Search results for 'Secondary Quality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  74
    Jennifer McKitrick (2002). Reid's Foundation for the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):478-494.
    Reid offers an under-appreciated account of the primary/secondary quality distinction. He gives sound reasons for rejecting the views of Locke, Boyle, Galileo and others, and presents a better alternative, according to which the distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. Primary qualities, for Reid, are qualities whose intrinsic natures can be known through sensation. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are unknown causes of sensations. Some may object that Reid's view is internally inconsistent, or unacceptably relativistic. (...)
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  2.  78
    Emmett L. Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism . In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately.
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  3. Edward W. Averill (1982). The Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Review 91 (July):343-362.
  4.  50
    Natika Newton (1989). On Viewing Pain as a Secondary Quality. Noûs 23 (5):569-98.
  5.  48
    Lewis White Beck (1946). Secondary Quality. Journal of Philosophy 43 (October):599-609.
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  6.  62
    Elizabeth Tropman (2010). Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1):31-45.
    Sensibility theorists such as John McDowell have argued that once we appreciate certain similarities between moral values and secondary qualities, a new meta-ethical position might emerge, one that avoids the alleged difficulties with moral intuitionism and non-cognitivism. The aim of this paper is to examine the meta-ethical prospects of this secondary-quality analogy. Of particular concern will be the extent to which McDowell’s comparison of values to secondary qualities supports a viewpoint unique from that of the moral (...)
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  7. Lucy Allais (2007). Kant's Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (3):459-484.
    : Interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism have been dominated by two extreme views: phenomenalist and merely epistemic readings. There are serious objections to both of these extremes, and the aim of this paper is to develop a middle ground between the two. In the Prolegomena, Kant suggests that his idealism about appearances can be understood in terms of an analogy with secondary qualities like color. Commentators have rejected this option because they have assumed that the analogy should be read (...)
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  8.  67
    Uriah Kriegel (2008). Composition as a Secondary Quality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):359-383.
    Abstract: The 'special composition question' is this: given objects O1, . . . , On, under what conditions is there an object O, such that O1, . . . , On compose O? This paper explores a heterodox answer to this question, one that casts composition as a secondary quality. According to the approach I want to consider, there is an O that O1, . . . , On compose (roughly) just in case a normal intuiter would, under (...)
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  9.  30
    Emmett Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
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  10.  82
    John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.
    Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. Among (...)
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  11. Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman (1989). Color as a Secondary Quality. Mind 98 (January):81-103.
  12. David Palmer (1976). Boyle's Corpuscular Hypothesis and Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 29 (3):181 - 189.
    Locke denied that ideas of secondary qualities resemble their causes. It has been suggested that Locke denied this because he accepted a mechanical corpuscular hypothesis about the constitution of objects. This paper shows that this and other usual explanations of Locke's denial are mistaken. Further, it suggests an alternative relationship between the scientific account and Locke's philosophical views, and finally it provides Locke's real justification for his claim that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their causes.
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  13.  12
    Elżbieta Łukasiewicz (2012). Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. Polish Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):47-76.
    In the present paper we shall first focus on Locke’s and Reid’s understanding of primary and secondary qualities, as these two approaches mark the main dividing line in interpreting this distinction. Next, we will consider some modern approaches to the distinction and try to answer the question of whether, from theperspective of what we know about perception of sensory qualities, Locke’s ontological interpretation or Reid’s epistemological approach to the distinction are tenable ideas. Finally, we will concentrate on the relation (...)
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  14.  10
    James Van Cleve (2011). Primary–Secondary Quality Distinction. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press
  15. James Van Cleve (2011). Reid on the Real Foundation of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press
     
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  16. Peter Menzies & Huw Price (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):187-203.
    In this paper we defend the view that the ordinary notions of cause and effect have a direct and essential connection with our ability to intervene in the world as agents.1 This is a well known but rather unpopular philosophical approach to causation, often called the manipulability theory. In the interests of brevity and accuracy, we prefer to call it the agency theory.2 Thus the central thesis of an agency account of causation is something like this: an event A (...)
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  17.  59
    Lisa Downing (2009). Locke : The Primary and Secondary Quality Distinction. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge
  18. Peter Menzies & Huw Price (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. BJPS 44 (2):187-203.
    In this paper we defend the view that the ordinary notions of cause and effect have a direct and essential connection with our ability to intervene in the world as agents.1 This is a well known but rather unpopular philosophical approach to causation, often called the manipulability theory. In the interests of brevity and accuracy, we prefer to call it the agency theory.2 Thus the central thesis of an agency account of causation is something like this: an event A (...)
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  19.  4
    Mario Gomez-Torrente (2011). Kripke on Color Words and the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. In Alan Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press 290-323.
    An exposition of Kripke's unpublished critique of dispositionalism about color, followed by a review of some recent defenses of dispositionalism and a sketch of some objections that could be made to these defenses from a broadly Kripkean perspective.
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  20.  33
    Michael Jacovides (2007). Locke on the Semantics of Secondary Quality Words: A Reply to Matthew Stuart. Philosophical Review 116 (4):633-645.
  21.  79
    Huw Price (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):187 - 203.
    In this paper we defend the view that the ordinary notions of cause and effect have a direct and essential connection with our ability to intervene in the world as agents.1 This is a well known but rather unpopular philosophical approach to causation, often called the manipulability theory. In the interests of brevity and accuracy, we prefer to call it the agency theory.2 Thus the central thesis of an agency account of causation is something like this: an event A is (...)
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  22. Margaret D. Wilson (1982). Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke? In Colin M. Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays.
  23.  31
    Laura Keating (1998). Reconsidering the Basis of Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 6 (2):169 – 192.
  24. Benjamin Hill (2004). 'Resemblance'and Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. Locke Studies 4:89-122.
     
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  25.  14
    Christopher O. Tollefsen (2000). McDowell’s Moral Realism and the Secondary Quality Analogy. Disputatio:1-13.
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  26.  27
    Arnold I. Davidson & Norbert Hornstein (1984). The Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction: Berkeley, Locke, and the Foundations of Corpuscularian Science. Dialogue 23 (2):281-303.
  27.  3
    Margaret Dauler Wilson (1999). CHAPTER 15. Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke? In Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy. Princeton University Press 215-228.
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  28. Saul A. Kripke, No Fool’s Red? Some Considerations on the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction.
  29.  2
    Charles Owen Hopkins (1955). Effectiveness of Secondary Reinforcing Stimuli as a Function of the Quantity and Quality of Food Reinforcement. Journal of Experimental Psychology 50 (5):339.
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  30. Steffen Borge (2007). Some Remarks on Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities. Acta Analytica 22 (1):74-84.
    John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic (...)
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  31.  58
    Janet Levin (1987). Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):400-411.
    In "the subjective view", Colin mcginn contends that a dispositional (or "subjectivist") account of secondary qualities may be incompatible with physicalism, As it provides special reasons to think that the experiences of secondary qualities cannot be reduced to physical or functional states. The primary aim of this paper is to show that such an account of secondary qualities is compatible with--Indeed, Encourages--A physico-Functional theory of experience. Further, It argues that if secondary quality experiences cannot be (...)
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  32.  96
    Colin McGinn (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities And Indexical Thoughts. Clarendon Press.
    This book investigates the subjective and objective representations of the world, developing analogies between secondary qualities and indexical thoughts and arguing that subjective representations are ineliminable. Throughout, McGinn brings together historical and contemporary discussions to illuminate old problems in a novel way.
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  33. Samuel C. Rickless (1997). Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):297-319.
    In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are simple, (...)
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  34.  36
    David Novitz (1975). Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Return to Fundamentals. Philosophical Papers 4 (October):89-104.
    The aim of this article is to give an account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in a way which allows the distinction a useful place in an explanation of scientific enquiry. this is done by modifying certain of locke's criteria for primacy, and by showing that this procedure has certain advantages over keith campbell's account of the distinction. in particular, i argue that primary qualities cannot be specified in a theory-neutral way, and that this has important (...)
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  35. A. D. Smith (1990). Of Primary and Secondary Qualities. Philosophical Review 99 (2):221-254.
  36. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell
     
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  37. Gerald Vision (1982). Primary and Secondary Qualities: An Essay in Epistemology. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 17 (March):135-170.
    It seems almost a truism to say that colour is a sensation; and yet Young, by honestly recognizing this elementary truth, established the first consistent theory of colour. So far as I know, Thomas Young was the first who, starting from the well-known fact that there are three primary colours, sought for the explanation of this fact, not in the nature of light, but in the constitution of man. (James Clerk Maxwell, p. 267.)It is doubtless scientific to disregard certain aspects (...)
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  38.  97
    David McNaughton (1984). McGinn on Experience of Primary and Secondary Qualities. Analysis 44 (2):78-80.
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  39.  35
    Michael A. Smith (1986). Peacocke on Red and Red. Synthese 68 (September):559-576.
    How are we to define red? We seem to face a dilemma. For it seems that we must define red in terms of looks red. But looks red is semantically complex. We must therefore define looks red in terms of red. Can we avoid this dilemma? Christopher Peacocke thinks we can. He claims that we can define the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red; the concept of a sensational property of visual experience. Peacocke agrees (...)
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  40.  34
    Steven M. Nadler (1990). Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):47-61.
  41.  38
    E. Valberg (1980). A Theory of Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 55 (October):437-453.
    'color is not "in" objects" makes sense only if 'color "is" in objects' does. But it does not, Because we cannot say what it "would be like" if it "were". 'being green' means 'that which looks green' understood "attributively", Not referentially, I.E., 'that which looks green ("whatever that is")', Not 'that which emits certain light-Waves'. "contra" kripke, Heat is 'that which feels hot ("whatever that is")', Though the only thing whose "existence" it requires is molecular motion. If we ask what (...)
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  42.  7
    Peter Sandoe (1988). Secondary Qualities--Subjective and Intrinsic. Theoria 54 (3):200-219.
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  43.  35
    Maurice Charlesworth (1987). Hacker on Secondary Qualities. Mind 76 (July):386-391.
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  44. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge
     
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  45.  27
    R. E. Tully (1976). Reduction and Secondary Qualities. Mind 85 (July):351-370.
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  46. Brian O'Shaughnessy (1986). Secondary Qualities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (July):153-171.
     
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  47.  9
    Roderick Millar (1983). Valberg's Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 58 (January):107-109.
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  48.  10
    Christopher A. Shrock (2013). Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities. Dissertation, Baylor University
    Direct Realism is the view that human perception takes physical entities and their mind-independent properties as immediate objects. Although this thesis is supported by common sense, many argue that it can be dismissed on philosophical or quasi-scientific grounds. This essay attempts to defend Direct Realism against one such argument, which I call the “Problem of Secondary Qualities,” using the ideas of Scottish Common Sense philosopher Thomas Reid. The first chapter of this work offers a detailed introduction to the (...)
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  49.  88
    Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
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  50. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In L. Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities. Oxford
    The Dangerous Book for Boys Abstract: Seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of the senses are often thought to contain a profound truth: some perceptible properties are secondary qualities, dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers. In particular, colors are secondary qualities: for example, an object is green iff it is disposed to look green to standard perceivers in standard conditions. After rebutting Boghossian and Velleman’s argument that a certain kind of secondary (...)
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