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  1. Sarah McGrath, Ethics And.
    We pretend that philosophical problems divide into the various subfields of philosophy, but to take this pretense too seriously is a mistake. Philosophical problems often raise issues within more than one subfield, and require knowledge of and insights from several subfields. To pretend that ethical questions can be pursued in isolation from the rest of philosophy would be to miss out on a great deal. This course will highlight some recent, cutting—edge work on problems at the overlap of ethics and (...)
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  2. Sarah McGrath (2011). Moral Knowledge and Experience1. Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6 6:107.
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  3. Sarah McGrath (2011). Reply to King. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:235-241.
    In “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise” (2007), I offer an argument for the conclusion that our controversial moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I defend that argument against the criticisms put forth by Nathan King in his “McGrath on Moral Knowledge.”.
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  4. Sarah McGrath (2011). Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.
    In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution.
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  5. Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath (2010). Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough? Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.
    Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...)
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  6. Sarah McGrath (2010). Moral Realism Without Convergence. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):59-90.
    It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that we have no reason to think that it is true, and that the only convergence claims (...)
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  7. Sarah McGrath (2009). The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference1. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
    Case B. You tell me that eating meat is immoral. Although I believe that, left to my own devices, I would not think this, no matter how long I reflected, I adopt your attitude as my own. It is not that I believe that you are better informed about potentially relevant non-moral facts (e.g., about the conditions under which livestock is kept, or about the typical effects of eliminating meat from one’s diet). On the contrary, I know that I have (...)
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  8. Sarah McGrath (2007). Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 4. Oxford University Press. 87-108.
    The phenomenon of persistent ethical disagreement is often cited in connection with the question of whether there is any ‘‘absolute’’ morality, or whether, instead, morality is in some sense merely ‘‘a matter of personal opinion’’. Citing disagreement, many people who hold strong views about controversial issues such as the permissibility of abortion, eating meat, or the death penalty deny that these views are anything more than ‘‘personal beliefs’’. But while there might be inconsistencies lurking in this position, it is not (...)
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  9. Sarah Mcgrath (2006). Organ Procurement, Altruism, and Autonomy. Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (2-3):297-309.
  10. Sarah McGrath (2005). Causation by Omission: A Dilemma. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):125--48.
    Some omissions seem to be causes. For example, suppose Barry promises to water Alice’s plant, doesn’t water it, and that the plant then dries up and dies. Barry’s not watering the plant – his omitting to water the plant – caused its death. But there is reason to believe that if omissions are ever causes, then there is far more causation by omission than we ordinarily think. In other words, there is reason to think the following thesis true.
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  11. Sarah McGrath (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
    On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it would have (...)
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  12. Sarah McGrath (2003). Causation and the Making/Allowing Distinction. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):81 - 106.
    Throw: Harry throws a stone at Dick, hitting him. Intuitively, there is a moral difference between the first and the second case of each of these pairs.1 In the second case, the agent’s behavior is morally worse than his behavior in the first case. But in each pair, the agent’s behavior has the same outcome: in No Check and Shoot, the outcome is that a child dies, and Jim saves $40; in No Catch and Throw, the outcome is that Dick (...)
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