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Profile: Y. Sandy Berkovski (Bilkent University)
Profile: Sandy Berkovski (Bilkent University)
  1. Sandy Berkovski, A Hobbesian Theory of Shame.
    On most accounts present in the literature, the complex experience of shame has the injury to self-esteem as its main component. A major objection to this idea is that it fails to differentiate between shame and disappointment in oneself. I argue that previous attempts to respond to the objection are unsatisfactory. I argue further that the distinction should refer to the different ways the subject’s self-esteem is formed. A necessary requirement for shame is that the standards and values by which (...)
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  2. Sandy Berkovski, Lecture VIII.
    Is sensory experience stable and theory-neutral? If it is, scientists do not have different experiences, but rather have different interpretations of the same experience. Kuhn: scientists rarely have ‘bare’ experience. Also, the construction of sense-language has not been successful.
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  3. Sandy Berkovski (2012). The Possibility of Modified Hedonism. Theoria 78 (3):186-212.
    A popular objection to hedonist accounts of personal welfare has been the experience machine argument. Several modifications of traditional hedonism have been proposed in response. In this article I examine two such responses, recently expounded by Feldman and Sumner respectively. I argue that both modifications make hedonism indistinguishable from anti-hedonism. Sumner's account, I claim, also fails to satisfy the demands of theoretical unity.
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  4. Sandy Berkovski (2011). Lewis' Reduction of Modality. Acta Analytica 26 (2):95-114.
    I start by reconsidering two familiar arguments against modal realism. The argument from epistemology relates to the issue whether we can infer the existence of concrete objects by a priori means. The argument from pragmatics purports to refute the analogy between the indispensability of possible worlds and the indispensability of unobserved entities in physical science and of numbers in mathematics. Then I present two novel objections. One focusses on the obscurity of the notion of isolation required by modal realism. The (...)
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  5. Sandy Berkovski (2011). Prichard's Heresy. Philosophy 86 (04):503-524.
    H. A. Prichard ascribed to Aristotle a form of closeted hedonism. Aristotle allegedly misunderstood his own task: while his avowed goal in Nicomachean Ethics is to give an account of the nature of happiness, his real goal must be to offer an account of the factors most efficiently generating happiness. The reason is that the nature of happiness is enjoyment, and this fact is supposed to have been recognised by Aristotle and his audience. While later writers judged Prichard's view obviously (...)
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  6. Sandy Berkovski (2011). Possible Worlds: A Neo-Fregean Alternative. Axiomathes 21 (4):531-551.
    I outline a neo-Fregean strategy in the debate on the existence of possible worlds. The criterion of identity and the criterion of application are formulated. Special attention is paid to the fact that speakers do not possess proper names for worlds. A broadly Quinean solution is proposed in response to this difficulty.
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  7. Sandy Berkovski (2011). Reichenbach and Weyl on Apriority and Mathematical Applicability. Synthese 181 (1):63-77.
    I examine Reichenbach’s theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman’s interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach’s view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach’s account from Kant’s apriorism is the problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl’s theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost.
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  8. Sandy Berkovski (2010). —9—Sandy Berkovski Some Remarks on Mthat. In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context. Peter Lang. 2--213.
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  9. Sandy Berkovski (2002). Surprising User-Friendliness. Logique Et Analyse 45 (179-180):283-297.
    Some theorists are bewildered by the effectiveness of mathematical concepts. For example, Steiner attempts to show that there can be no rational explanation of mathematical applicability in physics. Others (notably Penrose) are concerned primarily with the unexpected effectiveness within mathematics. Both views consist of two parts: a puzzle and a positive solution. I defend their paradoxical parts against the sceptics who do not believe that the very problem of effectiveness is a genuine one. Utilising Horwich’s theory of surprise, I argue (...)
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