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Profile: Scott Hill (Auburn University)
  1. Scott Hill (forthcoming). Giving Up Omnipotence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    For any essential property God has, there is an ability He does not have. He is unable to bring about any state of affairs in which He does not have that property. Such inabilities seem to preclude omnipotence. After making trouble for the standard responses to this problem, I offer my own solution: God is not omnipotent. This may seem like a significant loss for the theist. But I show that it is not. The theist may abandon the doctrine that (...)
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  2. Scott Hill (2011). An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289.
    In this paper I develop a theological account of intrinsic value drawn from some passages in Robert Merrihew Adams’ book Finite and Infinite Goods. First I explain why Adams’ work on this topic is interesting, situate his theory within the broader literature on intrinsic value, and draw attention to some of its revisionist features. Next I state the theory, raise some problems for it, and refine it in light of those problems. Then I illustrate how the refined theory works by (...)
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  3. Scott Hill (2010). [Letters, Notes, and Comments]. Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (1):189 - 196.
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  4. Scott Hill (2010). Richard Joyce's New Objections to the Divine Command Theory. Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (1):189-196.
    In a 2002 paper for this journal, Richard Joyce presents three new arguments against the Divine Command Theory. In this comment, I attempt to show that each of these arguments is either unpersuasive or uninteresting. Two of Joyce’s arguments are unpersuasive because they rely on an implausible principle or an implausible claim about what counts as a platitude governing use of the term “wrong.” Joyce’s other argument is uninteresting because it is persuasive only if Joyce’s formulation of the Euthyphro Problem (...)
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  5. Scott Hill (2009). Good News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics. Argumentation 23 (2):277-283.
    Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about (ii). (...)
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  6. Scott Hill (2008). 'Is'–'Ought' Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies. Philosophia 36 (4):545-566.
    Hume seems to claim that there does not exist a valid argument that has all non-ethical sentences as premises and an ethical sentence as its conclusion. Starting with Prior, a number of counterexamples to this claim have been proposed. Unfortunately, all of these proposals are controversial. Even the most plausible have a premise that seems like it might be an ethical sentence or a conclusion that seems like it might be non-ethical. Since it is difficult to tell whether any of (...)
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