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Profile: Santiago Echeverri (University of Geneva)
  1. Santiago Echeverri (2014). Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism. In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva. 550-580.
  2. Santiago Echeverri (2013). Is Perception a Source of Reasons? Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
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  3. Santiago Echeverri (2011). Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience. In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience et réflexivité: perspectives au-delà de l’empirisme et de l’idéalisme. L'Harmattan.
    Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is (...)
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  4. Santiago Echeverri (2011). McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could be (...)
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  5. Santiago Echeverri (2004). Kant's Transcendental Philosophy and the Argument from Illusion. Pensamiento 60 (227):247-277.
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