Search results for 'Scientific Change' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2010). Putnam's Account of Apriority and Scientific Change: Its Historical and Contemporary Interest. Synthese 176 (3):429-445.score: 90.0
    In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and (...)
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  2. Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008). Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison. Springer.score: 90.0
    The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with a focus on the history (...)
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  3. Rogier De Langhe, Scientific Change.score: 75.0
  4. Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.) (1979). The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change. North-Holland Pub. Co..score: 66.0
  5. Otávio Bueno (2008). Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures. Studia Logica 89 (2):213 - 235.score: 60.0
    Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version (...)
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  6. Dudley Shapere (1989). Evolution and Continuity in Scientific Change. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):419-437.score: 60.0
    The alleged problem of "incommensurability" is examined, and attempts to explain scientific change in terms of concepts of meaning and reference are analyzed and rejected. A way of understanding scientific change through a properly developed concept of "reasons" is presented, and the issues of reasons, meaning, and reference are placed in the context of this broader interpretation of scientific change.
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  7. Otávio Bueno (1999). What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting. Erkenntnis 50 (1):55-81.score: 60.0
    In this paper a constructive empiricist account of scientific change is put forward. Based on da Costa's and French's partial structures approach, two notions of empirical adequacy are initially advanced (with particular emphasis on the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy). Using these notions, it is shown how both the informativeness and the empirical adequacy requirements of an empiricist theory of scientific change can then be met. Finally, some philosophical consequences with regard to the role of (...)
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  8. Hanne Andersen (2010). Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case Study. Episteme 7 (3):248-265.score: 60.0
    Recently, several scholars have argued that scientists can accept scientific claims in a collective process, and that the capacity of scientific groups to form joint acceptances is linked to a functional division of labor between the group members. However, these accounts reveal little about how the cognitive content of the jointly accepted claim is formed, and how group members depend on each other in this process. In this paper, I shall therefore argue that we need to link analyses (...)
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  9. Hanne Andersen & Brian Hepburn, Scientific Change. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    Scientific Change How do scientific theories, concepts and methods change over time? Answers to this question have historical parts and philosophical parts. There can be descriptive accounts of the recorded differences over time of particular theories, concepts, and methods—what might be called the shape of scientific change. Many stories of scientific change attempt to give […].
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  10. George Windholz & P. A. Lamal (1991). Pavlov's View of the Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics as It Relates to Theses Concerning Scientific Change. Synthese 88 (1):97 - 111.score: 60.0
    Pavlov's position on the inheritance of acquired characteristics was used to test selected theses of Laudan et al. (1986) concerning scientific change. It was determined that, despite negative experimental findings, Pavlov continued to accept the possibility of the inheritance of acquired habits. This confirms the main thesis I that, once accepted, theories persist despite negative experimental evidence. Pavolv's adherence to the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics might possibly be explained by his early experiences. Adolescent readings of a (...)
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  11. Xavier de Donato Rodríguez (2007). Idealization, Abduction, and Progressive Scientific Change. Theoria 22 (3):331-338.score: 60.0
    After a brief comparison of Aliseda’s account with different approaches to abductive reasoning, I relate abduction, as studied by Aliseda, to idealization, a notion which also occupies a very important role in scientific change, as well as to different ways of dealing with the growth of scientific knowledge understood as a particular kind of non-monotonic process. A particularly interesting kind of abductive reasoning could be that of finding an appropriate concretization case for a theory, originally revealed as (...)
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  12. Miriam Solomon (1994). Multivariate Models of Scientific Change. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:287 - 297.score: 60.0
    Social scientists regularly make use of multivariate models to describe complex social phenomena. It is argued that this approach is useful for modelling the variety of cognitive and social factors contributing to scientific change, and superior to the integrated models of scientific change currently available. It is also argued that care needs to be taken in drawing normative conclusions: cognitive factors are not instrinsically more "rational" than social factors, nor is it likely that social factors, by (...)
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  13. Xavier Donato Rodríguedez (2007). Idealization, Abduction, and Progressive Scientific Change. Theoria 22 (3):331-338.score: 60.0
    After a brief comparison of Aliseda’s account with different approaches to abductive reasoning, I relate abduction, as studied by Aliseda, to idealization, a notion which also occupies a very important role in scientific change, as well as to different ways of dealing with the growth of scientific knowledge understood as a particular kind of non-monotonic process. A particularly interesting kind of abductive reasoning could be that of finding an appropriate concretization case for a theory, originally revealed as (...)
     
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  14. O. Bueno (2000). Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):269-296.score: 57.0
    The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled (...)
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  15. Gérard Mégie & Robert McGinn (2006). From Stratospheric Ozone to Climate Change: Historical Perspective on Precaution and Scientific Responsibility. Science and Engineering Ethics 12 (4):596-606.score: 54.0
    The issue of the impact of human activities on the stratospheric ozone layer emerged in the early 1970s. But international regulations to mitigate the most serious effects were not adopted until the mid-1980s. This case holds lessons for addressing more complex environmental problems. Concepts that should inform discussion include “latency,’ ‘counter-factual scenario based on the Precautionary Principle,’ ‘inter-generational burden sharing,’ and ‘estimating global costs under factual and counter-factual regulatory scenarios.’ Stringent regulations were adopted when large scientific uncertainty existed, and (...)
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  16. Bryan Mowry (1985). From Galen's Theory to William Harvey's Theory: A Case Study in the Rationality of Scientific Theory Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (1):49-82.score: 54.0
    The history of science is that of older theories being challenged and eventually being superseded by newer theories. The rationality of this process of scientific theory change is a central issue in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper aims to elucidate this topic by examining an episode in the history of medical science, namely the change from Galen's theory of the movement of the heart and blood to Harvey’s theory of the circulation of the blood. In Part (...)
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  17. Hasok Chang (2011). The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change. Erkenntnis 75 (3):413-429.score: 52.0
    Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly accepted continuities (...)
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  18. Kólá ABíMBÓLÁ (2010). Rationality and Methodological Change: Dudley Shapere's Conception of Scientific Development. Principia 10 (1):39-65.score: 51.0
    Over the last 4 or so decades, Dudley Shapere has developed a rich and interesting alternative to the Kuhnian “relativist” account of science and its development. This paper is a review of this alternative viewpoint. It is a critical evaluation of Shapere’s arguments in support of the claim that radical methodological change can be allowed in science without thereby embracing relativism (and without ending with an irrational account of scientific change).
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  19. Joseph Howard Spear (2004). Cumulative Change in Scientific Production: Research Technologies and the Structuring of New Knowledge. Perspectives on Science 12 (1):55-85.score: 51.0
    : This paper seeks to contribute to the development of a sociological understanding of scientific change. It first presents a conceptual framework for defining and understanding the conditions that give rise to episodes of cumulative change (both as the selective reconstruction of events and as the patterned structuring of innovations over time and across different settings). It argues that one of the most powerful structuring mechanisms is the existence of standardized research technologies. Then, the development of electroencephalography (...)
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  20. Ingo Brigandt, Scientific Practice, Conceptual Change, and the Nature of Concepts.score: 48.0
    The theory of concepts advanced in the present discussion aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. To this end, I suggest that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) the concept.
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  21. Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.score: 48.0
    In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like (...)
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  22. John Worrall (1982). Scientific Realism and Scientific Change. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (128):201-231.score: 48.0
    The topic of the paper is the "realism-Instrumentalism" debate concerning the status of scientific theories. Popper's contributions to this debate are critically examined. In the first part his arguments against instrumentalism are considered; it is claimed that none strikes home against better versions of the doctrine (specifically those developed by duhem and poincare). In the second part, Various arguments against realism propounded by duhem and/or poincare (and much discussed by more recent philosophers) are evaluated. These are the arguments from (...)
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  23. Mark Risjord (2007). Scientific Change as Political Action: Franz Boas and the Anthropology of Race. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (1):24-45.score: 48.0
    A theory is value-neutral when no constitutive values are part of its content. Nonneutral theories seem to lack objectivity because it is not clear how the constitutive values could be empirically confirmed. This article analyzes Franz Boas’s famous arguments against nineteenth-century evolutionary anthropology and racial theory. While he recognized that talk of "higher civilizations" encoded a constitutive, political value with consequences for slavery and colonialism, he argued against it on empirical and methodological grounds. Boas’s arguments thus provide a model of (...)
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  24. Darrin W. Belousek (1998). Husserl on Scientific Method and Conceptual Change: A Realist Appraisal. Synthese 115 (1):71-98.score: 48.0
    Husserl claimed that all theoretical scientific concepts originate in and are valid in reference to 'life-world' experience and that scientific traditions preserve the sense and validity of such concepts through unitary and cumulative change. Each of these claims will, in turn, be sympathetically laid out and assessed in comparison with more standard characterizations of scientific method and conceptual change as well as the history of physics, concerning particularly the challenge they may pose for scientific (...)
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  25. Sarina Keller (2010). Scientization: Putting Global Climate Change on the Scientific Agenda and the Role of the IPCC. [REVIEW] Poiesis and Praxis 7 (3):197-209.score: 48.0
    Since the 1970s, climate change has dominated the international scientific and political agenda. In particular, the foundation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change at the end of the 1980s played a major role for the further enhancement of efforts in the field of climate change sciences. However, to understand the interaction of the worldwide coordination of climate change sciences as well as the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and its consequences, (...)
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  26. C. Hasok (1995). The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.score: 48.0
    Many of the experiments that produced the empirical basis of quantum mechanics relied on classical assumptions that contradicted quantum mechanics. Historically this did not cause practical problems, as classical mechanics was used mostly when it did not happen to diverge too much from quantum mechanics in the quantitative sense. That fortunate circumstances, however, did not alleviate the conceptual problems involved in understanding the classical experimental reasoning in quantum-mechanical terms. In general, this type of difficulty can be expected when a coherent (...)
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  27. Dudley Shapere (1984). Objectivity, Rationality, and Scientific Change. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:637 - 663.score: 48.0
    "Objectivity" and "rationality" of science do not depend on freedom from all "presuppositions", but are inextricably bound with the employment of background beliefs, so long as those background beliefs satisfy certain constraints. These latter have developed through application of the same kind of reasoning that they themselves dictate, and change in response to changes in the reasoning-patterns which they themselves generate. This interaction of constraints and reasoning does not eventuate in a vicious circle; rather, what results is a mutual (...)
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  28. Tim Fuller (2012). Is Scientific Theory Change Similar to Early Cognitive Development? Gopnik on Science and Childhood. Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):109 - 128.score: 48.0
    (2013). Is scientific theory change similar to early cognitive development? Gopnik on science and childhood. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 109-128. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625114.
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  29. Martti Kuokkanen & Timo Tuomivaara (1994). The Threshold Model of Scientific Change and the Continuity of Scientific Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25 (2):327 - 335.score: 48.0
    The continuity thesis of the Poznań school threshold model of the growth of scientific knowledge is considered in the light of the example of Van der Waals' and Boyle-Mariotte's laws. It is argued - using both traditional logical means and the structuralist reconstruction of the example - that the continuity thesis does not hold. A distinction between 'a historical and a systematic point of view' is introduced and it is argued that the continuity thesis of the threshold model presupposes (...)
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  30. David L. Hull (1982). Exemplars and Scientific Change. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:479 - 503.score: 48.0
    Philosophers have distinguished a metaphysical category which they term "historical entities" or "continuants". Such particulars are spatiotemporally localized and develop continuously through time while retaining internal cohesiveness. Species, social groups and conceptual systems can be profitably treated as historical entities. No damage is done to preanalytic intuitions in treating social groups as historical entities; both biological species and conceptual systems can be construed as historical entities only by modifying the ordinary way of viewing both. However, if species and conceptual systems (...)
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  31. Markus F. Peschl (2007). Triple-Loop Learning as Foundation for Profound Change, Individual Cultivation, and Radical Innovation. Construction Processes Beyond Scientific and Rational Knowledge. Constructivist Foundations 2 (2/3):136-145.score: 48.0
    Purpose: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s question concerning the relationship between scientific/ rational knowledge and the domain of wisdom and how these forms of knowledge come about is the starting point. This article aims at developing an epistemological as well as methodological framework that is capable of explaining how profound change can be brought about in various contexts, such as in individual cultivation, in organizations, in processes of radical innovation, etc. This framework is based on the triple-loop learning strategy and (...)
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  32. Paul Thagard (1994). Explaining Scientific Change: Integrating the Cognitive and the Social. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:298 - 303.score: 48.0
    Cognitive and social explanations of science should be complementary rather than competing. Mind, society, and nature interact in complex ways to produce the growth of scientific knowledge. The recent development and wide acceptance of the theory that ulcers are caused by bacteria illustrates the interaction of psychological, sociological, and natural factors. Mind-nature interactions are evident in the use of instruments and experiments. Mind-society interactions are evident in collaborative research and the flow of information among researchers. Finally, nature-society interactions are (...)
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  33. Veikko Rantala (1995). Translation and Scientific Change'. In HerfelWilliam (ed.), Theories and Models in Scientific Processes. Rodopi. 249--268.score: 48.0
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  34. Hernán Miguel, Jorge Paruelo & Guillermo Pissinis (2002). Las Salvedades (Provisos) y la Magnitud Del Cambio Teórico (Provisos and the Magnitude of Scientific Change). Crítica 34 (101):43 - 71.score: 48.0
    Las fallas predictivas obligan a alguna modificación en las teorías, lo cual, en muchos casos, consiste en detectar algún factor que ha interferido en el experimento. Podría ser que se tratara de un factor de un tipo ya reconocido por la teoría o bien que fuera necesario proponer un factor de un tipo no conocido hasta el momento. En este trabajo proponemos un ordenamiento de los cambios en las teorías de acuerdo con el tipo de factor propuesto en la modificación. (...)
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  35. Hasok Chang (1995). The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.score: 46.0
  36. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2003). A Role for Reason in Science. Dialogue 42 (3):573-598.score: 45.0
    In "Dynamics of Reason" (2001), Michael Friedman advocates a neo-Kantian perspective for philosophy of science that addresses the problem of scientific change and opposes both Quine's naturalism and Kuhn's relativism. This critical notice of Friedman's book focuses on the "relativized a priori" principles articulated by Friedman. Friedman's arguments against Quine and Kuhn are subsequently evaluated. It is concluded that Friedman succeeds in illustrating deficiencies of Quine's naturalism, however, he fails to sufficiently establish a "rational" basis for theory-choice and, (...)
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  37. K. Brad Wray (2007). Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited. Synthese 158 (1):61-73.score: 45.0
    I re-examine Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. I argue that the sorts of events Kuhn regards as scientific revolutions are a diverse lot, differing in significant ways. But, I also argue that Kuhn does provide us with a principled way to distinguish revolutionary changes from non-revolutionary changes in science. Scientific revolutions are those changes in science that (1) involve taxonomic changes, (2) are precipitated by disappointment with existing practices, and (3) cannot be resolved by appealing to shared (...)
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  38. Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard & Steve Wykstra (1986). Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research. Synthese 69 (2):141 - 223.score: 45.0
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  39. Otavio Bueno & Newton da Costa (2007). Quasi-Truth, Paraconsistency, and the Foundations of Science. Synthese 154 (3):383 - 399.score: 45.0
    In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to (...)
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  40. Barbara Gabriella Renzi (2009). A Type Hierarchy of Selection Processes for the Evaluation of Evolutionary Analogies. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):311 - 336.score: 45.0
    In this paper I propose a type-hierarchy approach to provide an intersubjective framework for the evaluation of evolutionary analogies. This approach develops David Hull’s and others’ attempts to provide full generalisation for selection processes, in order to show that sociocultural development and, particularly, scientific change can be considered as an instance of Darwinian selection. I argue that the recent work by Eileen Cornell Way on type hierarchies can offer the kind of generalisation needed to solve the main problems (...)
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  41. Edith Dudley Sylla (1993). Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists on the Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies. Vivarium 31 (1):37-83.score: 45.0
  42. Gary Gutting (1973). Conceptual Structures and Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 4 (3):209-230.score: 45.0
  43. Matthew D. Lund (2010). N. R. Hanson: Observation, Discovery, and Scientific Change. Humanity Books.score: 45.0
    Biographical sketch -- Philosophical context -- Observation -- Logic of discovery -- Philosophy and history of science -- Quantum theory -- Conceptual structure, analogy, and the logic of discovery revisited.
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  44. Rachel Laudan (1978). The Recent Revolution in Geology and Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Change. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:227 - 239.score: 45.0
  45. Cecilia Heyes (1988). Are Scientists Agents in Scientific Change? Biology and Philosophy 3 (2):194-199.score: 45.0
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  46. Richard F. Kitchener (1987). Genetic Epistemology, Equilibration and the Rationality of Scientific Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 18 (3):339-366.score: 45.0
  47. Lena Soler (ed.) (2008). Rethinking Scientific Change. Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities? Springer.score: 45.0
    This is one of the attractions of the volume.
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  48. A. C. Garrett (1996). European Science and Scholarship in Exile: Conformity and Disparity Mitchell Ash and Alfons Söllner, Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigre German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars After 1933. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1996. History of the Human Sciences 9 (4):139-149.score: 45.0
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  49. H. Zandvoort (1988). Macromolecules, Dogmatism, and Scientific Change: The Prehistory of Polymer Chemistry as Testing Ground for Philosophy of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):489-515.score: 45.0
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  50. Paul L. Franco (2012). Are Kant's Concepts and Methodology Inconsistent with Scientific Change? Constitutivity and the Synthetic Method in Kant. Hopos 2 (2):321-353.score: 45.0
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