Search results for 'Self-ascription' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. James M. Dow, Shoegenstein on Self-Ascription, Immunity to Error and I-as-Subject.
    Contemporary accounts of the self-ascription of experiences are wedded to two basic dogmas. The first is that self-ascription is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM). The second dogma is that there is distinction between awareness of oneself qua subject and awareness of oneself qua object (the SCS/SCO distinction). In this paper, I urge that these dogmas are groundless. First, I illustrate that claims about immunity to error through misidentification are usually based upon claims (...)
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  2.  38
    David R. Olson (2007). Self-Ascription of Intention: Responsibility, Obligation and Self-Control. Synthese 159 (2):297 - 314.
    In the late preschool years children acquire a "theory of mind", the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children's ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children's developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability to (...)
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  3. M. Frank (1995). Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. Common Knowledge 4:30--50.
  4. George Graham (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press 89.
  5.  80
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self‐Ascription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-219.
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  6.  59
    Richard Holton (forthcoming). Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se. In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell
    There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription (...)
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  7.  86
    Stephan Torre (2010). Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
    I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two (...)
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  8. Andrew J. Pierce (2012). Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription. Lexington Books.
    Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription argues that groups have an irreducibly collective right to determine the meaning of their shared group identity, and that such a right is especially important for historically oppressed groups. It provides a novel approach to issues of identity politics, group rights, and racial identity, one which combines and develops the insights of contemporary critical theory and race theory, and will thus be of special interest to scholars in these fields.
     
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  9. Andrew J. Pierce (2013). Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription. Lexington Books.
    Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription argues that groups have an irreducibly collective right to determine the meaning of their shared group identity, and that such a right is especially important for historically oppressed groups. It provides a novel approach to issues of identity politics, group rights, and racial identity, one which combines and develops the insights of contemporary critical theory and race theory, and will thus be of special interest to scholars in these fields.
     
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  10.  23
    Quassim Cassam (1995). Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press 311--336.
  11.  6
    Fabrice Pataut, Antirealism and the Self-Ascription of Attitudes.
    In a nutshell, semantic antirealism is the doctrine that if a statement is true, then it must be possible, at least in principle, to determine that it is true. Consider the particular case of self-ascriptions of attitudes such as beliefs, desires and intentions, i.e. statements of the form "I φ [that] p", where φ ranges over propositional attitude verbs and p provides the content of whatever is φd by the self-ascriber. Should we be semantic antirealists about these when the putative (...)
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  12. Johannes Haag (2010). Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection: An Kantian Approach. In Gasser G. (ed.), Personal Identity ans Resurrection. How do we survive our death. Ashgate 127-143.
  13. David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  14.  28
    Neil Feit (2000). Self-Ascription and Belief de Re. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
  15.  82
    Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987). Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing. Philosophical Perspectives 1:405-454.
  16.  5
    Brian Loar (1993). Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58.
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  17.  13
    James E. Tomberlin (1991). Belief, Self-Ascription, and Ontology. Philosophical Issues 1:233-259.
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  18.  3
    Robert M. Gordon (1993). Self-Ascription of Belief and Desire. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45.
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  19.  12
    Nathan Rotenstreich (1981). Self-Ascription and Objectivity. Philosophia 10 (3-4):189-198.
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  20. Neil Feit (2012). Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag 47--213.
     
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  21. Manfred Frank (2000). Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge: Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. In Willem van Reijen & Willem G. Weststeijn (eds.), Subjectivity. Rodopi
  22.  22
    James Russell (2007). Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children. Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.
    The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as 'the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts' [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432—451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes the form of three concentric (...)
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  23.  84
    Robert M. Gordon (2007). Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.
    An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying (...)
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  24.  11
    Andreas Kemmerling (2012). First Person Authority Without Glamorous Self-Knowledge. In Löffler Jäger (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement – Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium.
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  25.  53
    Martin F. Fricke (2009). Evans and First Person Authority. Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief and (...)
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  26.  40
    Martin Francisco Fricke (2009). Evans and First Person Authority. Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief and (...)
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  27.  26
    Frederik Kaufman (1990). Conceptual Necessity, Causality and Self-Ascriptions of Sensation. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):3-11.
  28.  4
    Mitchell Ginsberg (1972). Mind And Belief: Psychological Ascription And The Concept Of Belief. Ny: Humanities Press.
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  29.  28
    José Eduardo Porcher (2012). Against the Deflationary Account of Self-Deception. Humana.Mente 20:67-84.
    Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while some of it supports the contrary attribution. Theorists have resorted either to attributing both beliefs to the self-deceived, or to postulating an unconscious belief coupled with another kind of cognitive attitude. On the other hand, deflationary accounts of self- deception have attempted a more parsimonious solution: attributing only one, false belief to the subject. (...)
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  30.  58
    José Medina (2006). What's so Special About Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):575-603.
    This is a critical discussion of selected chapters of the first volume of Scott Soames's _Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. It is argued that this volume falls short of the minimal standards of scholarship appropriate to a work that advertises itself as a history, and, further, that Soames's frequent heuristic simplifications and distortions, since they are only sporadically identified as such, are more likely to confuse than to enlighten the student. These points are illustrated by reference to Soames's discussions (...)
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  31.  93
    Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2014). Metacognitive Feelings, Self-Ascriptions and Metal Actions. Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):145-162.
    The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The (...)
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  32.  42
    Neil Feit (2008). Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford University Press.
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  33. Margaret Gilbert (1971). Vices and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (15):443-453.
    Towards an account of character traits in self-Knowledge, With an assessment of the sartrean thesis ("spectatorism") that character trait concepts are fitted for other-Ascription rather than self-Ascription. The logic of ascriptions of evil character and specific vices is dealt with. The relationship of self-Ascription to self-Falsification and "seeing oneself as an object" is examined. Self-Ascription has peculiarities, But at most a very mild form of spectatorism is born out.
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  34. Steven Yalowitz (2000). A Dispositional Account of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):249-278.
    It is widely thought that dispositional accounts of content cannot adequately provide for two of its essential features: normativity and non-inferentially-based self-knowledge. This paper argues that these criticisms depend upon having wrongly bracketed the presumption of first-person authority. With that presumption in place, dispositional conceptions can account for normativity: conditions of correctness must then be presumed, ceteris paribus, to be successfully grasped in particular cases, and thus to result from semantic-constituting dispositions; error occurs when cetera are not paria. An account (...)
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  35.  59
    R. Greene (2003). Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge and the Regress Problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.
    Abstract In the contemporary literature on self-knowledge discussion is framed by and large by two competing models of self-knowledge: the observational (or perceptual) model and the constitutive model. On the observational model self-knowledge is the result of ?cognitively viewing? one's mental states. Constitutive theories of self-knowledge, on the other hand, hold that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentional states. That is, self-ascription is a necessary condition for being in a particular mental state. Akeel Bilgrami is (...)
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  36.  84
    Tomis Kapitan (1999). The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:17-43.
    Two claims have been prominent in recent discussion of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible {Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that awareness of self accompanies at least all those conscious states through which one refers to something. The latter {Ubiquity Thesis) has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano and Sartre, but recently variants have been defended by D. Henrich and M. Frank. Facing criticism from three arguments which nevertheless cannot decisively refute the (...)
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  37.  37
    Andrea Christofidou (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity. Philosophy 75 (294):539-570.
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to.
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  38.  38
    James M. Dow (2012). On the Joint Engagement of Persons: Self-Consciousness, the Symmetry Thesis and Person Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):1-27.
    In The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Jose Luis Bermúdez presents an abductive argument for what he calls ‘the Symmetry Thesis’ about self-ascription: in order to have the ability to self-ascribe psychological predicates to oneself, one must be able to ascribe psychological predicates to other subjects like oneself. Bermúdez discusses joint engagement as a key phenomenon that underwrites his abductive argument for the Symmetry Thesis. He argues that the ability to self-ascribe is “constituted” by the intersubjective relations that are realized in (...)
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  39. Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...)
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  40.  64
    Martin F. Fricke (2012). Rules of Language and First Person Authority. Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.
    This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...)
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  41. Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
    Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, (...)
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  42.  53
    Rockney Jacobsen (1997). Self-Quotation and Self-Knowledge. Synthese 110 (3):419-445.
    I argue that indirect quotation in the first person simple present tense (self-quotation) provides a class of infallible assertions. The defense of this conclusion examines the joint descriptive and constitutive functions of performative utterances and argues that a parallel treatment of belief ascription is in order. The parallel account yields a class of infallible belief ascriptions that makes no appeal to privileged modes of access. Confronting a dilemma formulated by Crispin Wright for theories of self-knowledge gives an epistemological setting for (...)
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  43.  13
    Martín Francisco Fricke (2008). Teorías constitutivas de la autoridad de la primera persona: Wright y Heal. Ludus Vitalis 16 (29):73-91.
    Someone who believes “I believe it will rain” can easily be mistaken about the rain. But it does not seem likely, and might even be impossible, that he is wrong about the fact that he believes that it is going to rain. How can we account for this authority about our own beliefs – the phenomenon known as first person authority? In this paper I examine a type of theory proposed, in distinct forms, by Crispin Wright and Jane Heal (...)
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  44.  5
    James M. Dow (2012). Mindreading, Mindsharing, and the Origins of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 40 (2):39-70.
    Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally understood folk psychology to emerge in one of two ways: either first through the origin of the function of self-consciousness or first through the origin of the function of mindreading. The aim of this paper is to provide reasons to doubt that those options exhaust the possibilities. In particular, I will argue that in the discussion about whether self-consciousness or mindreading evolved first, we have lost sight of a viable third option. I will urge that (...)
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  45.  10
    Dan Zahavi & Andreas Roepstorff (2011). Faces and Ascriptions: Mapping Measures of the Self. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):141-148.
    The ‘self’ is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the experimental instrumentalization has gone hand in (...)
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  46. Rory Madden (2013). Could a Brain in a Vat Self‐Refer? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):74-93.
    : Radical sceptical possibilities challenge the anti-realist view that truth consists in ideal rational acceptability. Putnam, as part of his defence of an anti-realist view, subjected the case of the brain in a vat to a semantic externalist treatment, which aimed to maintain the desired connection between truth and ideal rational acceptability. It is argued here that self-consciousness poses special problems for this externalist strategy. It is shown how, on a standard model of first-person reference, Putnam's brain in a vat (...)
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  47.  64
    Martin F. Fricke (2007). Davidson y la autoridad de la primera persona. Dianoia 52 (58):49-76.
    In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in three main points: (1) The status of the theory is unclear, given that it is phenomenologically inadequate. (2) The theory explains only that part of the phenomenon of first person authority which is due to the fact that no two speakers speak exactly the same idiolect. But first person authority might be a more far-reaching phenomenon than this. (3) Davidson’s argument depends on the claim that (...)
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  48. Lucy F. O'Brien (2005). Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580–601.
    My aim in this paper is to articulate further what may be called an agency theory of self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self- knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two notions.<sup>2</sup> However, it has not always been clear what _epistemic_ advantage agency gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate account of how a subject knows her own mental states (...)
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  49.  85
    Frank Hofmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence. Erkenntnis 71 (1):19 - 34.
    The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription (...)
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  50.  45
    Adam Morton (2013). Imaginary Emotions. The Monist 96 (4):505-516.
    I give grounds for taking seriously the possibility that some of the emotions we ascribe do not exist. I build on the premise that the experience of imagining an emotion resembles that of having one. First a person imagines having an emotion. This is much like an emotion, so the person takes herself to be having the emotion that she imagines, and acts or expects a disposition to act accordingly. The view sketched here contrasts possibly impossible emotions such as disembodied (...)
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