Search results for 'Seeing as' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. I. As (1997). Have Argued Elsewhere, God's Omnipotence is Not to Be Understood as the Ability to Do Absolutely Anything, Including That Which is Logically Impossible to Do–See My “The Absolutist Theory of Omnipotence,”. Sophia 36:55-78.score: 420.0
     
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  2. Kathleen Stock (2013). Some Reflections on Seeing-as, Metaphor-Grasping and Imagining. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):201-213.score: 240.0
    In this paper I examine the frequently made claim that grasping a metaphor is a kind of ‘seeing-as’. I describe several ways in which it might be thought that metaphor-grasping is importantly similar to seeing-as, such that an extension of the latter category is though justified to include the former. For some of these similarities, I suggest they are illusory; for others, I argue that they are shared in virtue of the membership of both seeing-as and metaphor-grasping (...)
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  3. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Human Diagrammatic Reasoning and Seeing-As. Synthese 186 (1):121-148.score: 240.0
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all.
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  4. Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Content of a Seeing-As Experience. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):215-237.score: 240.0
    In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational (...)-as (its configurational fold) and by an experience of knowingly illusory seeing-as (its recognitional fold). To my mind, Wittgenstein’s reflections on seeing-as have anticipated these claims. (shrink)
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  5. Panos Theodorou (2004). Of the Same in the Different. What is Wrong with Kuhn's Use of ``Seeing'' and ``Seeing As''. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (1):175-200.score: 240.0
    Kuhn uses the distinction between `(simple) seeing', and `seeing as' in order to claim that among competing paradigms there cannot be found any middle (experiential) ground; nothing `same' can be located behind such radically different paradigm-worlds. He claims that scientists do not see a common something as this thing at one time and as that thing at another. Each time scientists simply see what they see. To claim the contrary is to claim that scientists arrive at their paradigmatic (...)
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  6. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.score: 234.0
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered (...)
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  7. B. R. Tilghman (1988). Seeing and Seeing-AS. AI and Society 2 (4):303-313.score: 234.0
    This paper highlights the importance of inter-relationships between language, context, practice and interpretation. These inter-relationships should be of interest to AI researchers working in multi-disciplinary fields such as knowledge based systems, speech and vision. Attention is drawn to the importance of Part II, Section II of Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations for understanding the enormous complexity of the concept of seeing and how it is woven into an understanding of language and of human relations.
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  8. J. F. M. Hunter (1981). Wittgenstein on Seeing and Seeing As. Philosophical Investigations 4 (2):33-49.score: 224.0
    The article is an interpretation of about the first half of chapter xi of part ii of "philosophical investigations". Wittgenstein is treated as having the single aim of arguing down the massive temptation to suppose that the expression 'to see...As...', And such similar expressions as 'to recognize', Record the occurrence of an experience distinct from the experience of simply seeing the object seen as or recognized. Ways are suggested of making a kind of sense of most of the very (...)
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  9. Ned Block (2014). Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).score: 210.0
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  10. Lynne Tirrell (1991). Seeing Metaphor as Seeing-As: Remarks on Davidson's Positive View of Metaphor. Philosophical Investigations 14 (2):143-154.score: 210.0
  11. Emmanuel Alloa (2011). Seeing-in, Seeing-as, Seeing-With: Looking Through Pictures. In Elisabeth Nemeth, Richard Heinrich, Wolfram Pichler & Wagner David (eds.), Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts. Volume I. Proceedings of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Ontos: 179-190.score: 180.0
    In the constitution of contemporary image theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy has undoubtedly become a major conceptual reference. Rather than trying to establish what Wittgenstein’s own image theory could possibly look like, this paper would like to critically assess some of the advantages as well as some of the quandaries that arise when using Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’ for addressing the plural realities of images. While putting into evidence the tensions that come into play when applying what was initially a (...)
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  12. Charles E. M. Dunlop (1984). Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'. Synthese 60 (September):349-368.score: 180.0
    This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how (...)
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  13. Andreas Blank (2011). Wittgenstein on Verification and Seeing-As, 1930–1932. Inquiry 54 (6):614 - 632.score: 180.0
    Abstract This article examines the little-explored remarks on verification in Wittgenstein's notebooks during the period between 1930 and 1932. In these remarks, Wittgenstein connects a verificationist theory of meaning with the notion of logical multiplicity, understood as a space of possibilities: a proposition is verified by a fact if and only if the proposition and the fact have the same logical multiplicity. But while in his early philosophy logical multiplicities were analysed as an outcome of the formal properties of simple (...)
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  14. J. Kellenberger (2002). Seeing-As' in Religion: Discovery and Community. Religious Studies 38 (1):101-108.score: 180.0
    Seeing-as’, or aspect seeing, is generally recognized as having significance for religion, especially so since Wittgenstein. Two questions arise regarding religiously seeing the world as God's creation: have the religious seen the world aright, and does the world religiously require a community that uses religious concepts? I argue that a particular strain of religious tradition provides us with a way to understand the issue of discovery, and that a traditional understanding of the power of God requires that (...)
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  15. Alberto Voltolini (2012). How to Reconcile Seeing-As with Seeing-In (with Mimetic Purposes in Mind). In G. Currie, P. Kot'atko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications. 99-113.score: 180.0
    I will try to show that seeing-as doubly grounds seeing-in. First, I will urge that a seeing-as of a certain kind, what I will call illusory seeing-as, partially constitutes the twofold experience of seeing-in, by being what the proper ‘seeing-in’- fold of that experience really amounts to: the experience of illusorily yet awarely seeing the picture’s image as the picture’s subject, in other terms, an experience of aware misrecognition of that image as that (...)
     
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  16. Lawrence Nolan (2012). Malebranche on Sensory Cognition and "Seeing As&Quot;. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):21-52.score: 162.0
    Nicolas Malebranche Famously holds that we see all things in the physical world by means of ideas in God. This is the doctrine of Vision in God. In his initial formulation of the doctrine in the first edition of the Search After Truth (1674), Malebranche seems to posit ideas of particular physical objects in God, such as the idea of the sun or the idea of a tree. However, in Elucidations of the Search published four years later he insists that (...)
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  17. Ingrid H. Stadler (1958). On Seeing As. Philosophical Review 67 (January):91-94.score: 162.0
  18. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1956). Seeing and Seeing As. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:109-124.score: 162.0
  19. Michael E. Malone (1978). Is Scientific Observation Seeing As? Philosophical Investigations 1 (4):23-38.score: 162.0
  20. Lynne Tirrell (1991). Seeing Metaphor as Seeing-As: Davidson's Positive View of Metaphor. Philosophical Investigations 14 (2):143-154.score: 162.0
    Davidson suggests that metaphor is a pragmatic (not a semantic) phenomenon; it prompts its audience to see one thing as another. Davidson rightly attacks speaker-intentionalism as the source of metaphorical meaning, but settles for an account that depends on audience intentions. A better approach would undermine intentionalism per se, replacing it with a social practice analysis based on patterns of extending the metaphor. This paper shows why Davidson’s perceptual model fails to stave off semantic analysis, and argues that the professed (...)
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  21. Nicoletta Orlandi (2011). Embedded Seeing-As: Multi-Stable Visual Perception Without Interpretation. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):1-19.score: 156.0
    Standard models of visual perception hold that vision is an inferential or interpretative process. Such models are said to be superior to competing, non-inferential views in explanatory power. In particular, they are said to be capable of explaining a number of otherwise mysterious, visual phenomena such as multi-stable perception. Multi-stable perception paradigmatically occurs in the presence of ambiguous figures, single images that can give rise to two or more distinct percepts. Different interpretations are said to produce the different percepts. In (...)
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  22. Alberto Voltolini (2014). Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.score: 156.0
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such (...)
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  23. Reshef Agam‐Segal (2014). When Language Gives Out: Conceptualization, and Aspect‐Seeing as a Form of Judgment. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):41-68.score: 156.0
    This article characterizes aspect-perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant's sense: a distinct way in which the mind contacts world and applies concepts. First, aspect-perception involves a mode of thinking about things apart from any established routine of conceptualizing them. It is thus a form of concept application that is essentially reflection about language. Second, this mode of reflection has an experiential, sometimes perceptual, element: in aspect-perception, that is, we experience meanings—bodies of norms. Third, aspect-perception can be “preparatory”: (...)
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  24. Elisabeth Camp, Saying and Seeing-As: The Linguistic Uses and Cognitive Effects of Metaphor.score: 150.0
    Metaphor is a pervasive feature of language. We use metaphor to talk about the world in both familiar and innovative ways, and in contexts ranging from everyday conversation to literature and scientific theorizing. However, metaphor poses serious challenges for standard theories of meaning, because it seems to straddle so many important boundaries: between language and thought, between semantics and pragmatics, between rational communication and mere causal association.
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  25. Igal Kvart (1993). Seeing That and Seeing As. Noûs 27 (3):279-302.score: 150.0
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  26. Jennifer Church (2000). 'Seeing As' and the Double Bind of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):99-112.score: 150.0
  27. Noel Fleming (1957). Recognizing and Seeing As. Philosophical Review 66 (2):161-179.score: 150.0
  28. Alec Hyslop (1983). On 'Seeing-As'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (June):533-540.score: 150.0
  29. Brian E. Butler (2007). Seeing Ecology and Seeing as Ecology: On Brereton's Hollywood Utopia and the Anderson's Moving Image Theory. Film-Philosophy 11 (1):61-69.score: 150.0
  30. B. R. Tilghman (1983). Seeing and Seeing-as in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Philosophical Investigations 6 (2):116-134.score: 150.0
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  31. T. E. Wilkerson (1973). Seeing-As. Mind 82 (328):481-496.score: 150.0
  32. Kaisa Puhakka (1992). Discovery as Seeing: Lessons From Radical Empiricism and Meditative Practice. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):48-58.score: 150.0
    Suggests that genuine discovery in the context of qualitative research implies a distance between what is seen in the phenomenological sense and what has already been described. The ingenuity of William James's descriptions of hitherto undescribed aspects of everyday experience are rooted in an openness to seeing that characterizes his "radical empiricism." James was a pathfinder and explorer who did introspection and discovered the phenomena of transitive consciousness. The concepts of seeing as the mode of discovery, problematics of (...)
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  33. Robert Howell (1972). Seeing As. Synthese 23 (4):400 - 422.score: 150.0
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  34. James J. Heaney (1979). Faith and the Logic of Seeing-As. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):189 - 198.score: 150.0
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  35. Robert Hoffman (1967). Mr. Malinovich on `Seeing' as an Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (3):439-440.score: 150.0
  36. Robert Joseph Rossi (1974). Experience and Reason: The Three Hypotheses of Seeing As. Educational Philosophy and Theory 6 (2):55–63.score: 150.0
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  37. William L. Reese (1978). Religious 'Seeing-As'. Religious Studies 14 (1):73 - 87.score: 150.0
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  38. Nicoletta Orlandi (2011). The Innocent Eye: Seeing-as Without Concepts. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):17.score: 150.0
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  39. J. Benoist (2001). Categorial Intuition (Husserl) And'Seeing As'(Wittgenstein)(Aspect Seeing). Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.score: 150.0
  40. John A. Grim & Mary Evelyn Tucker (2006). An Overview of Teilhard's Commitment to 'Seeing' as Expressed in His Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Mysticism. In Celia Deane-Drummond (ed.), Pierre Teilhard De Chardin on People and Planet. Equinox.score: 150.0
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  41. Norwood R. Hanson (2002). Seeing and Seeing As. In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. 321--339.score: 150.0
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  42. Anne Jaap Jacobson (2012). Seeing as a Social Phenomenon : Feminist Theory and the Cognitive Sciences. In Robyn Bluhm, Anne Jaap Jacobson & Heidi Lene Maibom (eds.), Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 150.0
  43. J. M. Monnoyer (2002). 'Seeing As' in Wittgenstein. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 56 (219):109-124.score: 150.0
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  44. Kevin Mulligan (1988). Seeing as and Assimilative Perception. Brentano Studien 1:129-52.score: 150.0
     
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  45. Peter Slater (1980). Seeing as, Seeing in and Seeing Through. Sophia 19 (3):13-24.score: 150.0
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  46. Voltolini (2012). How to Reconcile Seeing-As with Seeing-In (with Mimetic Purposes in Mind). In G. Currie, P. Kot’Atko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications.score: 150.0
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  47. Patricia H. Werhane (2010). The Centrality of “Seeing As” and a Question About “Truth”. Journal of Business Ethics Education 7:197-200.score: 150.0
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  48. Kelly Besecke (2005). Seeing Invisible Religion: Religion as a Societal Conversation About Transcendent Meaning. Sociological Theory 23 (2):179-196.score: 126.0
    Contemporary sociology conceptualizes religion along two dimensions: the institutional and the individual. Lost in this dichotomy is religion's noninstitutional, but collective and public, cultural dimension. As a result, theories of religious modernity, including both sides of the secularization debate, are unable to recognize or evaluate the social power of noninstitutionalized religious communication. This article offers a reconceptualization of religion that highlights its cultural, communicative dimension. Original research on religious talk provides an empirical ground for a theoretical discussion that highlights: (1) (...)
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  49. Nathaniel F. Barrett & Wesley J. Wildman (2009). Seeing is Believing? How Reinterpreting Perception as Dynamic Engagement Alters the Justificatory Force of Religious Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):71 - 86.score: 126.0
    William Alston’s Theory of Appearing has attracted considerable attention in recent years, both for its elegant interpretation of direct realism in light of the presentational character of perceptual experience and for its central role in his defense of the justificatory force of Christian mystical experiences. There are different ways to account for presentational character, however, and in this article we argue that a superior interpretation of direct realism can be given by a theory of perception as dynamic engagement. The conditions (...)
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  50. John Barresi, On Seeing Our Selves and Others as Persons.score: 126.0
    Human beings may be the only organisms capable of thinking of self and other in equivalent ways – as selves and persons. Most organisms think about their own activities differently than they do the activities of others. A few large-brained organisms like chimps and dolphins sometimes think of the activities of self and other in the same way. But, only humans think quite generally in this manner. In this paper I give a description of our commonsense notions of self and (...)
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