10 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)
Profile: Sarah Wright (Birkbeck College)
  1. Sarah Wright (2013). A Neo‐Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):262-275.
    What is the best model of epistemic agency for virtue epistemology? Insofar as the intellectual and moral virtues are similar, it is desirable to develop models of agency that are similar across the two realms. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics present a model of the virtues on which the moral and intellectual virtues are unified. The Stoics’ materialism and determinism also help to explain how we can be responsible for our beliefs even when we cannot believe otherwise. In this paper I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Sarah Wright (2012). How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (2):113-126.
    Abstract Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism about (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Sarah Wright (2011). Hume on Testimony: A Virtue-Theoretic Defense. History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (3):247.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Sarah Wright (2011). Invasive Species and the Loss of Beta Diversity. Ethics and the Environment 16 (1):75-98.
    As I travel the highways of Georgia, I am regularly appalled by the ubiquitous presence of kudzu. It covers trees, telephone poles, open swathes of land, and old houses, making many locations indistinguishable from one another; all I can see from the road is a wave of green covering any formerly distinctive markings. Thinking back to the intentional introduction of kudzu to the American southeast, I recognize that those individuals who encouraged the planting of kudzu made a serious mistake.1 Their (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Sarah Wright (2011). Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach. Episteme 8 (1):99-111.
    Attributor contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism both suggest ways in which our concept of knowledge depends on a context. Both offer approaches that incorporate traditionally non-epistemic elements into our standards for knowledge. But neither can account for the fact that the social role of a subject affects the standards that the subject must meet in order to warrant a knowledge attribution. I illustrate the dependence of the standards for knowledge on the social roles of the knower with three types of examplesand (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Sarah Wright (2010). Internalist Virtues and Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.
    What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, i.e., as depending only on internal states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play any role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagzebski is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sarah Wright (2010). Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):95-114.
    Abstract: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism (from Keith DeRose) and methodological contextualism (from Michael Williams). I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Sarah Wright (2009). The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):91-112.
    If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. David Schmidtz & Sarah Wright (2008). What Nozick Did for Decision Theory. In , Person, Polis, Planet: Essays in Applied Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 282-294.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Schmidtz & Sarah Wright (2004). What Nozick Did for Decision Theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):282–294.