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Profile: Sean Allen-Hermanson (Florida International University)
  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2014). Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A Case Study. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work (...)
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  2. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2013). Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.
    Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from supports in (...)
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  3. Sean Allen-Hermanson & Jennifer Matey (2012). Synesthesia. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  4. Thomas M. Lennon, Sean Allen-Hermanson, Samantha Brennan, Jean-Pierre Schachter, Marceline Morais, Scott Campbell, Zena Ryder & Nebojsa Kujundzic (2011). E-Collection. Modern Schoolman 88 (3/4).
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  5. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2010). Blindsight in Monkeys: Lost and (Perhaps) Found. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2): 47-71.
    Stoerig and Cowey’s work is widely regarded as showing that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly persuasively argue that the experimental results are compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing only a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised procedure which can distinguish these hypotheses, and offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis provides a superior explanation. The study of blindsight might contribute towards a general investigation into animal (...)
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  6. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2008). Desgabets: Rationalist or Cartesian Empiricist? In Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind (Springer).
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  7. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2008). Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.
    This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that most (...)
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  8. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2005). Morgan's Canon Revisited. Philosophy of Science 72 (4):608-31.
    The famous ethological maxim known as “Morgan’s Canon” continues to be the subject of interpretive controversy. I reconsider Morgan’s canon in light of two questions: First, what did Morgan intend? Second, is this, or perhaps some re-interpretation of the canon, useful within cognitive ethology? As for the first issue, Morgan’s distinction between higher and lower faculties is suggestive of an early supervenience concept. As for the second, both the canon in its original form, and various recent re-readings, offer nothing useful (...)
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  9. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2001). The Pragmatist's Troubles With Bivalence and Counterfactuals. Dialogue 40 (4):669-90.
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