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Scott Campbell [20]Scott M. Campbell [5]
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  1. Scott M. Campbell (2013). Early Lecture Courses. In Francois Raffoul & Eric S. Nelson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger. Bloomsbury. 179.
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  2. Scott M. Campbell (2013). The Tragic Sense of Life in Heidegger's Readings of Antigone. In S. Campbell & P. Bruno (eds.), The Science, Politics, and Ontology of Life-Philosophy. Bloomsbury. 185.
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  3. Scott M. Campbell (2012). The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language. Fordham University Press.
    Science and the originality of life -- Christian facticity -- Grasping life as a topic -- Ruinance -- The retrieval of history -- Facticity and ontology -- Factical speaking -- Rhetoric -- Sophistry.
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  4. Scott Campbell (2011). Stove, David. Against the Idols of the Age. Review of Metaphysics 54 (4):943-945.
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  5. Thomas M. Lennon, Sean Allen-Hermanson, Samantha Brennan, Jean-Pierre Schachter, Marceline Morais, Scott Campbell, Zena Ryder & Nebojsa Kujundzic (2011). E-Collection. Modern Schoolman 88 (3/4).
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  6. Scott M. Campbell (2007). Revelation and Concealment in the Early Heidegger's Conception of Λόγος. Heidegger Studies 23:47-69.
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  7. Scott Campbell (2006). The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.
    It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the (...)
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  8. Scott Campbell (2006). The Potential Information Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):102–123.
    I argue for a version of the causal analysis of seeing which I call the 'potential information' analysis. I proceed initially by considering some standard causal analyses, those of Tye and Jackson. I show that these analyses are too weak, for they allow cases of hallucination to count as seeing. I argue that what is central to seeing is that our visual experiences provide a means of gaining true beliefs about objects. This, however, does not mean that we must actually (...)
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  9. Scott Campbell & Greg Currie (2006). Against Beck: In Defence of Risk Analysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):149-172.
    For more than 10 years, Ulrich Beck has dominated discussion of risk issues in the social sciences. We argue that Beck's criticisms of the theory and practise of risk analysis are groundless. His understanding of what risk is is badly flawed. His attempt to identify risk and risk perception fails. He misunderstands and distorts the use of probability in risk analysis. His comments about the insurance industry show that he does not understand some of the basics of that industry. And (...)
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  10. Scott Campbell (2005). Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival? Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396.
    In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend (...)
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  11. Scott Campbell (2004). Can You Survive a Brain-Zap? Theoria 70 (1):22-27.
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  12. Scott Campbell (2004). Rapid Psychological Change. Analysis 64 (3):256-264.
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  13. Scott Campbell (2004). Seeing Objects and Surfaces, and the 'in Virtue Of' Relation. Philosophy 79 (309):393-402.
    Frank Jackson in Perception uses the relation to ground the distinction between direct and indirect perception. He argues that it follows that our perception of physical objects is mediated by perceiving their facing surfaces, and so is indirect. I argue that this is false. Seeing a part of an object is in itself a seeing of the object; there is no indirectness involved. Hence, the relation is an inadequate basis for the direct-indirect distinction. I also argue that claims that we (...)
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  14. Scott M. Campbell (2004). Heidegger and the Educated Life. Philosophy Today 48 (4):370-376.
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  15. Scott Campbell & James Franklin (2004). Randomness and the Justification of Induction. Synthese 138 (1):79 - 99.
    In 1947 Donald Cary Williams claimed in The Ground of Induction to have solved the Humean problem of induction, by means of an adaptation of reasoning first advanced by Bernoulli in 1713. Later on David Stove defended and improved upon Williams’ argument in The Rational- ity of Induction (1986). We call this proposed solution of induction the ‘Williams-Stove sampling thesis’. There has been no lack of objections raised to the sampling thesis, and it has not been widely accepted. In our (...)
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  16. Scott Campbell (2002). Causal Analyses of Seeing. Erkenntnis 56 (2):169-180.
    I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye. I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it does not rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in this respect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory -- which involves a robot that mimics another (unseen) robot -- (...)
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  17. Scott Campbell (2001). Animals, Babies, and Subjects. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):157-167.
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  18. Scott Campbell (2001). Is Connectedess Necessary to What Matters in Survival? Ration 14 (3):193-202.
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  19. Scott Campbell (2001). Neo-Lockeanism and Circularity. Philosophia 28 (1-4):477-489.
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  20. Scott Campbell (2001). Persons and Substances. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-67.
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a (...)
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  21. Scott Campbell (2001). Review: David Stove - Against the Idols of the Age. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 54 (4):943-945.
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  22. Scott Campbell (2001). The Psychological Theory and Dead People. Dialogue 40 (04):783-.
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  23. Scott Campbell (2000). Could Your Life Have Been Different? American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):37 - 50.
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  24. Scott Campbell (2000). Defending Common Sense. [REVIEW] Partisan Review.
    The greatest philosopher of the twentieth century may not have been Wittgenstein, or Russell, or Quine (and he certainly wasn’t Heidegger), but he may have been a somewhat obscure and conservative Australian named David Stove (1927-94). If he wasn’t the greatest philosopher of the century, Stove was certainly the funniest and most dazzling defender of common sense to be numbered among the ranks of last century’s thinkers, better even—by far—than G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin. The twentieth century was (...)
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  25. Scott Campbell (2000). Strawson, Parfit and Impersonality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):207-225.