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Profile: Sarah Robins (University of Kansas)
  1. Sarah K. Robins & Carl F. Craver (2009). Biological Clocks: Explaining with Models of Mechanisms. In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 41--67.
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    Carl F. Craver & Sarah K. Robins (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms, Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be used (...)
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    Sarah Robins, Dina Ghosh, Nicole Rosales & Rebecca Treiman, Letter Knowledge in Parent–Child Conversations: Differences Between Families Differing in Socio-Economic Status.
    Copyright © 2014 Robins, Ghosh, Rosales and Treiman. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
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    Sarah Robins & Carl Craver (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms , Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be (...)
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    Sarah Robins (2014). How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory. Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):903-915.
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  6. Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (2009). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    _The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology_ is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-two chapters organised into six clear parts: I. Historical background to the philosophy of psychology II. Psychological explanation III. Cognition and representation IV. The biological basis of psychology V. Perceptual experience VI. Personhood The _Companion_ covers key topics such (...)
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