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  1. Seahwa Kim (2013). A Defence of Semantic Pretence Hermeneutic Fictionalism Against the Autism Objection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-13.
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  2. Seahwa Kim (2012). Modal Tense and the Absolutely Unrestricted Quantifier. Acta Analytica 27 (1):73-76.
    In this paper, I examine Takashi Yagisawa’s response to van Inwagen’s ontic objection against David Lewis. Van Inwagen criticizes Lewis’s commitment to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘there is,’ and Yagisawa claims that by adopting modal tenses he avoids commitment to absolutely unrestricted quantification. I argue that Yagisawa faces a problem parallel to the one Lewis faces. Although Yagisawa officially rejects the absolutely unrestricted sense of a quantifying expression, he is still committed to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘is a (...)
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  3. Seahwa Kim (2011). On Gilmore's Definition of 'Dead'. Philosophia 39 (1):105-110.
    Gilmore proposes a new definition of ‘dead’ in response to Fred Feldman’s earlier definition in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies.’ In this paper, I critically examine Gilmore’s new definition. First, I explain what his definition is and how it is an improvement upon Feldman’s definition. Second, I raise an objection to it by noting that it fails to rule out the possibility of a thing that dies without becoming dead.
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  4. Seahwa Kim (2011). Understanding Yagisawa's Worlds. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):293-301.
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  5. Seahwa Kim (2010). The Rationality of Emotion Toward Fiction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):106-119.
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  6. Seahwa Kim (2009). A New Interpretation of the Indispensability Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):189 - 201.
    The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument runs as follows: We have reason to believe in Fs if Fs are indispensable to our best available science. Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best available science. Therefore, we have reason to believe in mathematical entities.According to the standard understanding, in order to refute the argument the nominalist has to show that mathematical entities are dispensable by providing an at least as good theory of the same phenomena that is not ontologically committed to mathematical entities. (...)
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  7. Seahwa Kim (2009). Counterlegals and the 'Makes No Difference' Argument. Erkenntnis 70 (3):419 - 426.
    In his 2003 paper, “Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?”, Alan Baker criticizes what he terms the ‘Makes No Difference’ (MND) argument by arguing that it does not succeed in undermining platonism. In this paper, I raise two objections. The first objection is that Baker is wrong in claiming that the premise of the MND argument lacks a truth-value. The second objection is that the theory of counterlegals which he appeals to in his argument is incompatible with (...)
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  8. Seahwa Kim (2006). World-Indexed Descriptivism and an Illusory Problem of Empty Names. Philosophy 101:277-298.
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  9. Seahwa Kim & Cei Maslen (2006). Counterfactuals as Short Stories. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):81 - 117.
    We present an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of stories and combine it with an account similar to Walton's account of truth in fiction to yield truth conditions for counterfactuals. We discuss unusual features of this account, and compare it to other main approaches. In particular, we argue that our analysis succeeds in accounting for counterpossibles and counterfactuals with true antecedents while the other two main approaches fail, and we give reasons for thinking that it is important to have an (...)
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  10. Seahwa Kim, Cei Maslen & Counterfactuals as Short (2006). Elisabeth Camp/Metaphor and That Certain Ôje Ne Sais Quoi'1–25 Juan Comesana/a Well–Founded Solution to the Generality Problem 27–47 Fred Feldman/Actual Utility, the Objection From Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility 49–79. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129:667-669.
  11. Seahwa Kim (2005). Modal Fictionalism and Analysis. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 116.
  12. Seahwa Kim (2005). The Real Puzzle From Radford. Erkenntnis 62 (1):29 - 46.
    In this paper, I will argue that Radfords real question is not the conceptual one, as it is usually taken, but the causal one, and show that Waltons account, which treats Radfords puzzle as the conceptual question, is not a satisfactory solution to it. I will also argue that contrary to what Walton claims, the causal question is not only important, but also closely related to the conceptual and normative questions. What matters is not that Walton has not solved Radfords (...)
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  13. Seahwa Kim (2002). Modal Fictionalism Generalized and Defended. Philosophical Studies 111 (2):121 - 146.
    In this paper, I will defend modalfictionalism. The paper has two parts. In thefirst part, I will suggest a revised version ofmodal fictionalism which can avoid certaintechnical problems. In the second part, I willpropose a nominalized version of modalfictionalism and a general scheme offictionalism for the nominalist.
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  14. Seahwa Kim (1999). Fiction, Mathematics and Modality: A Unified Fictionalism. Dissertation, Princeton University
    I defend a unified fictionalism about modality and mathematics. First, I defend each view separately against internal objections. Then, I attempt a unified fictionalism by giving an analysis of truth in fiction which is neither modal nor platonistic. Finally, I explore the prospects for nominalistic unified fictionalism. ;In the first chapter, I defend modal fictionalism: the view that statements about possible worlds are best understood as claims about the content of a fiction, the 'many-worlds story'. I address the Brock-Rosen objection (...)
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