11 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Sarah Moss (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
  1. Sarah Moss (forthcoming). On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary. Semantics and Pragmatics.
    This paper motivates and develops a novel semantics for several epistemic expressions, including possibility modals and indicative conditionals. The semantics I defend constitutes an alternative to standard truth conditional theories, as it assigns sets of probability spaces as sentential semantic values. I argue that what my theory lacks in conservatism is made up for by its strength. In particular, my semantics accounts for the distinctive behavior of nested epistemic modals, indicative conditionals embedded under probability operators, and instances of constructive dilemma (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Sarah Moss (forthcoming). Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
    This paper defines and defends time-slice epistemology, according to which there are no essentially diachronic norms of rationality. First I motivate and distinguish two notions of time-slice epistemology. Then I defend time-slice theories of action under indeterminacy, i.e. theories about how you should act when the outcome of your decision depends on some indeterminate claim. I raise objections to a theory of action under indeterminacy recently defended by Robbie Williams, and I propose some alternative theories in its place. Throughout this (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Sarah Moss (2014). Credal Dilemmas. Noûs 48 (3):n/a-n/a.
  4. Sarah Moss (2013). Epistemology Formalized. Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
    This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple diagnosis of probabilistic analogs of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest-relative.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Sarah Moss (2013). Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.
    This paper argues that several leading theories of subjunctive conditionals are incompatible with ordinary intuitions about what credences we ought to have in subjunctive conditionals. In short, our theory of subjunctives should intuitively display semantic humility, i.e. our semantic theory should deliver the truth conditions of sentences without pronouncing on whether those conditions actually obtain. In addition to describing intuitions about subjunctive conditionals, I argue that we can derive these ordinary intuitions from justified premises, and I answer a possible worry (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Sarah Moss (2012). Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):671-686.
    I demonstrate that the theory of persistence defended in Sider [2001] does not accommodate our intuitions about counting sentences. I develop two theories that improve on Sider's: a contextualist theory and an error theory. I argue that the latter is stronger, simpler, and better fitted to some important ordinary language judgments than rival four-dimensionalist theories of persistence.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sarah Moss (2012). On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals. Noûs 46 (3):561-586.
    Recently, von Fintel (2001) and Gillies (2007) have argued that certain sequences of counterfactuals, namely reverse Sobel sequences, should motivate us to abandon standard truth conditional theories of counterfactuals for dynamic semantic theories. I argue that we can give a pragmatic account of our judgments about counterfactuals without giving up the standard semantics. In particular, I introduce a pragmatic principle governing assertability, and I use this principle to explain a variety of subtle data concerning reverse Sobel sequences.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Sarah Moss (2012). Solving the Color Incompatibility Problem. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):841-851.
    It is commonly held that Wittgenstein abandoned the Tractatus largely because of a problem concerning color incompatibility. My aim is to solve this problem on Wittgenstein’s behalf. First I introduce the central program of the Tractatus (§1) and the color incompatibility problem (§2). Then I solve the problem without abandoning any Tractarian ideas (§3), and show that given certain weak assumptions, the central program of the Tractatus can in fact be accomplished (§4). I conclude by distinguishing my system of analysis (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Sarah Moss (2012). The Role of Linguistics in the Philosophy of Language. In Delia Graff Fara & Gillian Russell (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language.
    This paper discusses several case studies that illustrate the relationship between the philosophy of language and three branches of linguistics: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Among other things, I identify binding arguments in the linguistics literature preceding (Stanley 2000), and I invent binding arguments to evaluate various semantic and pragmatic theories of belief ascriptions.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Sarah Moss (2012). Updating as Communication. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
    Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Sarah Moss (2011). Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise. Mind 120 (480):1053-1069.
    It is commonly assumed that when we assign different credences to a proposition, a perfect compromise between our opinions simply ‘splits the difference’ between our credences. I introduce and defend an alternative account, namely that a perfect compromise maximizes the average of the expected epistemic values that we each assign to alternative credences in the disputed proposition. I compare the compromise strategy I introduce with the traditional strategy of compromising by splitting the difference, and I argue that my strategy is (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation