An incisive analysis of Deleuze's philosophy of eventsSean Bowden shows how the Deleuzian event should be understood in terms of the broader metaphysical thesis that substances are ontologically secondary with respect to events. He achieves this through a reconstruction of Deleuze's relation to the history of thought from the Stoics through to Simondon, taking account of Leibniz, Lautman, structuralism and psychoanalysis along the way.This exciting new reading of Deleuze focuses firmly on his approach to events. Bowden also examines and clarifies (...) a number of Deleuze's most difficult philosophical concepts, including sense, problematic Ideas and intensive individuation, and engages with material by Lautman and Simondon that has not yet been translated into English. (shrink)

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze claims that it is in virtue of a relation of expression which holds between intensive processes of individuation and virtual Ideas that the former determines the latter to be actualised in concrete entities. He is, however, less than forthcoming in this book about exactly how we should understand the relation of expression. This article addresses itself to this lacuna. It clarifies five characteristic features of the expressive relation, partly by drawing on Deleuze's discussion of the (...) relation of expression in Expressionism in Philosophy, party by examining familiar examples of expressive relations. It then maps these characteristic features of expression onto Deleuze's discussion of the relation between Ideas and intensity in Difference and Repetition, showing that virtual Ideas are ontologically inseparable from the intensive processes that both constitute and actualise them in the production of actual entities. By way of conclusion, this expressive account of the relation between the virtual, the actual and the intensive will be compared and contrasted with several leading accounts to be found in the secondary literature. (shrink)

This article consists of a close reading and explication of several of the central philosophical concepts to be found in Simondon's L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique. It then proceeds to show how not only these concepts, but also Simondon's method for constructing these concepts, are taken up by Gilles Deleuze in Chapter 5 of his Difference and Repetition. In particular, the article shows how Deleuze's characterization of ‘intensive processes of individuation’ is thoroughly Simondonian. The article will also provide the English (...) speaking reader with an introduction to the French language commentary on Simondon and Deleuze. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article synthesizes several different studies of Hegel's and Nietzsche's expressive conceptions of action and agency and identifies a related account in Deleuze's Logic of Sense. It argues that such conceptions not only challenge familiar voluntarist accounts of action and agency; they also demand a reassessment of standard approaches to the relation between norms and action. For the voluntarist, an agent's action is caused by the separate, prior intention of the agent. For expressivists, an agent's intention is inseparable from (...) the action expressing it and nonisolatable from the expression of this intention-action in interpretative activity. For the voluntarist, the norms governing action can be thought of as more or less freestanding, entering into the prior formation of the agent's intention. For the expressivist, the norm or principle on which an agent acts will be produced over time, through the unfolding of the action expressing it, as well as through interpretative struggle over the meaning of that action, all of which takes place in a social space governed by more basic norms concerning the offering of act-descriptions, recognition, and social and hermeneutical struggle. A number of important differences among Hegel's, Nietzsche's, and Deleuze's accounts are identified, and their significance is explored. (shrink)

A reassessment of Badiou's work which demonstrates its critical importance for contemporary philosophy. -/- This collection of thirteen essays engages directly with the work of Alain Badiou, focusing specifically on the philosophical content of his work and the various connections he established with both his contemporaries and his philosophical heritage. -/- You’ll find in-depth critical readings of his oeuvre through the lens of a number of important philosophical thinkers and themes, ranging from Cantor and category/topos theory, Lacan and Lautman, through (...) to Sartre and the subject. This is an important collection for anyone interested in the work of Badiou and contemporary Continental philosophy. (shrink)

A major problem threatens Deleuze’s project in The Logic of Sense. He makes an ontological distinction between events and substances, but he then collapses a crucial distinction between two kinds of events, namely, actions and mere occurrences. Indeed, whereas actions are commonly differentiated from mere occurrences with reference to their causal dependence on the intentions of their agents, Deleuze asserts a strict ontological distinction between the realm of causes and the realm of events, and holds that events of all types (...) are incorporeal happenings which are inseparable from expressed sense. For Deleuze, what counts as one’s action thus does not depend on one’s intention, but rather on a process of “making sense” of that action. Nevertheless, Deleuze continues to speak of the need to “will” the event. In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, I will read a conception of “expressive agency” into The Logic of Sense. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the relation between problems and the formation and development of concepts in Bergson’s work, as well as in Bachelard, Canguilhem and Deleuze. Building on work by Elie During, I argue that it is not only Bergson but also Deleuze who shares with the French epistemological tradition an “anti-positivist” conception of concept formation, founded upon the posing and solving of novel problems as opposed to the acquisition and verification of empirical facts. Contrary to During, however, I argue (...) that it is not Bergson but Deleuze who furnishes us with an “anti-positivist” conception of problems that is adequate to this anti-positivist conception of concept formation. Deleuze’s anti-positivist view of problems holds, firstly, that genuine problems require the creation of novel terms in which to state and solve them. He shares this view with Bergson, Bachelard and Canguilhem. Secondly, however, Deleuze holds that a problem’s “truth” is not to be evaluated with reference to its eventual solutions, nor with reference to some privileged and contentful experience of reality, but is rather a matter of its purely intrinsic productivity. (shrink)

This collection brings together the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the rich tradition of American pragmatist thought, taking seriously the commitment to pluralism at the heart of both. Contributors explore in novel ways Deleuze’s explicit references to pragmatism, and examine the philosophical significance of a number of points at which Deleuze’s philosophy converges with, or diverges from, the work of leading pragmatists. The papers of the first part of the volume take as their focus Deleuze’s philosophical relationship to classical pragmatism (...) and the work of Peirce, James and Dewey. Particular areas of focus include theories of signs, metaphysics, perspectivism, experience, the transcendental and democracy. The papers comprising the second half of the volume are concerned with developing critical encounters between Deleuze’s work and the work of contemporary pragmatists such as Rorty, Brandom, Price, Shusterman and others. Issues addressed include antirepresentationalism, constructivism, politics, objectivity, naturalism, affect, human finitude and the nature and value of philosophy itself. With contributions by internationally recognized specialists in both poststructuralist and pragmatist thought, the collection is certain to enrich Deleuze scholarship, enliven discussion in pragmatist circles, and contribute in significant ways to contemporary philosophical debate. (shrink)

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze effectively argues that two types of relation between events govern their ‘evental’ or ‘ideal play’, and ultimately underlie determined substances, that is, worldly individuals and persons. Leibniz calls these relations ‘compossibility’ and ‘incompossibility’. Deleuze calls them ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’. This paper explores how Deleuze appropriates and extends a number of Leibnizian concepts in order to ground the idea that events have ontological priority over substances ‘all the way down’.

Several themes treated in chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition are addressed at greater length in The Logic of Sense, published one year later. In particular, Deleuze's critique of ‘the privilege of designation’ and ‘the modality of solutions’, along with his positive claims about the relation between sense and problems, arguably summarise a number of analyses found in The Logic of Sense. However, despite the convergence between Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense as regards the sense–problem relation, The (...) Logic of Sense does not explicitly address the other aspects of thought that Difference and Repetition considers inseparable from the sense–problem relation. In particular, the notion of ‘transcendental empiricism’ – that is, the idea that the conditions of experience themselves emerge from experience – is not explicitly mentioned in The Logic of Sense. There is no explicit discussion in The Logic of Sense of ‘encounters’ or ‘shocks’ and their role in the genesis of thought. And there is no explicit discussion in The Logic of Sense of the discordant relations between the different faculties of thought as they provoke and constrain one another in the elaboration of differential problems. This essay intends to argue that, despite the lack of explicit discussion, The Logic of Sense does advance an account of the differential genesis of thought, and along the same general lines as chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition. (shrink)

Larry May's and Kenneth Shockley's discussions of punishment for mob‐based harms fall back on the idea of individual mens rea. They recognise that the mens rea element is complicated by the fact that an individual's intentional actions in the context of mob activity have a collective dimension to them, either because they are ‘group‐based’, or because they are enabled or constrained by the collective's ‘normative authority’. However, their accounts of punishment fail to adequately reflect this complication. We claim that this (...) is because they primarily countenance ‘paradigmatic’ forms of punishment. Part 2 of the article argues that a non‐paradigmatic form of punishment – one that is ‘expressive’ insofar as it publicly communicates a denunciation – can better target the complex relations between the individual and collective dimensions of mob‐based harms. In order to better illuminate the target of such punishment, Part 1 of the article clarifies the relation between individual, shared and collective responsibility for mob‐based harms. Responding to several shortcomings in May's and Shockley's work, we examine the emergence of ‘mob mentality’ and argue that mob beliefs, intentions and norms are dynamically ‘expressed’ (i.e. publicly manifested, communicated and shaped) in and through the situated behaviour of individual mob members. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the relation between problems and the formation and development of concepts in Bergson’s work, as well as in Bachelard, Canguilhem and Deleuze. Building on work by Elie During, I argue that it is not only Bergson but also Deleuze who shares with the French epistemological tradition an “anti-positivist” conception of concept formation, founded upon the posing and solving of novel problems as opposed to the acquisition and verification of empirical facts. Contrary to During, however, I argue (...) that it is not Bergson but Deleuze who furnishes us with an “anti-positivist” conception of problems that is adequate to this anti-positivist conception of concept formation. Deleuze’s anti-positivist view of problems holds, firstly, that genuine problems require the creation of novel terms in which to state and solve them. He shares this view with Bergson, Bachelard and Canguilhem. Secondly, however, Deleuze holds that a problem’s “truth” is not to be evaluated with reference to its eventual solutions, nor with reference to some privileged and contentful experience of reality, but is rather a matter of its purely intrinsic productivity. (shrink)

Volume 2, Issue 2, June 2018, Page 119-124.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

In the wake of the numerous translations of Badiou’s works that have appeared in recent years, including the translation of the second volume of his major work, Logic of Worlds: Being and Event II, there has been a marked increase in interest in the philo- sophical underpinnings of his oeuvre. The papers brought together in this volume provide a range of incisive and critical engagements with Badiou’s philosophical heritage and the philosophical prob- lems his work engages, both directly and indirectly. (...) Our aim is to offer a balanced assessment of the ways in which Badiou responds to various philosophical thinkers, arguments and traditions, and of the arguments that he employs to do so. (shrink)

After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended with particular (...) reference to the work of Charles Taylor on expression, as well as recent work on embodied cognition. (shrink)

After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended with particular (...) reference to the work of Charles Taylor on expression, as well as recent work on embodied cognition. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 203, March 2012.