Search results for 'Sanford Krolick' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. William Kluback, David B. Burrell, H. Kimmerle, Robert C. Roberts, Sanford Krolick, Glenn Hewitt, Merold Westphal, Haim Gordon, Brendan E. A. Liddell, Donald W. Musser & Dan Magurshak (1984). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2):165-188.score: 240.0
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  2. Sanford Krolick (1985). Through a Glass Darkly: What is the Phenomenology of Religion? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17 (3):193 - 199.score: 240.0
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  3. Sanford W. Krolick (1981). Gesture and Myth: A Phenomenological Reflection on Myth and Traditional Culture. [REVIEW] Man and World 14 (2):201-221.score: 240.0
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  4. A. Whitney Sanford (2013). Anand Pandian: Crooked Stalks Cultivating Virtue in South India. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (3):721-722.score: 60.0
    Anand Pandian: Crooked Stalks Cultivating Virtue in South India Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9308-4 Authors A. Whitney Sanford, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.
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  5. Anthony J. Sanford, Linda M. Moxey & Kevin Paterson (1994). Psychological Studies of Quantifiers. Journal of Semantics 11 (3):153-170.score: 60.0
    In this paper we present a summary review of recent psychological studies which make a contribution to an understanding of how quantifiers are used. Until relatively recently, the contribution which psychology has made has been somewhat restricted. For example, the approach which has enjoyed the greatest popularity in psychology is explaining quantifiers as expressions which have fuzzy or vague projections on to mental scales of amount. Following Moxey & Sanford (1993a), this view is questioned. Experimental work is summarized showing (...)
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  6. David H. Sanford (1988). Begging the Question as Involving Actual Belief and Inconceivable Without It. Metaphilosophy 19 (1):32–37.score: 60.0
    This article answers John Biro's "Knowability, Believability, and Begging the Question: a Reply to Sanford" in "Metaphilosophy" 15 (1984). Biro and I agree that of two argument instances with the same form and content, one but not the other can beg the question, depending on other factors. These factors include actual beliefs, or so I maintain (against Biro) with the help of some analysed examples. Brief selections from Archbishop Whatley and J S Mill suggest that they also regard reference (...)
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  7. Jonathan J. Sanford (ed.) (2012). Spider-Man and Philosophy: The Web of Inquiry. John Wiley & Sons, Inc..score: 60.0
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction Part One. The Spectacular Life of Spider-Man? 1. Does Peter Parker Have a Good Life? Neil Mussett 2. What Price Atonement? Peter Parker and the Infinite Debt Taneli Kukkonen "My Name is Peter Parker": Unmasking the Right and the Good Mark D. White Part Two. Responsibility-Man 4. "With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility": Spider-Man, Christian Ethics, and the Problem of Evil Adam Barkman 5. Does Great Power Bring Great Responsibility? Spider-Man and the Good Samaritan J. (...)
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  8. S. B. Barton & A. J. Sanford (1990). The Control of Attributional Patterns by the Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions. Journal of Semantics 7 (1):81-92.score: 60.0
    Recent evidence has shown that certain quantifiers (few, only a few) and quantifying adverbs (seldom, rarely) when used tend to make people think of reasons for the small proportions or low frequencies which they denote. Other expressions single out small proportions or low frequences, but do not lead to a focus on reasons (e. g. a few; occasionally). In the present paper, these observations are applied to the attribution of cause in short two–line vignettes which make reference to situations, and (...)
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  9. A. J. Sanford, S. Garrod, A. Lucas & R. Henderson (1983). Pronouns Without Explicit Antecedents? Journal of Semantics 2 (3-4):303-318.score: 60.0
    Yule (1982) has argued that examples from speech show that pronouns may be interpreted nonreferentially. In the present paper, it is argued that pronouns elicit procedures for the identification of referents which are in explicit focus (Sanford and Garrod, 1981). Three experiments are offered in support of this view. The discussion centres on the need for carefully assessing the knowledge-states of listeners when pronouns are used in the absence of antecedents. It is proposed that felicitous use of pronouns without (...)
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  10. David H. Sanford (1978). Causal Necessity and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 33 (2):185 - 194.score: 30.0
    Hume's arguments for the contention that causal necessity precludes logical necessity depend on the questionable principle that a cause must precede its effect. Hobbes' definition of entire cause, although it fails to account for causal priority, is not refuted by Hume. The objections of Myles Brand and Marshall Swain (Philosophical Studies, 1976) to my counterexample against Hume (Philosophical Studies, 1975) are ineffective. Their other objections to my criticisms of their argument against defining causation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (...)
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  11. David H. Sanford (1975). Causal Necessity and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 28 (2):185 - 194.score: 30.0
    Myles Brand and Marshall Swain advocate the principle that if A is the set of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the occurrence of B, then if C is a set of conditions individually necessary for the occurrence of B, every member of C is a member of A. I agree with John Barker and Risto Hilpinen who each argue that this principle is not true for causal necessity and sufficiency, but I disagree with their claim that it is (...)
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  12. D. H. Sanford (2011). Can a Sum Change its Parts? Analysis 71 (2):235-239.score: 30.0
    I consider two logically independent definitions of (mereological) sum identity when x is a sum of the ys and w is a sum of the zs. Def 1 x=y: every part of every y shares a part with some z, and every part of every z shares a part with some y. Def 2 x = y: all the ys are zs, and all the zs are ys. Neither allows a sum to change its parts. Peter van Inwagen tells a (...)
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  13. David H. Sanford (1993). The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology. Noûs 27 (2):219-228.score: 30.0
    Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to solve this problem. (...)
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  14. David H. Sanford (1976). The Primary Objects of Perception. Mind 85 (April):189-208.score: 30.0
    The primary objects of hearing are sounds: everything we hear we hear by hearing a sound. (This claim differs from Berkeley’s that we hear only sounds and from Aristotle’s that we only hear sounds.) Colored regions are primary objects of sight, and pressure resistant regions are primary objects of perception by touch. By definition, the primary objects of perception are physical. The properties of the primary objects of perception are exactly the properties sense-datum theories attribute to sense-data. Indirect Realism holds (...)
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  15. David H. Sanford (1981). Illusions and Sense-Data. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):371-385.score: 30.0
    Examples of sensory illusion show the failure of the attempt of traditional sense-datum theory to account for something's phenomenally appearing to be F by postulating the existence of a sense-datum that is actually F. the Muller-Lyer Illusion cannot be explained by postulating two sensibly presented lines that actually have the lengths the physical lines appear to have. Illusions due to color contrast cannot be explained by postulating sense-data that actually have the colors the physical samples appear to have.
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  16. David H. Sanford, Determinates Vs. Determinables. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 30.0
    Everything red is colored, and all squares are polygons. A square is distinguished from other polygons by being four-sided, equilateral, and equiangular. What distinguishes red things from other colored things? This has been understood as a conceptual rather than scientific question. Theories of wavelengths and reflectance and sensory processing are not considered. Given just our ordinary understanding of color, it seems that what differentiates red from other colors is only redness itself. The Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson introduced the terms (...)
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  17. David H. Sanford (1981). Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):379 - 388.score: 30.0
    Fred Dretske holds that if one knows something, one need not eliminate every alternative to it but only the relevant alternatives. Besides defending this view in "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge" ("Phil. Stud.", 40, 363-378, n 81), he makes some tentative suggestions about determining when an alternative is relevant. I discuss these suggestions and conclude that there are problems yet to be solved. I do not conclude that there are insoluble problems or that Dretske's approach is on the wrong track. (...)
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  18. David H. Sanford (2003). Fusion Confusion. Analysis 63 (277):1–4.score: 30.0
    Two fusions can be in the same place at the same time. So long as a house made of Tinkertoys is intact, the fusion of all its Tinkertoys parts coincides with the fusion of it walls and its roof. If none of the Tinkertoys is destroyed, their fusion persists through the complete disassembly of the house. (So the house is not a fusion of its Tinkertoy parts.) The fusion of the walls and roof does not persist through the complete disassembly (...)
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  19. David H. Sanford (1970). Locke, Leibniz, and Wiggins on Being in the Same Place at the Same Time. Philosophical Review 79 (1):75-82.score: 30.0
    Locke thought it was a necessary truth that no two material bodies could be in the same place at the same time. Leibniz wasn't so sure. This paper sides with Leibniz. I examine the arguments of David Wiggins in defense of Locke on this point (Philosophical Review, January 1968). Wiggins’ arguments are ineffective.
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  20. David H. Sanford (2005). Distinctness and Non-Identity. Analysis 65 (288):269–274.score: 30.0
    The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
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  21. Jonathan J. Sanford (2010). Are You Man Enough? Aristotle and Courage. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):431-445.score: 30.0
    There are four features to Aristotle’s account of courage that appear peculiar when compared to our own intuitions about this virtue: (1) his account of courage seems not, on its surface, to fit a eudaimonist model, (2) courage is restricted to a surprisingly small number of actions, (3) this restriction, among other things, excludes women and non-combatant men from ever exercising this virtue, and (4) courage is counted as virtuous because of its nobility and beauty. In this paper I explore (...)
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  22. David H. Sanford (1993). Disjunctive Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.score: 30.0
    Philosophers have had difficulty in explaining the difference between disjunctive and non-disjunctive predicates. Purely syntactical criteria are ineffective, and mention of resemblance begs the question. I draw the distinction by reference to relations between borderline cases. The crucial point about the disjoint predicate 'red or green', for example, is that no borderline case of 'red' is a borderline case of 'green'. Other varieties of disjunctive predicates are: inclusively disjunctive (such as 'red or hard'), disconnected (such as 'grue' on the usual (...)
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  23. David H. Sanford (1975). Infinity and Vagueness. Philosophical Review 84 (4):520-535.score: 30.0
    Many philosophic arguments concerned with infinite series depend on the mutual inconsistency of statements of the following five forms: (1) something exists which has R to something; (2) R is asymmetric; (3) R is transitive; (4) for any x which has R to something, there is something which has R to x; (5) only finitely many things are related by R. Such arguments are suspect if the two-place relation R in question involves any conceptual vagueness or inexactness. Traditional sorites arguments (...)
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  24. Jonathan J. Sanford (2002). Scheler on Feeling and Values. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:165-181.score: 30.0
    Max Scheler argues that there is much to learn about reality through faculties that lie beyond the boundary of reason. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler explores values (Werte), awareness of which depends primarily on affective receptivity rather than rational perceptionof the world. This essay explores the possibility of affective insight in light of Scheler’s analysis of values. Scheler’s notion of values as moral facts is first examined, next consideration is given to how we learn (...)
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  25. David H. Sanford (1968). McTaggart on Time. Philosophy 43 (166):371 - 378.score: 30.0
    McTaggart argues that the A series, which orders events with reference to past, present, and future, involves an inescapable contradiction. The significant difference between the earlier version of his argument (Mind, 1908) and the version in The Nature of Existence, Volume II, Chapter 33 (1927), has often gone unnoticed. His arguments are all invalid; the conclusion can be rejected without rejecting any premiss. It is therefore unnecessary to adopt any philosophical thesis about time (e.g., that some token-reflexive analysis of tensed (...)
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  26. David H. Sanford (1984). The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):53-75.score: 30.0
    I revise J L Mackie's first account of casual direction by replacing his notion of "fixity" by a newly defined notion of "sufficing" that is designed to accommodate indeterminism. Keeping Mackie's distinction between casual order and casual direction, I then consider another revision that replaces "fixity" with "one-way conditionship". In response to the charge that all such accounts of casual priority beg the question by making an unjustified appeal to temporal priority, i maintain that one-way conditionship explains rather that assumes (...)
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  27. Werner Menski, Carl Olson, William Cenkner, Anne E. Monius, Sarah Hodges, Jeffrey J. Kripal, Carol Salomon, Deepak Sarma, William Cenkner, John E. Cort, Peter A. Huff, Joseph A. Bracken, Larry D. Shinn, Jonathan S. Walters, Ellison Banks Findly, John Grimes, Loriliai Biernacki, David L. Gosling, Thomas Forsthoefel, Michael H. Fisher, Ian Barrow, Srimati Basu, Natalie Gummer, Pradip Bhattacharya, John Grimes, Heather T. Frazer, Elaine Craddock, Andrea Pinkney, Joseph Schaller, Michael W. Myers, Lise F. Vail, Wayne Howard, Bradley B. Burroughs, Shalva Weil, Joseph A. Bracken, Christopher W. Gowans, Dan Cozort, Katherine Janiec Jones, Carl Olson, M. D. McLean, A. Whitney Sanford, Sarah Lamb, Eliza F. Kent, Ashley Dawson, Amir Hussain, John Powers, Jennifer B. Saunders & Ramdas Lamb (2005). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] International Journal of Hindu Studies 9 (1-3):153-228.score: 30.0
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  28. A. Whitney Sanford (2011). Ethics, Narrative, and Agriculture: Transforming Agricultural Practice Through Ecological Imagination. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24 (3):283-303.score: 30.0
    The environmental degradation caused by industrial agriculture, as well as the resulting social and health consequences, creates an urgency to rethink food production by expanding the moral imagination to include agricultural practices. Agricultural practices presume human use of the earth and acknowledge human dependence on the biotic community, and these relations mean that agriculture presents a separate set of considerations in the broader field of environmental ethics. Many scholars and activists have argued persuasively that we need new stories to rethink (...)
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  29. David H. Sanford (1979). Nostalgia for the Ordinary: Comments on Papers by Unger and Wheeler. Synthese 41 (2):175 - 184.score: 30.0
    Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we accept (...)
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  30. David H. Sanford (1968). Contraries and Subcontraries. Noûs 2 (1):95-96.score: 30.0
    If two statements are contraries if and only if they cannot both be true, but can both be false, then some corresponding A and E categorical statements are not contraries, even on the presupposition that something exists which satisfies the subject term. For some such statements are necessarily true and thus cannot be false. There is a similar problem with subcontraries.
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  31. David H. Sanford (1991). Coulds, Mights, Ifs and Cans, Revisited. Noûs 25 (2):208-211.score: 30.0
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  32. Dominic E. Sanford & David A. Fleming (2010). We Meant No Harm, Yet We Made a Mistake; Why Not Apologize for It? A Student's View. HEC Forum 22 (2):159-169.score: 30.0
    This essay explores the unique perspective of medical students regarding the ethical challenges of providing full disclosure to patients and their families when medical mistakes are made, especially when such mistakes lead to tragic outcomes. This narrative underscores core precepts of the healing profession, challenging the health care team to be open and truthful, even when doing so is uncomfortable. This account also reminds us that nonabandonment is an obligation that assumes accountability for one’s actions in the healing relationship and (...)
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  33. David H. Sanford (1972). Begging the Question. Analysis 32 (6):197-199.score: 30.0
    A primary purpose of argument is to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of the conclusion. A question begging argument fails this purpose because it violates what W. E. Johnson called an epistemic condition of inference. Although an argument of the sort characterized by Robert Hoffman in his response (Analysis 32.2, Dec 71) to Richard Robinson (Analysis 31.4, March 71) begs the question in all circumstances, we usually understand the charge that an argument is (...)
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  34. David H. Sanford (2002). Vague Numbers. Acta Analytica 17 (1):63-73.score: 30.0
    If there are vague numbers, it would be easier to use numbers as semantic values in a treatment of vagueness while avoiding precise cut-off points. When we assign a particular statement a range of values (less than 1 and greater than 0) there is no precise sharp cut-off point that locates the greatest lower bound or the least upper bound of the interval, I should like to say. Is this possible? “Vague Numbers” stands for awareness of the problem. I do (...)
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  35. David H. Sanford (1994). Causation and Intelligibility. Philosophy 69 (267):55 - 67.score: 30.0
    Hume, in "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", holds (1) that all causal reasoning is based on experience and (2) that causal reasoning is based on nothing but experience. (1) does not imply (2), and Hume's good reasons for (1) are not good reasons for (2). This essay accepts (1) and argues against (2). A priori reasoning plays a role in causal inference. Familiar examples from Hume and from classroom examples of sudden disappearances and radical changes do not show otherwise. A (...)
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  36. David H. Sanford (1983). Impartial Perception. Philosophy 58 (225):392 - 395.score: 30.0
    Wittgenstein remarks in the "Tractatus" that the eye is not in the visual field. I question the claim of Michael Dummett and P T Geach that reflection on this remark helps one conceive of an observer perceiving objects in space without having any location in that space. The literal meaning of "point of view" is illustrated by the visual field. Reflection on the fact that the point of view is not itself normally an object of sight is no help in (...)
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  37. David H. Sanford (1976). Competing Semantics of Vagueness: Many Values Versus Super-Truth. Synthese 33 (2-4):195--210.score: 30.0
    A semantics of vagueness should reject the principle that every statement has a truth-value yet retain the classical tautologies. A many-value, non-truth-functional semantics and a semantics of super-valuations each have this result. According to the super-valuation approach, 'if a man with n hairs on his head is bald, then a man with n plus one hairs on his head is also bald' is false because it comes out false no matter how the vague predicate 'is bald' is appropriately made precise. (...)
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  38. David H. Sanford (1966). Red, Green and Absolute Determinacy: A Reply to C. Radford's Incompatibilities of Colours. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (October):356-358.score: 30.0
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  39. David H. Sanford (1976). What Could Have Happened. Noûs 10 (September):313-326.score: 30.0
    Morton White proposes two patterns of expansion for sentences of the form "Possible (x is Q)" in "On What Could Have Happened" (Philosophical Review, 1968). His attempts in "Ands and Cans" (Mind, 1974) and in "Positive Freedom, Negative Freedom, and Possibility" (Journal of Philosophy, 1973) to simplify these two patterns and his argument for abandoning the first pattern are mistaken. Although I question a number of White's claims, my purpose is to improve his treatment of possibility rather than to refute (...)
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  40. David H. Sanford (1986). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting By Daniel C. Dennett Clarendon Press, 1985, X + 200 Pp., £17.50, £7.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Philosophy 61 (238):547-.score: 30.0
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  41. David H. Sanford (1976). The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship. Journal of Philosophy 73 (8):193-207.score: 30.0
    I criticize and emend J L Mackie's account of causal priority by replacing ‘fixity’ in its central clause by 'x is a causal condition of y, but y is not a causal condition of x'. This replacement works only if 'is a causal condition of' is not a symmetric relation. Even apart from our desire to account for causal priority, it is desirable to have an account of nonsymmetric conditionship. Truth, for example, is a condition of knowledge, but knowledge is (...)
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  42. Amanda J. Hickman & Melanie S. Sanford (2012). High-Valent Organometallic Copper and Palladium in Catalysis. In Jeffrey Kastner (ed.), Nature. Mit Press. 484--7393.score: 30.0
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  43. S. C. Garrod & A. J. Sanford (1982). The Mental Representation of Discourse in a Focussed Memory System: Implications for the Interpretation of Anaphoric Noun Phrases. Journal of Semantics 1 (1):21-41.score: 30.0
    To a cognitive psychologist discourse comprehension poses a number of interesting problems both in terms of mental representation and mental operations. In this paper we suggest that certain of these problems can be brought into clear focus by employing a procedural approach to discourse description. In line with this approach a general framework for the mental representation of discourse is discussed in which distinctions between different types of memory partitions are proposed. It is argued that one needs to distinguish both (...)
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  44. Anthony J. Sanford (2002). Context, Attention and Depth of Processing During Interpretation. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):188–206.score: 30.0
  45. Simon C. Garrod & Anthony J. Sanford (1988). Discourse Models as Interfaces Between Language and the Spatial World. Journal of Semantics 6 (1):147-160.score: 30.0
    This paper outlines an argument that the meaning of spatial terms depends critically upon our mental models of space. We argue that such models capture the functional geometry of spatial scenes to represent various control relations between the objects in the scene. The discussion centres around two analyses. First, an analysis of the spatial descriptions taken from task oriented dialogue, which seem to reflect a number of distinct mental models of the same visual scene, and secondly an analysis of simple (...)
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  46. Linda M. Moxey & Anthony J. Sanford (1993). Communicating Quantities: A Psychological Perspective (Essays in Cognitive Psychology). Psychology Press.score: 30.0
  47. Laurence Parker, Michelle Kelly & Jaymin Sanford (1998). The Urban Context of Schools and Education: Community, Commitment, and Change. Educational Theory 48 (1):123-137.score: 30.0
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  48. David H. Sanford (1975). Borderline Logic. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.score: 30.0
    To accommodate vague statements and predicates, I propose an infinite-valued, non-truth-functional interpretation of logic on which the tautologies are exactly the tautologies of classical two-valued logic. iI introduce a determinacy operator, analogous to the necessity operator in alethic modal logic, to allow the definition of first-order and higher-order borderline cases. On the interpretation proposed for determinacy, every statement corresponding to a theorem of modal system T is a logical truth, and I conjecture that every logical truth on the interpretation corresponds (...)
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  49. Whitney Sanford (2009). The Future of Food. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (2):181-190.score: 30.0
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  50. David H. Sanford (1977). The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to Barker. Dialogue 16 (03):485-498.score: 30.0
    According to John A Barker, whether an argument begs the question is purely a matter of logical form (Dialogue, 1976). According to me, it is also a matter of epistemic conditions; some arguments which beg the question in some contexts need not beg the question in every context (Analysis, 1972). I point out difficulties in Barker's treatment and defend my own views against some of his criticisms. In the concluding section, "Alleged difficulties with disjunctive syllogism," I defend the validity of (...)
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