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Profile: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)
  1. Sanford Goldberg (ed.) (forthcoming). Putnam on Brains in Vats. Cambridge University Press.
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  2. Sanford Goldberg (ed.) (forthcoming). The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press.
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  3. Sanford Goldberg (2013). Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion1. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 167.
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  4. Sanford Goldberg (2013). Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):168-186.
    The process of education, and in particular that involving very young children, often involves students' taking their teachers' word on a good many things. At the same time, good education at every level ought to inculcate, develop, and support students' ability to think for themselves. While these two features of education need not be regarded as contradictory, it is not clear how they relate to one another, nor is it clear how (when taken together) these features ought to bear on (...)
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  5. Sanford C. Goldberg (2013). Anonymous Assertions. Episteme 10 (2):135-151.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...)
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  6. Sanford C. Goldberg (2013). Inclusiveness in the Face of Anticipated Disagreement. Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.
    This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic (...)
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  7. Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  8. Sanford C. Goldberg (2012). Epistemic Extendedness, Testimony, and the Epistemology of Instrument-Based Belief. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.
    In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a crucial (...)
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  9. Sanford Goldberg (2011). Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: The Case of Testimony. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oup Oxford.
     
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  10. Sanford Goldberg (2011). Work: The Case of Testimony. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 175.
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  11. Sanford Goldberg (2010). Comments on Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):138-150.
    Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony. (...)
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  12. Sanford Goldberg (2010). Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world.
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  13. Sanford Goldberg (2010). The Metasemantics of Memory. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):95-107.
    In Sven Bernecker’s excellent new book, Memory, he proposes an account of what we might call the metasemantics of memory: the conditions that determine the contents of the mental representations employed in memory. Bernecker endorses a pastist externalist view, according to which the content of a memory-constituting representation is fixed, in part, by the external conditions prevalent at the (past) time of the tokening of the original representation (the one from which the memory-constituting one is causally derived). Bernecker argues that (...)
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  14. Sanford C. Goldberg (2010). The Epistemology of Silence. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oup Oxford. 243--261.
     
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  15. Sanford Goldberg (2009). Experts, Semantic and Epistemic. Noûs 43 (4):581-598.
    In this paper I argue that the tendency to defer in matters semantic is rationalized by our reliance on the say-so of others for much of what we know about the world. The result, I contend, is a new and distinctly epistemic source of support for the doctrine of attitude anti-individualism.
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  16. Sanford Goldberg (2009). Introduction. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):1-3.
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  17. Sanford Goldberg (2009). The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Conditions on Testimonial Knowledge. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  18. Sanford C. Goldberg (2009). Reliabilism in Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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  19. Sanford Goldberg (2008). Internalism, Externalism and the Epistemology of Linguistic Understanding. Communication and Cognition. Monographies 41 (3-4):191-216.
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  20. Sanford Goldberg (2008). Must Differences in Cognitive Value Be Transparent? Erkenntnis 69 (2):165 - 187.
    Frege’s ‘differential dubitability’ test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different ‘cognitive values’. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q (as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true, (...)
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  21. Sanford Goldberg (2008). Metaphysical Realism and Thought. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):149 - 163.
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  22. Sanford C. Goldberg (2008). Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowledge. The second is the extension challenge, (...)
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  23. Sanford Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):515–518.
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  24. Sanford Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part 1 he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part 2 he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics (...)
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  25. Sanford Goldberg (2007). How Lucky Can You Get? Synthese 158 (3):315 - 327.
    In this paper, I apply Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology to the case of knowledge through testimony. I claim (1) that Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and reflective luck provides a nice taxonomy of testimony cases, (2) that the taxonomic categories that emerge can be used to suggest precisely what epistemic statuses are transmissible through testimony, and (3) that the resulting picture can make clear how testimony can actually be knowledge-generating.
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  26. Sanford Goldberg (2007). Introduction. In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press.
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  27. Sanford Goldberg (ed.) (2007). Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents eleven specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and ...
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  28. Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification. Nos 41 (2):178�203.
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  29. Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Semantic Externalism and Epistemic Illusions. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 235--252.
     
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  30. Sanford Goldberg (2006). An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for 'Empty' Natural Kind Terms. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):147-168.
    Several authors (Boghossian 1998; Segal 2000) allege that 'empty' would-be natural kind terms are a problem for anti-individualistic semantics. In this paper I rebut the charge by providing an anti-individualistic semantics for such terms.
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  31. Sanford Goldberg (2006). Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 127--44.
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  32. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301�314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...)
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  33. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Testimony as Evidence. Philosophica 78.
    Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
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  34. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):118-138.
    Many people agree that a proper epistemological treatment of testimonial knowledge will regard testimonial warrant—the total truth-conducive support enjoyed by a belief grounded on a piece of testimony —as socially diffuse, in the sense that it is not something that supervenes on the proper functionality of the hearer’s cognitive resources together with the reasons she has for accepting the testimony. After arguing for such a view, I go on to identify a challenge many people think flows from an acknowledgment of (...)
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  35. Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson (2006). Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
    One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony--whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...)
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  36. Bradley Monton & Sanford Goldberg (2006). The Problem of the Many Minds. Minds and Machines 16 (4):463-470.
    It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particlestuff persist through time.
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  37. Sanford Goldberg (2005). Testimonial Knowledge Through Unsafe Testimony. Analysis 65 (288):302–311.
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  38. Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). (Nonstandard) Lessons From World-Switching Cases. Philosophia 32 (1-4):85-131.
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  39. Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.
    Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory (...)
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  40. Sanford C. Goldberg (2004). Review of Maria Frapolli (Ed.), Esther Romero (Ed.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (1).
  41. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  42. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). On Our Alleged A Priori Knowledge That Water Exists. Analysis 63 (1):38-41.
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  43. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts? In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
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  44. Sanford Goldberg (2002). Review: Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (1):128-130.
    Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe. But Hanna shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their ideas only by means of an intensive, (...)
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  45. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
    In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
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  46. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.
    Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are.
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  47. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Mentalistic Explanation and Mental Causation. Manuscrito 25 (3):199-216.
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  48. Sanford C. Goldberg (2001). Testimonially Based Knowledge From False Testimony. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):512-526.
    Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).
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  49. Sanford Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51 - 79.
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  50. Sanford Goldberg (2000). Paul Horwich, Meaning Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 20 (5):350-353.
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