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Sarah Robins [8]Sarah K. Robins [5]
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Profile: Sarah Robins (University of Kansas)
  1.  6
    Sarah K. Robins (2016). Misremembering. Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):432-447.
    The Archival and Constructive views of memory offer contrasting characterizations of remembering and its relation to memory errors. I evaluate the descriptive adequacy of each by offering a close analysis of one of the most prominent experimental techniques by which memory errors are elicited—the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. Explaining the DRM effect requires appreciating it as a distinct form of memory error, which I refer to as misremembering. Misremembering is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event. It (...)
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  2.  10
    Sarah Robins (forthcoming). Representing the Past: Memory Traces and the Causal Theory of Memory. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    According to the Causal Theory of Memory, remembering a particular past event requires a causal connection between that event and its subsequent representation in memory, specifically, a connection sustained by a memory trace. The CTM is the default view of memory in contemporary philosophy, but debates persist over what the involved memory traces must be like. Martin and Deutscher argued that the CTM required memory traces to be structural analogues of past events. Bernecker and Michaelian, contemporary CTM proponents, reject structural (...)
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  3.  3
    Sarah K. Robins (forthcoming). Contiguity and the Causal Theory of Memory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker’s Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying (...)
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  4. Sarah K. Robins & Carl F. Craver (2009). Biological Clocks: Explaining with Models of Mechanisms. In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 41--67.
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  5.  71
    Carl F. Craver & Sarah K. Robins (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms, Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be used (...)
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  6.  7
    Sarah K. Robins (2016). Optogenetics and the Mechanism of False Memory. Synthese 193 (5):1561-1583.
    Constructivists about memory argue that memory is a capacity for building representations of past events from a generalized information store. The view is motivated by the memory errors discovered in cognitive psychology. Little has been known about the neural mechanisms by which false memories are produced. Recently, using a method I call the Optogenetic False Memory Technique, neuroscientists have created false memories in mice. In this paper, I examine how Constructivism fares in light of O-FaMe results. My aims are two-fold. (...)
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  7.  26
    Sarah Robins & Carl Craver (2011). No Nonsense Neuro-Law. Neuroethics 4 (3):195-203.
    In Minds, Brains, and Norms , Pardo and Patterson deny that the activities of persons (knowledge, rule-following, interpretation) can be understood exclusively in terms of the brain, and thus conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant to the law, and to the conceptual and philosophical questions that arise in legal contexts. On their view, such appeals to neuroscience are an exercise in nonsense. We agree that understanding persons requires more than understanding brains, but we deny their pessimistic conclusion. Whether neuroscience can be (...)
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  8.  20
    Sarah Robins (2014). How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory. Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):903-915.
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  9.  3
    Sarah Robins, Dina Ghosh, Nicole Rosales & Rebecca Treiman, Letter Knowledge in Parent–Child Conversations: Differences Between Families Differing in Socio-Economic Status.
    Copyright © 2014 Robins, Ghosh, Rosales and Treiman. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
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  10.  1
    Sarah Robins, Mindreading and Tacit Knowledge.
    This is the author's final draft. Copyright 2014 Elsevier.
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  11. Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.) (2009). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    _The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology_ is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-two chapters organised into six clear parts: I. Historical background to the philosophy of psychology II. Psychological explanation III. Cognition and representation IV. The biological basis of psychology V. Perceptual experience VI. Personhood The _Companion_ covers key topics such (...)
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  12. Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (2017). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
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  13. Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.) (2009). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    _The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology_ is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-two chapters organised into six clear parts: I. Historical background to the philosophy of psychology II. Psychological explanation III. Cognition and representation IV. The biological basis of psychology V. Perceptual experience VI. Personhood The _Companion_ covers key topics such (...)
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