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Profile: Seamus Bradley (Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München)
  1. Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele (2014). Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp? Episteme 11 (3):277-289.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga , that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. (...)
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  2.  24
    Roman Frigg, Seamus Bradley, Hailiang Du & Leonard A. Smith (2014). Laplace’s Demon and the Adventures of His Apprentices. Philosophy of Science 81 (1):31-59.
    The sensitive dependence on initial conditions (SDIC) associated with nonlinear models imposes limitations on the models’ predictive power. We draw attention to an additional limitation than has been under-appreciated, namely structural model error (SME). A model has SME if the model-dynamics differ from the dynamics in the target system. If a nonlinear model has only the slightest SME, then its ability to generate decision-relevant predictions is compromised. Given a perfect model, we can take the effects of SDIC into account by (...)
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  3.  9
    Seamus Bradley (forthcoming). Constraints on Rational Theory Choice. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv063.
    In a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a view (...)
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  4.  21
    Karim P. Y. Thebault, Seamus Bradley & Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Modelling Inequality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not, however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have criticised some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealisations involved, and a particular target are `kinetic exchange' approaches used to model the emergence of inequality within the distribution of individual (...)
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  5.  20
    Foad Dizadji-Bahmani & Seamus Bradley, Lewis' Account of Counterfactuals is Incongruent with Lewis' Account of Laws of Nature.
    In this paper we argue that there is a problem with the conjunction of David Lewis' account of counterfactual conditionals and his account of laws of nature. This is a pressing problem since both accounts are individually plausible, and popular.
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  6. Seamus Bradley, Scientific Uncertainty: A User's Guide. Grantham Institute on Climate Change Discussion Paper.
    There are different kinds of uncertainty. I outline some of the various ways that uncertainty enters science, focusing on uncertainty in climate science and weather prediction. I then show how we cope with some of these sources of error through sophisticated modelling techniques. I show how we maintain confidence in the face of error.
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  7.  23
    Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele (2014). Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1287-1303.
    Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.
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  8. Seamus Bradley (2011). A Literary Approach to Scientific Practice. Metascience 20 (2):363--367.
    A literary approach to scientific practice: Essay Review of R.I.G. Hughes' _The Theoretical Practices of Physics_.
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  9.  15
    Roman Frigg, Seamus Bradley, Reason L. Machete & Leonard A. Smith, Probabilistic Forecasting: Why Model Imperfection is a Poison Pill.
    This volume is a serious attempt to open up the subject of European philosophy of science to real thought, and provide the structural basis for the interdisciplinary development of its specialist fields, but also to provoke reflection on the idea of ‘European philosophy of science’. This efforts should foster a contemporaneous reflection on what might be meant by philosophy of science in Europe and European philosophy of science, and how in fact awareness of it could assist philosophers interpret and motivate (...)
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  10.  98
    Seamus Bradley (2012). Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities. In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer
  11.  2
    Seamus Bradley (forthcoming). Nonclassical Probability and Convex Hulls. Erkenntnis:1-15.
    It is well known that the convex hull of the classical truth value functions contains all and only the probability functions. Work by Paris and Williams has shown that this also holds for various kinds of nonclassical logics too. This note summarises the formal details of this topic and extends the results slightly.
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  12.  9
    Seamus Bradley, Rational Theory Choice: Arrow Undermined, Kuhn Vindicated.
    In a recent paper, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational entreprise. In this paper I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to avoid Okasha’s conclusion. I go on to argue that making further assumptions about the space of possible scientific theories allows us to make scientific rationality more contentful. I then (...)
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  13.  7
    Seamus Bradley, Nonprobabilistic Chance?
    "Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed -- without argument -- that chances are probabilities. I explore the extent to which this assumption is really sanctioned by what we understand by the concept of chance.
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