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  1. Sara Rachel Chant (2015). Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):83-92.
    In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.
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  2. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality. OUP Usa.
    Acting together requires collective intentions. The contributions to this volume seek to critically assess or to enrich theories of collective intentionality by exploring topics such as collective belief, mutual coordination, and the explanation of group behavior.
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  3. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Includes essays that challenge the need for a theory of collective intentionality as well as essays that extend and enrich existing theories of collective intentionality The essays concerning collective rationality (part II) break new ground in that they challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become (...)
     
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  4. Frank Hindriks, Sara Rachel Chant & Gerhard Preyer (2014). Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five. In Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. 1-9.
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  5. Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2008). Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action. Mind 117 (467):549-573.
    Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group must have beliefs about the beliefs of the other members. But in spite of the fact that this so-called "interactive knowledge" is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive knowledge. In this paper, we argue that such an account (...)
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  6. Hans-Johan Glock, Judith Baker, Eliza Block, Sarah Buss, Sara Rachel Chant, Zachary Ernst, Gopal Sreenivasan & Sungho Choi (2008). Index of MIND Vol. 117 Nos 1–4, 2008. Mind 117:468.
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  7. Sara Rachel Chant (2007). Unintentional Collective Action. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.
    In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called 'aggregate action.' Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I (...)
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  8. Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2007). Group Intentions as Equilibria. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.
    In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
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  9. Zachary Ernst & Sara Rachel Chant (2007). Collective Action as Individual Choice. Studia Logica 86 (3):415 - 434.
    We argue that conceptual analyses of collective action should be informed by game-theoretic analyses of collective action. In particular, we argue that Ariel Rubenstein’s so-called ‘Electronic Mail Game’ provides a useful model of collective action, and of the formation of collective intentions.
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  10. Sara Rachel Chant (2006). The Special Composition Question in Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):422–441.
    Just as we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of objects composes a single object, we may ask whether, and under what conditions, a collection of actions composes a single action. In the material objects literature, this question is known as the "special composition question," and I take it that there is a similar question to be asked of collections of actions. I will call that question the "special composition question in action," and argue that the correct (...)
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  11. Sara Rachel Chant (2004). Composite Action. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    Philosophical theories of action have been dominated by the view that the presence of certain kinds of intentions on the part of the agent are the mark of action. Specifically, action theorists have typically based their analyses on the premise that whether something is an action depends on whether what was done was purposeful, goal-directed, or intended, and that it was brought about in some way by or done with an intention of the agent. Furthermore, action theorists have been mainly (...)
     
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