Search results for 'Sayward Charles' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Charles Sayward (1975). Pragmatics and Indexicality. Pragmatics Microfiche 1 (4):D5-D11.score: 420.0
    A conception of pragmatics distinguishes pragmatics from semantics proper in terms of indexicality: semantics is conceived as the quest for a truth definition for languages without indexical expressions; pragmatics is conceived as a quest for a truth definition for languages with indexical expressions. I argue that indexicality is not a feature that can be used to capture anything like what Morris and Carnap had in mind.
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  2. Charles Sayward (1971). More on Assertion and Belief. Philosophical Studies 22 (1-2):20 - 24.score: 360.0
    In an earlier paper Sayward argued that a speaker could not make an assertion by uttering a sentence of form “p, but I believe not-p” given that the speaker spoke honestly and literally. Robert Imlay criticized some things said in that earlier paper. This paper responds to those criticisms.
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  3. Charles Sayward (1972). True Propositions: A Reply to C.J.F. Williams. Analysis 32 (3):101-106.score: 360.0
    This paper replies to points Williams makes to his reply to Sayward’s criticism of Williams’s proposal of ‘for some p ___ states that p & p’ as an analysis of ‘___ is true’.
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  4. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1987). Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence. Theory and Decision 50:67-75.score: 300.0
    Fundamental to Quine’s philosophy of logic is the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This paper considers the content of this claim and the reasons for thinking it is true.
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  5. Charles Sayward (2006). What Truth is There in Psychological Egoism? Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):145-159.score: 300.0
    Psychological egoism says that a purposive action is self-interested in a certain sense. The trick is to say in what sense. On the one hand, the psychological egoist wants to avoid a thesis that can be falsified by trivial examples. On the other hand, what is wanted is a thesis that lacks vacuity. The paper’s purpose is to arrive at such a thesis and show that it is a reasonable guess with empirical content.
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  6. Charles Sayward (2003). Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism? Facta Philosophica 5:173-182.score: 300.0
    Hilary Putnam suggests that the essence of the realist conception of mathematics is that the statements of mathematics are objective so that the true ones are objectively true. An argument for mathematical realism, thus conceived, is implicit in Putnam's writing. The first premise is that within currently accepted science there are objective truths. Next is the premise that some of these statements logically imply statements of pure mathematics. The conclusion drawn is that some statements of pure mathematics are objectively true. (...)
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  7. Charles Sayward & Wayne Wasserman (1981). Has Nozick Justified the State? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:411-415.score: 300.0
    In ANARCY, STATE AND UTOPIA Robert Nozick says that the fundamental question of political philosophy, one that precedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there should be any state at all. In the first part of his book he attempts to justify the state. We argue that he is not successful.
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  8. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1979). A Problem About Conversational Implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):19 - 25.score: 300.0
    Conversational implicatures are easy to grasp for the most part. But it is another matter to give a rational reconstruction of how they are grasped. We argue that Grice's attempt to do this fails. We distinguish two sorts of cases: (1) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves what would the speaker have to believe given that what he said is such as is required by the talk exchange; (2) those in which we grasp the implicature by (...)
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  9. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1999). Null Sentences. Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.score: 300.0
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
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  10. Charles Sayward (2007). Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality. Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.score: 300.0
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends that (...)
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  11. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.score: 300.0
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is possible.
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  12. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1981). Bound Variables and Schematic Letters. Logique Et Analyse 95:425-429.score: 300.0
    The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
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  13. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1989). Are All Tautologies True? Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.score: 300.0
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  14. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1985). Is Moral Relativism Consistent? Analysis 45 (1):40-44.score: 300.0
    Let C1 and C2 be distinct moral codes formulated in English. Let C1 contain a norm N and C2 its negation. The paper construes the moral relativist as saying that if both codes are consistent, then, in the strongest sense of correctness applicable to moral norms, they are also both correct in the sense that they contain only correct moral norms. If we believe that the physical statements of English are true (false) in English, we will reject an analogous statement (...)
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  15. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1995). What’s So Special About Sentences? Communication and Cognition 28 (4):409-25.score: 300.0
    This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...)
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  16. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2002). There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification. Theoria 68 (1):4-12.score: 300.0
    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This is what is defended in (...)
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  17. Charles Sayward (2003). Applying the Concept of Pain. Iyyun 52 (July):290-300.score: 300.0
    This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in which the pretending possibility is reasonable, these cases always contain some element that makes it reasonable. This will be the element we ask for when we ask why pretending possibility is raised. Knowledge that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or neutralizing its pain-negating aspect.
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  18. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). Kripke on Necessity and Identity. Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.score: 300.0
    It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.
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  19. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1994). The Internal/External Question. Grazier Philosophishe Studien 47:31-41.score: 300.0
    For Rudolf Carnap the question ‘Do numbers exist?’ does not have just one sense. Asked from within mathematics, it has a trivial answer that could not possibly divide philosophers of mathematics. Asked from outside of mathematics, it lacks meaning. This paper discusses Carnap’s distinction and defends much of what he has to say.
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  20. George Englebretsen & Charles Sayward (2010). Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics. continuum.score: 300.0
    This title introduces students to non-classical logic, syllogistic, to quantificational and modal logic. The book includes exercises throughout and a glossary of terms and symbols. Taking students beyond classical mathematical logic, "Philosophical Logic" is a wide-ranging introduction to more advanced topics in the study of philosophical logic. Starting by contrasting familiar classical logic with constructivist or intuitionist logic, the book goes on to offer concise but easy-to-read introductions to such subjects as quantificational and syllogistic logic, modal logic and set theory. (...)
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  21. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1987). Domains of Discourse. Logique Et Analyse 117:173-176.score: 300.0
    Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
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  22. Charles Sayward (2006). What is the Logic of Propositional Identity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1):3-15.score: 300.0
    Propositional identity is not expressed by a predicate. So its logic is not given by the ordinary first order axioms for identity. What are the logical axioms governing this concept, then? Some axioms in addition to those proposed by Arthur Prior are proposed.
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  23. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1990). Offices and God. Sophia 29:29-34.score: 300.0
    Pavel Tichy presents an interpretation of Anselm’s Proslogion III argument. Tichy presents an interpretation of this argument and raises doubts about one of the premises. The authors contend that Tichy’s interpretation of Anselm is wrong. The argument Tichy comes to raise doubts about is not Anselm’s.
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  24. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1990). Moral Relativism and Deontic Logic. Synthese 85 (1):139 - 152.score: 300.0
    If a native of India asserts "Killing cattle is wrong" and a Nebraskan asserts "Killing cattle is not wrong", and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral (...)
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  25. Charles Sayward (2001). On Some Much Maligned Remarks of Wittgenstein on Gödel. Philosophical Investigations 24 (3):262–270.score: 300.0
    In "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics" Wittgenstein discusses an argument that goes from Gödel’s incompleteness result to the conclusion that some truths of mathematics are unprovable. Wittgenstein takes issue with this argument. Wittgenstein’s remarks in this connection have received very negative reaction from some very prominent people, for example, Gödel and Dummett. The paper is a defense of what Wittgenstein has to say about the argument in question.
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  26. Charles Sayward (1978). Strawson on Categories. Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (3):83-87.score: 300.0
    A type theory constructed with reference to a particular language will associate with each monadic predicate P of that language a class of individuals C(P) of which it is categorically significant to predicate P (or which P spans, for short). The extension of P is a subset of C(P), which is a subset of the language’s universe of discourse. The set C(P) is a category discriminated by the language. The relation 'is spanned by the same predicates as' divides the language’s (...)
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  27. Charles Sayward (1989). Does the Law of Excluded Middle Require Bivalence? Erkenntnis 31 (1):129 - 137.score: 300.0
    Determining whether the law of excluded middle requires bivalence depends upon whether we are talking about sentences or propositions. If we are talking about sentences, neither side has a decisive case. If we are talking of propositions, there is a strong argument on the side of those who say the excluded middle does require bivalence. I argue that all challenges to this argument can be met.
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  28. Charles Sayward (2004). Malcolm on Criteria. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):349-358.score: 300.0
    Consider the general proposition that normally when people pain-behave they are in pain. Where a traditional philosopher like Mill tries to give an empirical proof of this proposition (the argument from analogy), Malcolm tries to give a transcendental proof. Malcolm’s argument is transcendental in that he tries to show that the very conditions under which we can have a concept provide for the application of the concept and the knowledge that the concept is truly as well as properly applied. The (...)
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  29. Charles Sayward (2005). Thompson Clarke and the Problem of Other Minds. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):1-14.score: 300.0
    The force of sceptical inquiries into out knowledge of other people is a paradigm of the force that philosophical views can have. Sceptical views arise out of philosophical inquiries that are identical in all major respects with inquiries that we employ in ordinary cases. These inquiries employ perfectly mundane methods of making and assessing claims to know. This paper tries to show that these inquiries are conducted in cases that lack certain contextual ingredients found in ordinary cases. The paper concludes (...)
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  30. Eric Russert Kraemer & Charles Sayward (1980). Dualism and the Argument From Continuity. Philosophical Studies 37 (January):55-59.score: 300.0
    One of the things C. D Broad argued many years ago is that certain 'scientific' arguments against dualist interactionism come back in the end to a metaphysical bias in favor of materialism. Here the authors pursue this basic strategy against another 'scientific' argument against dualism itself. The argument is called 'the argument from continuity'. According to this argument the fact that organisms and species develop by insensible gradations renders dualism implausible. The authors try to demonstrate that this argument fails to (...)
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  31. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1990). Tractatus 6.2–6.22. Philosophical Investigations 13 (2):126-136.score: 300.0
    It is argued that Wittgenstein’s remarks 6.2-6.22 Tractatus fare well when one focuses on non-quantificational arithmetic, but they are problematic when one moves to quantificational arithmetic.
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  32. Charles Sayward (1989). Do Moral Explanations Matter? Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.score: 300.0
    Nicholas Sturgeon has claimed that moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. He claims that the correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize all other anti-realist views. This paper argues that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanation is consistent with moral relativism.
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  33. Charles Sayward (2002). A Conversation About Numbers. Philosophia 29 (1-4):191-209.score: 300.0
    This is a dialogue in which five characters are involved. Various issues in the philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Among those issues are these: numbers as abstract objects, our knowledge of numbers as abstract objects, a proof as showing a mathematical statement to be true as opposed to the statement being true in virtue of having a proof.
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  34. Charles Sayward (1980). Expressing Propositions. Proceedings of the 1979 Mid America Linguistics Conference 10:93-100.score: 300.0
    The paper’s purpose is to get clearer on what it is to express a proposition. A proposition is understood as anything that can be asserted, assumed, conjectured, stated, believed, and so on. It is not something that can be asked, ordered, requested, and so on. The paper tries to provide groundwork for a successful analysis by making distinctions and clarifying problems.
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  35. Douglas Erlandson & Charles Sayward (1981). Is Heaven a Possible World? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):55 - 58.score: 300.0
    The goal of theodicy is to show how God could create our world with all its evil. This paper argues that the theodicist can achieve her goal only if she gives up one of these three propositions: (1) evil does not exist in heaven; (2) heaven is better than the present world; (3) heaven is a possible world. Second, it is argued that the theodicist can reject (3) without giving up her belief that heaven exists, so that (3) is her (...)
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  36. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1999). Did the Greeks Discover the Irrationals? Philosophy 74 (2):169-176.score: 300.0
    A popular view is that the great discovery of Pythagoras was that there are irrational numbers, e.g., the positive square root of two. Against this it is argued that mathematics and geometry, together with their applications, do not show that there are irrational numbers or compel assent to that proposition.
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  37. Charles Sayward (2003). A Defense of Mill on Other Minds. Dialectica 57 (3):315–322.score: 300.0
    This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
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  38. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.score: 300.0
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  39. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). Two Concepts of Truth. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):35 - 58.score: 300.0
    In this paper the authors recapitulate, justify, and defend against criticism the extension of the redundancy theory of truth to cover a wide range of uses of ‘true’ and ‘false’. In this they are guided by the work of A. N. Prior. They argue Prior was right about the scope and limits of the redundancy theory and that the line he drew between those uses of ‘true’ which are and are not susceptible to treatment via redundancy serves to distinguish two (...)
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  40. Charles Sayward (2005). A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Mathematics. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (2):55-69.score: 300.0
    Three theses are gleaned from Wittgenstein’s writing. First, extra-mathematical uses of mathematical expressions are not referential uses. Second, the senses of the expressions of pure mathematics are to be found in their uses outside of mathematics. Third, mathematical truth is fixed by mathematical proof. These theses are defended. The philosophy of mathematics defined by the three theses is compared with realism, nominalism, and formalism.
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  41. Charles Sayward & Wayne Wasserman (1990). Nagel, Internalism, and Relativism. Journal of Philosophical Research 1990:310-319.score: 300.0
    In this paper we give (1) a new interpretation to Nagel’s THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM and (2) use that interpretation to show that internalism and anti-realism are compatible, despite appearances to the contrary.
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  42. Charles Sayward (1987). Prior’s Theory of Truth. Analysis 47 (2):83-87.score: 300.0
    This paper is a critical exposition of Prior’s theory of truth as expressed by the following truth locutions: (1) ‘it is true that’ prefixed to sentences; (2) ‘true proposition’; (3) true belief’, ‘true assertion’, ‘true statement’, etc.; (4) ‘true sentence’.
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  43. Charles Sayward (1988). W.D. Ross on Acting From Motives. Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (4):299-306.score: 300.0
    This paper defends a position held by W, D, Ross that it is no part of one’s duty to have a certain motive since one cannot by choice have it here and now.
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  44. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. rodopi.score: 300.0
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by (...)
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  45. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2000). Frege on Identities. History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.score: 300.0
    The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...)
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  46. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1987). Relativism and Ontology. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):278-290.score: 300.0
    This paper deals with the question of whether there is objectivist truth about set-theoretic matters. The dogmatist and skeptic agree that there is such truth. They disagree about whether this truth is knowable. In contrast, the relativist says there is no objective truth to be known. Two versions of relativism are distinguished in the paper. One of these versions is defended.
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  47. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1982). Indenumerability and Substitutional Quantification. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (4):358-366.score: 300.0
    We here establish two theorems which refute a pair of what we believe to be plausible assumptions about differences between objectual and substitutional quantification. The assumptions (roughly stated) are as follows: (1) there is at least one set d and denumerable first order language L such that d is the domain set of no interpretation of L in which objectual and substitutional quantification coincide. (2) There exist interpreted, denumerable, first order languages K with indenumerable domains such that substitutional quantification deviates (...)
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  48. Charles Sayward (1990). Four Views of Arithmetical Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):155-168.score: 300.0
    Four views of arithmetical truth are distinguished: the classical view, the provability view, the extended provability view, the criterial view. The main problem with the first is the ontology it requires one to accept. Two anti-realist views are the two provability views. The first of these is judged to be preferable. However, it requires a non-trivial account of the provability of axioms. The criterial view is gotten from remarks Wittgenstein makes in Tractatus 6.2-6.22 . It is judged to be the (...)
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  49. Charles Sayward (2005). Steiner Versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical Truth. Theoria 20 (3):347-352.score: 300.0
    Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
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  50. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1992). Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps. Philosophical Papers 21 (2):141-150.score: 300.0
    An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends this (...)
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