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Profile: Sean Enda Power (University College Cork)
  1. Sean Enda Power (forthcoming). Perceiving Multiple Locations in Time: A Phenomenological Defence of Tenseless Theory. Topoi:1-7.
    It is a common claim that one concept of time, tenseless theory, is in greater conflict with how the world seems to us (with the phenomenology) than the competing theories of tense theory and presentism. This paper offers at least one counter-example to that claim. Here, it is argued that tenseless theory fares better than its competitors in capturing the phenomenology in particular cases of perception. These cases are where the visual phenomenology is of events occurring together which must be (...)
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  2. Sean Enda Power (2013). Perceiving External Things and the Time-Lag Argument. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117.
    : We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time-lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time-lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense-data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time-lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I argue that (...)
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  3. Sean Enda Power (2012). The Metaphysics of the 'Specious' Present. Erkenntnis 77 (1):121-132.
    The doctrine of the specious present, that we perceive or, at least, seem to perceive a period of time is often taken to be an obvious claim about perception. Yet, it also seems just as commonly rejected as being incoherent. In this paper, following a distinction between three conceptions of the specious present, it is argued that the incoherence is due to hidden metaphysical assumptions about perception and time. It is argued that for those who do not hold such assumptions, (...)
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  4. Sean Enda Power (2010). Complex Experience, Relativity and Abandoning Simultaneity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):231-256.
    Starting from the special theory of relativity it is argued that the structure of an experience is extended over time, making experience dynamic rather than static. The paper describes and explains what is meant by phenomenal parts and outlines opposing positions on the experience of time. Time according to he special theory of relativity is defined and the possibility of static experience shown to be implausible, leading to the conclusion that experience is dynamic. Some implications of this for the relationship (...)
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