Aim To ascertain the quantity and nature of gifts and items provided by the pharmaceutical industry in Australia to medical specialists and to consider whether these are appropriate in terms of justifiable ethical standards, empirical research and views expressed in the literature.
I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.
We question the usefulness of Pylyshyn's dichotomy between cognitively penetrable and cognitively impenetrable mechanisms as the basis for his distinction between cognition and early vision. This dichotomy is comparable to others that have been proposed in psychology prompting disputes that by their very nature could not be resolved. This fate is inevitable for Pylyshyn's thesis because of its reliance on internal representations and their interpretation. What is more fruitful in relation to this issue is not a difficult dichotomy, but a (...) different look at perception such as proposed by Gibson (1979). (shrink)
Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing, showing that it was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings but rather a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. The essays in this volume open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition (...) of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena of aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy in a new century. (shrink)
This discussion completes 'Moral Dilemmas, Compromise and Compensation' ("Philosophy", Vol. 66. No. 257, July 1991). In correction of the earlier discussion, the claim that resolution of moral dilemmas by compromise is always preferable to resolution by compensation, is withdrawn. In a particular case, the decision which is preferable requires judgment (Subsec. 3.8). In amplification of the earlier discussion, it is observed that another way of resolving moral conflicts is what M P. Follett calls 'Integration'. In this, the one claimant is (...) made better off and the other claimant is made no worse off. This is in fact an application of a principle of Pareto's. Here again, in a particular case, the decision whether resolution by integration is preferable to resolution by compromise, requires judgment (Subsec. 3.5). (shrink)