Search results for 'Seeing as' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  48
    Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Content of a Seeing-As Experience. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):215-237.
    In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational (...)-as (its configurational fold) and by an experience of knowingly illusory seeing-as (its recognitional fold). To my mind, Wittgenstein’s reflections on seeing-as have anticipated these claims. (shrink)
    Translate
      Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  56
    Annalisa Coliva (2012). Human Diagrammatic Reasoning and Seeing-As. Synthese 186 (1):121-148.
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  60
    Kathleen Stock (2013). Some Reflections on Seeing-as, Metaphor-Grasping and Imagining. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):201-213.
    In this paper I examine the frequently made claim that grasping a metaphor is a kind of ‘seeing-as’. I describe several ways in which it might be thought that metaphor-grasping is importantly similar to seeing-as, such that an extension of the latter category is though justified to include the former. For some of these similarities, I suggest they are illusory; for others, I argue that they are shared in virtue of the membership of both seeing-as and metaphor-grasping (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  21
    Panos Theodorou (2004). Of the Same in the Different. What is Wrong with Kuhn's Use of ``Seeing'' and ``Seeing As''. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):175-200.
    Kuhn uses the distinction between `(simple) seeing', and `seeing as' in order to claim that among competing paradigms there cannot be found any middle (experiential) ground; nothing `same' can be located behind such radically different paradigm-worlds. He claims that scientists do not see a common something as this thing at one time and as that thing at another. Each time scientists simply see what they see. To claim the contrary is to claim that scientists arrive at their paradigmatic (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Berit Brogaard (2012). Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  19
    B. R. Tilghman (1988). Seeing and Seeing-AS. AI and Society 2 (4):303-313.
    This paper highlights the importance of inter-relationships between language, context, practice and interpretation. These inter-relationships should be of interest to AI researchers working in multi-disciplinary fields such as knowledge based systems, speech and vision. Attention is drawn to the importance of Part II, Section II of Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations for understanding the enormous complexity of the concept of seeing and how it is woven into an understanding of language and of human relations.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Ned Block (2014). Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
  8.  49
    J. F. M. Hunter (1981). Wittgenstein on Seeing and Seeing As. Philosophical Investigations 4 (2):33-49.
    The article is an interpretation of about the first half of chapter xi of part ii of "philosophical investigations". Wittgenstein is treated as having the single aim of arguing down the massive temptation to suppose that the expression 'to see...As...', And such similar expressions as 'to recognize', Record the occurrence of an experience distinct from the experience of simply seeing the object seen as or recognized. Ways are suggested of making a kind of sense of most of the very (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Lynne Tirrell (1991). Seeing Metaphor as Seeing-As: Remarks on Davidson's Positive View of Metaphor. Philosophical Investigations 14 (2):143-154.
    Davidson suggests that metaphor is a pragmatic (not a semantic) phenomenon; on his view, metaphor is a perlocutionary effect prompts its audience to see one thing as another. Davidson rightly attacks speaker-intentionalism as the source of metaphorical meaning, but settles for an account that depends on audience intentions. A better approach would undermine intentionalism per se, replacing it with a social practice analysis based on patterns of extending the metaphor. This paper shows why Davidson’s perceptual model fails to stave off (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Emmanuel Alloa (2011). Seeing-in, Seeing-as, Seeing-With: Looking Through Pictures. In Elisabeth Nemeth, Richard Heinrich, Wolfram Pichler & Wagner David (eds.), Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts. Volume I. Proceedings of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Ontos: 179-190
    In the constitution of contemporary image theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy has undoubtedly become a major conceptual reference. Rather than trying to establish what Wittgenstein’s own image theory could possibly look like, this paper would like to critically assess some of the advantages as well as some of the quandaries that arise when using Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’ for addressing the plural realities of images. While putting into evidence the tensions that come into play when applying what was initially a (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  17
    Daniel Enrique Kalpokas (2015). Perceptual Experience and Seeing-As. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):123-144.
    According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Nicoletta Orlandi (2011). The Innocent Eye: Seeing-as Without Concepts. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):17.
    Can one see one thing as another without possessing a concept of it? The answer to this question is intuitively negative. This is because seeing x as F is usually taken to consist in the application of the concept F to x . Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck figure, for instance, involves applying the concept DUCK to the figure; thus, one cannot see the figure as the figure of a duck unless one has the concept of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13. Elisabeth Maura Camp (2003). Saying and Seeing-As: The Linguistic Uses and Cognitive Effects of Metaphor. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Metaphor is a pervasive and significant feature of language. We use metaphor to talk about the world in familiar and innovative ways, and in contexts ranging from everyday conversation to literature and scientific theorizing. However, metaphor poses serious challenges for standard philosophical theories of meaning, because it straddles so many important boundaries: between language and thought, between semantics and pragmatics, between rational communication and mere causal association. ;In this dissertation, I develop a pragmatic theory of metaphorical utterances which reconciles two (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14.  67
    Jennifer Church (2000). 'Seeing As' and the Double Bind of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):99-112.
    Central to aesthetic experience, but also to experience in general, is the phenomenon of ‘seeing as'. We see a painting as a landscape, we hear sequence of sounds as a melody, we see a wooden contraption as a boat, and we hear a comment as an insult. There are interesting and important differences between these cases of ‘seeing as': the painting cannot literally be a landscape while the wooden contraption can literally be a boat; a failure to hear (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  95
    Charles E. M. Dunlop (1984). Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'. Synthese 60 (September):349-368.
    This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  30
    Andreas Blank (2011). Wittgenstein on Verification and Seeing-As, 1930–1932. Inquiry 54 (6):614 - 632.
    Abstract This article examines the little-explored remarks on verification in Wittgenstein's notebooks during the period between 1930 and 1932. In these remarks, Wittgenstein connects a verificationist theory of meaning with the notion of logical multiplicity, understood as a space of possibilities: a proposition is verified by a fact if and only if the proposition and the fact have the same logical multiplicity. But while in his early philosophy logical multiplicities were analysed as an outcome of the formal properties of simple (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  3
    William L. Reese (1978). Religious ‘Seeing-As’: WILLIAM L. REESE. Religious Studies 14 (1):73-87.
    The conceptual framework of religion is more like the frame of a picture than the frame of a house; and what goes on within the frame is other than conceptual. This is the hypothesis motivating the analysis which follows. Given the hypothesis, the problem is to conceive what religion is - this other-than-conceptual enterprise which tends to attract conceptual frames. A possible answer is available in Wittgensteinian ‘seeing-as’. A number of philosophers of religion have recently exercised this option. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  12
    J. Kellenberger (2002). Seeing-As' in Religion: Discovery and Community. Religious Studies 38 (1):101-108.
    Seeing-as’, or aspect seeing, is generally recognized as having significance for religion, especially so since Wittgenstein. Two questions arise regarding religiously seeing the world as God's creation: have the religious seen the world aright, and does the world religiously require a community that uses religious concepts? I argue that a particular strain of religious tradition provides us with a way to understand the issue of discovery, and that a traditional understanding of the power of God requires that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.) (2015). Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. Routledge.
    Seeing-as and Novelty brings together new essays that consider Wittgenstein’s treatment of the phenomenon of aspect perception in relation to the broader idea of conceptual novelty; that is, the acquisition or creation of new concepts, and the application of an acquired understanding in unfamiliar or novel situations. Over the last twenty years, aspect perception has received increasing philosophical attention, largely related to applying Wittgenstein’s remarks on the phenomena of seeing-as, found in Part II of Philosophical Investigations , to (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Gary Kemp & Gabriele M. Mras (eds.) (2016). Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-as and Seeing-In. Routledge.
    Pictorial representation is one of the core questions in aesthetics and philosophy of art. What is a picture? How do pictures represent things? This collection of specially commissioned chapters examines the influential thesis that the core of pictorial representation is not resemblance but 'seeing-in', in particular as found in the work of Richard Wollheim. We can see a passing cloud _as_ a rabbit, but we also see a rabbit _in_ the clouds. 'Seeing-in' is an imaginative act of the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. John Ross (1993). An Examination of the 'Seeing-As' Discussion in "Philosophical Investigations" Part Ii. Dissertation, Fordham University
    The "seeing-as" discussion in Philosophical Investigations Part II is typical of Wittgenstein's later work. This material focuses on psychological concepts, but the point and source of the discussion is not immediately obvious. The relationship of this material to Part I is also unclear. Some authors have suggested that Wittgenstein was moving in new directions; others have suggested a continuity between the two parts. ;In Part I, Wittgenstein develops his analysis of the meaning of "concept". We acquire concepts by learning (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Alberto Voltolini (2012). How to Reconcile Seeing-As with Seeing-In (with Mimetic Purposes in Mind). In G. Currie, P. Kot'atko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Rivista di Estetica. College Publications 99-113.
    I will try to show that seeing-as doubly grounds seeing-in. First, I will urge that a seeing-as of a certain kind, what I will call illusory seeing-as, partially constitutes the twofold experience of seeing-in, by being what the proper ‘seeing-in’- fold of that experience really amounts to: the experience of illusorily yet awarely seeing the picture’s image as the picture’s subject, in other terms, an experience of aware misrecognition of that image as that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  58
    Fabian Dorsch (2016). Seeing-In as Aspect Perception. In Gary Kemp & Gabriele Mras (eds.), Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-as and Seeing-in. Routledge
  24.  26
    Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1956). Seeing and Seeing As. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:109-124.
  25.  41
    Ingrid H. Stadler (1958). On Seeing As. Philosophical Review 67 (January):91-94.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  17
    Michael E. Malone (1978). Is Scientific Observation Seeing As? Philosophical Investigations 1 (4):23-38.
  27. Lawrence Nolan (2012). Malebranche on Sensory Cognition and "Seeing As". Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):21-52.
    Nicolas Malebranche Famously holds that we see all things in the physical world by means of ideas in God. This is the doctrine of Vision in God. In his initial formulation of the doctrine in the first edition of the Search After Truth , Malebranche seems to posit ideas of particular physical objects in God, such as the idea of the sun or the idea of a tree. However, in Elucidations of the Search published four years later he insists that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Nicoletta Orlandi (2012). Embedded Seeing-As: Multi-Stable Visual Perception Without Interpretation. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):1-19.
    Standard models of visual perception hold that vision is an inferential or interpretative process. Such models are said to be superior to competing, non-inferential views in explanatory power. In particular, they are said to be capable of explaining a number of otherwise mysterious, visual phenomena such as multi-stable perception. Multi-stable perception paradigmatically occurs in the presence of ambiguous figures, single images that can give rise to two or more distinct percepts. Different interpretations are said to produce the different percepts. In (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  29.  15
    Reshef Agam‐Segal (2014). When Language Gives Out: Conceptualization, and Aspect‐Seeing as a Form of Judgment. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):41-68.
    This article characterizes aspect-perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant's sense: a distinct way in which the mind contacts world and applies concepts. First, aspect-perception involves a mode of thinking about things apart from any established routine of conceptualizing them. It is thus a form of concept application that is essentially reflection about language. Second, this mode of reflection has an experiential, sometimes perceptual, element: in aspect-perception, that is, we experience meanings—bodies of norms. Third, aspect-perception can be “preparatory”: (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  28
    Alberto Voltolini (2014). Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Lynne Tirrell (1991). Seeing Metaphor as Seeing-As: Davidson's Positive View of Metaphor. Philosophical Investigations 14 (2):143-154.
    Davidson suggests that metaphor is a pragmatic (not a semantic) phenomenon; it prompts its audience to see one thing as another. Davidson rightly attacks speaker-intentionalism as the source of metaphorical meaning, but settles for an account that depends on audience intentions. A better approach would undermine intentionalism per se, replacing it with a social practice analysis based on patterns of extending the metaphor. This paper shows why Davidson’s perceptual model fails to stave off semantic analysis, and argues that the professed (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Voltolini (2012). How to Reconcile Seeing-As with Seeing-In (with Mimetic Purposes in Mind). In G. Currie, P. Kot’Atko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  76
    Igal Kvart (1993). Seeing That and Seeing As. Noûs 27 (3):279-302.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34.  8
    Kathleen Stock, Objectification, Images and ‘Mind-Insensitive Seeing-As’.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  39
    Robert Howell (1972). Seeing As. Synthese 23 (4):400 - 422.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  36.  21
    Patricia H. Werhane (2010). The Centrality of “Seeing As” and a Question About “Truth”. Journal of Business Ethics Education 7:197-200.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  54
    Brian E. Butler (2007). Seeing Ecology and Seeing as Ecology: On Brereton's Hollywood Utopia and the Anderson's Moving Image Theory. Film-Philosophy 11 (1):61-69.
    Joseph D. Anderson & Barbara Fisher Anderson Moving Image Theory: Ecological ConsiderationsCarbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.ISBN 0 8093 2599 3253pp.Pat Brereton Hollywood Utopia: Ecology in Contemporary American CinemaBristol: Intellect.ISBN 1 84150117 4270pp.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  41
    Kaisa Puhakka (1992). Discovery as Seeing: Lessons From Radical Empiricism and Meditative Practice. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):48-58.
    Suggests that genuine discovery in the context of qualitative research implies a distance between what is seen in the phenomenological sense and what has already been described. The ingenuity of William James's descriptions of hitherto undescribed aspects of everyday experience are rooted in an openness to seeing that characterizes his "radical empiricism." James was a pathfinder and explorer who did introspection and discovered the phenomena of transitive consciousness. The concepts of seeing as the mode of discovery, problematics of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. J. Benoist (2001). Categorial Intuition (Husserl) And'Seeing As'(Wittgenstein)(Aspect Seeing). Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.
  40.  40
    Noel Fleming (1957). Recognizing and Seeing As. Philosophical Review 66 (2):161-179.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  39
    Alec Hyslop (1983). On 'Seeing-As'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (June):533-540.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  2
    G. N. A. Vesey (1956). VI.—Seeing and Seeing As. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1):109-124.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  26
    T. E. Wilkerson (1973). Seeing-As. Mind 82 (328):481-496.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  22
    James J. Heaney (1979). Faith and the Logic of Seeing-As. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):189 - 198.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  17
    B. R. Tilghman (1983). Seeing and Seeing-as in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Philosophical Investigations 6 (2):116-134.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  3
    Emmanuel Alloa (2011). Seeing-as, Seeing-in, Seeing-With: Looking Through Images. In Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - N.S. 17. De Gruyter 179-190.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  14
    Robert Hoffman (1967). Mr. Malinovich on `Seeing' as an Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (3):439-440.
  48.  4
    Peter Slater (1980). Seeing as, Seeing in and Seeing Through. Sophia 19 (3):13-24.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  1
    J. Kellenberger (2002). Seeing-As' in Religion: Discovery and Community. Religious Studies 38 (1).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  7
    Robert Joseph Rossi (1974). Experience and Reason: The Three Hypotheses of Seeing As. Educational Philosophy and Theory 6 (2):55–63.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000