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Profile: Sebastian Köhler (University of Edinburgh)
  1. Sebastian Köhler (forthcoming). What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error? Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  2. Sebastian Köhler (2013). Do Expressivists Have an Attitude Problem? Ethics 123 (3):479-507.
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  3. Sebastian Köhler (2013). Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality and Reasons By Joshua Gert. Analysis 74 (1):ant094.
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  4. Sebastian Köhler & Michael Ridge (2013). Revolutionary Expressivism. Ratio 26 (4):428-449.
    While the meta-ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become expressivists. Additionally, the paper explores certain important but largely ignored methodological issues that arise for reforming definitions generally and with a vengeance (...)
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  5. Henry S. Richardson, Chike Jeffers, Kieran Oberman, Mark Lance, Rebecca Kukla, Sebastian Köhler, William MacAskill, Robert Gooding-Williams, We Burghardt du Bois & Ty Raterman (2013). 10. Gillian Russell, Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Gillian Russell, Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction (Pp. 586-592). [REVIEW] Ethics 123 (3).
     
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  6. Sebastian Köhler (2012). Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement. Thought 1 (1):71-78.
    One worry about metaethical expressivism is that it reduces to some form of subjectivism. This worry is enforced by subjectivists who argue that subjectivism can explain certain phenomena thought to support expressivism equally well. Recently, authors have started to suggest that subjectivism can take away what has often been seen as expressivism's biggest explanatory advantage, namely expressivism's ability to explain the possibility of moral disagreement. In this paper, I will give a response to an argument recently given by Frank Jackson (...)
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  7. Sebastian Kohler (2010). Thought-Experiments, Disagreement and Moral Realism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:245-252.
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