it seems to contradict the one-dimensional conceptualization of valence often (...) encountered in psychological theories, and the notion of valence as a common currency used to explain choice behavior. Here, we propose a framework to integrate the seemingly disparate conceptualizations of multifaceted valence and one-dimensional valence by suggesting that valence should be conceived at different levels, micro and macro. Micro-valences correspond to qualitatively different types of evaluations, potentially resulting in mixed feelings, whereas one-dimensional macro-valence corresponds to an integrative “common currency” to compare alternatives for choices. We propose that conceptualizing levels of valence may focus research attention on the mechanisms that relate valence at one level (micro) to valence at another level (macro), leading to new hypotheses and addressing various concerns that have been raised about the valence concept, such as the valence-emotion relation. (shrink)
Empathic accuracy (EA) - the correct assessment of the affective states and thoughts of a social partner - affects social behavior and the outcome of interpersonal interactions. Growing evidence has shown that interpersonal power of a perceiver affects EA when assessing a target. This picture, however, is not obvious; there is evidence supporting both the idea that power can improve EA or impair it. Moreover, the mechanisms through which high power individuals are more (or less) accurate at reading others’ minds (...) are unknown. The present article provides a new perspective on the power-EA link by investigating how two core abilities involved in EA, mentalizing and mirroring, can explain when and how power is related to EA. The inclusion of findings from neuroimaging studies on mentalizing and mirroring adds a cognitive neuroscience perspective to the power-EA research that has traditionally been conducted in a social psychological framework. The extent to which a given EA-test requires mentalizing or mirroring and the way power affects both of them could explain the contrasting findings. In addition, the analysis of the neural substrates of mentalizing and mirroring may provide new insight into the relationship between power and EA. (shrink)
Appraisal theories have described elaborate mechanisms underlying the elicitation of emotion at the psychological-cognitive level, but typically do not integrate neuroscientific concepts and findings. At the same time, theoretical developments in appraisal theory have been pretty much ignored by researchers studying the neuroscience of emotion. We feel that a stronger integration of these two literatures would be highly profitable for both sides. Here we outline a blueprint of the “appraising brain.” To this end, we review neuroimaging research investigating the processing (...) of major appraisal variables, and sketch a neuro-cognitive process model of appraisal with a special emphasis on the chronometry and the recursive aspect of emotional evaluation. We hope that this contribution will stimulate more hypothesis-driven research on the neuroscience of appraisal. (shrink)
Value plays a central role in practically every aspect of human life that requires a decision: whether we choose between different consumer goods, whether we decide which person we marry or which political candidate gets our vote, we choose the option that has more value to us. Over the last decade, neuroeconomic research has mapped the neural substrates of economic value, revealing that activation in brain regions such as ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), ventral striatum or posterior cingulate cortex reflects how (...) much an individual values an option and which of several options he/she will choose. However, while great progress has been made exploring the mechanisms underlying concrete decisions, neuroeconomic research has been less concerned with the questions of why people value what they value, and why different people value different things. Social psychologists and sociologists have long been interested in core values, motivational constructs that are intrinsically linked to the self-schema and are used to guide actions and decisions across different situations and different time points. Core value may thus be an important determinant of individual differences in economic value computation and decision-making. Based on a review of recent neuroimaging studies investigating the neural representation of core values and their interactions with neural systems representing economic value, we outline a common framework that integrates the core value concept and neuroeconomic research on value-based decision-making. (shrink)
We demonstrate that common genetic polymorphisms contribute to the increasing heterogeneity of cognitive functioning in old age. We assess two common Val/Met polymorphisms, one affecting the Catechol-O-Methyltransferase (COMT) enzyme, which degrades dopamine (DA) in prefrontal cortex (PFC), and the other influencing the brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) protein. In two tasks (Wisconsin Card Sorting and spatial working memory), we find that effects of COMT genotype on cognitive performance are magnified in old age and modulated by BDNF genotype. Older COMT Val homozygotes (...) showed particularly low levels of performance if they were also BDNF Met carriers. The age-associated magnification of COMT gene effects provides novel information on the inverted U-shaped relation linking dopaminergic neuromodulation in PFC to cognitive performance. The modulation of COMT effects by BDNF extends recent evidence of close interactions between frontal and medial-temporal circuitries in executive functioning and working memory. (shrink)
According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that (necessarily) all truths are knowable – ‘∀p (p ⊃ ◊Kp) ’ – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ‘∀p (p ⊃ Kp) ’ –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of anti-realism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, (...) the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, not ‘∀p (p ⊃ Kp)’, but ‘∀p (p ⊃ ¬¬Kp)’. Secondly, even if there were an intuitionistically acceptable proof of ‘∀p (p ⊃ Kp)’, i.e. an argument based on a different set of premises, the conclusion would have to be interpreted in accordance with Heyting semantics, and read in this way, the apparently preposterous conclusion would be true on conceptual grounds and acceptable even from a realist point of view. Fitch’s argument, understood as an immanent critique of verificationism, fails because in a debate dealing with the justification of deduction there can be no interpreted formal language on which realists and anti-realists could agree. Thus, the underlying problem is that a satisfactory solution to the “problem of shared content” is not available. I conclude with some remarks on the proposals by J. Salerno and N. Tennant to reconstruct certain arguments in the debate on anti-realism by establishing aporias. (shrink)
In the past, the amygdala has generally been conceptualized as a fear-processing module. Recently, however, it has been proposed to respond to all stimuli that are relevant with respect to the current needs, goals and values of an individual. This raises the question of whether the human amygdala may differentiate between separate kinds of relevance. A distinction between emotional (vs neutral) and social (vs nonsocial) relevance is supported by previous studies showing that the human amygdala preferentially responds to both emotionally (...) and socially significant information, and these factors might even display interactive encoding properties. However, no investigation has yet probed a full 2 (positive vs negative valence) x 2 (social vs nonsocial content) processing pattern, with neutral images as an additional baseline. Applying such an extended orthogonal factorial design, our fMRI study demonstrates that the human amygdala is (i) more strongly activated for neutral social vs nonsocial information, (ii) activated at a similar level when viewing social positive or negative images, but (iii) displays a valence effect (negative vs positive) for nonsocial images. In addition, this encoding pattern is not influenced by cognitive or behavioral emotion regulation mechanisms, and displays a hemispheric lateralization with more pronounced effects on the right side. Finally, the same valence x social content interaction was found in three additional cortical regions, namely the right fusiform gyrus, right anterior superior temporal gyrus, and medial orbitofrontal cortex. Overall, these findings suggest that valence and social content processing represent distinct kinds of relevance that interact within the human amygdala as well as in a more extensive cortical network, likely subserving a key role in relevance detection. (shrink)
Emotion regulation is crucial for successfully engaging in social interactions. Yet, little is known about the neural mechanisms controlling behavioral responses to emotional expressions perceived in the face of other people, which constitute a key element of interpersonal communication. Here, we investigated brain systems involved in social emotion perception and regulation, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 20 healthy participants who saw dynamic facial expressions of either happiness or sadness, and were asked to either imitate the expression or to (...) suppress any expression on their own face (in addition to a gender judgment control task). fMRI results revealed higher activity in regions associated with emotion (e.g., the insula), motor function (e.g., motor cortex), and theory of mind during imitation. Activity in dorsal cingulate cortex was also increased during imitation, possibly reflecting greater action monitoring or conflict with own feeling states. In addition, premotor regions were more strongly activated during both imitation and suppression, suggesting a recruitment of motor control for both the production and inhibition of emotion expressions. Expressive suppression produced increases in dorsolateral and lateral prefrontal cortex typically related to cognitive control. These results suggest that voluntary imitation and expressive suppression modulate brain responses to emotional signals perceived from faces, by up- and down-regulating activity in distributed subcortical and cortical networks that are particularly involved in emotion, action monitoring, and cognitive control. (shrink)
: The proposal that care ethic(s) (CE) be subsumed under the framework of virtue ethic(s) (VE) is both promising and problematic for feminists. Although some attempts to construe care as a virtue are more commendable than others, they cannot duplicate a freestanding feminist CE. Sander-Staudt recommends a model of theoretical collaboration between VE and CE that retains their comprehensiveness, allows CE to enhance VE as well as be enhanced by it, and leaves CE open to other collaborations.
In the beginning came Firstness along with icons that could represent it to an awakening dreamer. In his 2011 monograph on Charles Sanders Peirce and a Religious Metaphysics of Nature, Leon J. Niemoczynski develops a critical appreciation of Peircean Firstness that arises from “the depths of experience” as “the living ground of will, power, and potential” (15). Explicitly attuned to Robert Corrington’s “ecstatic naturalism,” Niemoczynski works his way through Peirce to Schelling in order to de-theologize the reader’s understanding of what (...) might be meant when Peirce uses the word God. Working against a “pantheistic” interpretation that would yet reserve some remnant of God “beyond” the world, Niemoczynski argues .. (shrink)
Bon nombre des écrits les plus originaux, et les plus méconnus, de Peirce concernent un sujet à première vue plus intéressant pour le gestionnaire de la recherche ou l'économiste que pour le philosophe, fût-il pragmatiste : l'optimisation de la recherche scientifique. Comment trouver une stratégie rationnelle permettant d'arriver à des résultats scientifiques intéressants plus vite et à un moindre coût ? Défait, c'est une nouvelle discipline que fonde en 1878, dans la discrétion, l'ingénieur du Coast Survey du Massachusetts nommé Charles (...) Sanders Peirce, plus connu aujourd'hui comme l'inventeur du pragmatisme. Son continuateur contemporain le plus notable est le philosophe américain Nicolas Rescher qui, dans Le Progrès scientifique entre autres, montre bien le déploiement de ce type de recherches au XX e siècle. (shrink)
Charles Sanders Peirce has authored an extraordinary ?Note on the Theory of the Economy of Research? (1879). The Note presents an economic model of research project selection in science. A case can be made that the Note was the first piece of modern scientific research in all of economics. This claim is based on the novelty of the method of argument, the graphical techniques, and the ratio of the marginal utilities found in the Note. The Note is also significant for (...) making economic factors a central part of a theory of scientific inference, something which contemporary economic methodologists and philosophers still have not done except for a few notable exceptions. And it has been used by philosopher Nicholas Rescher to interpret and criticize Karl Popper's notion of falsification. All of these contributions suggest that Peirce's Note may be of unusual interest to the economics profession. (shrink)
Charles Sanders Peirce was born in September 1839 and died five months before the guns of August 1914. He is perhaps the most important mind the United States has ever produced. He made significant contributions throughout his life as a mathematician, astronomer, chemist, geodesist, surveyor, cartographer, metrologist, engineer, and inventor. He was a psychologist, a philologist, a lexicographer, a historian of science, a lifelong student of medicine, and, above all, a philosopher, whose special fields were logic and semiotics. He is (...) widely credited with being the founder of pragmatism. In terms of his importance as a philosopher and a scientist, he has been compared to Plato and Aristotle. He himself intended "to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle." Peirce was also a tormented and in many ways tragic figure. He suffered throughout his life from various ailments, including a painful facial neuralgia, and had wide swings of mood which frequently left him depressed to the state of inertia, and other times found him explosively violent. Despite his consistent belief that ideas could find meaning only if they "worked" in the world, he himself found it almost impossible to make satisfactory economic and social arrangements for himself. This brilliant scientist, this great philosopher, this astounding polymath was never able, throughout his long life, to find an academic post that would allow him to pursue his major interest, the study of logic, and thus also fulfill his destiny as America's greatest philosopher. Much of his work remained unpublished in his own time, and is only now finding publication in a coherent, chronologically organized edition. Even more astounding is that,despite many monographic studies, there has been no biography until now, almost eighty years after his death. Brent has studied the Peirce papers in detail and enriches his account with numerous quotations from letters by Peirce and by his friends. This is a fascinating account of a p. (shrink)
This article reviews Michael Polanyi’s Post-Critical Epistemology by Andy F. Sanders but goes on to articulate certain crucial aspects of Polanyi’s post-critical understanding of truth that seem to be overlooked in Sanders’ account and which challenge conventional analyses of truth.
This volume provides a comprehensive exploration of Charles Sanders Peirce's work in mathematics and formal logic, highlighting linkages between Peirce's work and present developments in the science and history of logic. The essays are collected from an internationally distinguished group of scholars who gathered at Harvard University in 1989 to commemorate Peirce's birth in 1839. Not just of historical interest, Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce shows the considerable relevance of Peirce's work for current research. The stimulating depth (...) and originality of Peirce's thought and the continuing importance and usefulness of his ideas are brought out by this major volume.(publisher). (shrink)