Search results for 'Self-awareness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis (2005). The Roots of Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.score: 240.0
    In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account.
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  2. Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 157--180.score: 240.0
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of (...)
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  3. John Louis Schwenkler (2009). Space and Self-Awareness. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleyscore: 240.0
    How should we think about the role of visual spatial awareness in perception and perceptual knowledge? A common view, which finds a characteristic expression in Kant but has an intellectual heritage reaching back farther than that, is that an account of spatial awareness is fundamental to a theory of experience because spatiality is the defining characteristic of “outer sense”, of our perceptual awareness of how things are in the parts of the world that surround us. A natural counterpart to this (...)
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  4. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.score: 240.0
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use (...)
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  5. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window Onto Agentive Self-Awareness. Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.score: 240.0
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account (...)
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  6. Dan Zahavi (2002). First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.score: 240.0
    The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.
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  7. Stephen Langfur (2013). The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.score: 240.0
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
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  8. Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.) (2001). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.score: 240.0
  9. Michael Lacewing (2005). Emotional Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation. Ratio 18 (1):65-81.score: 240.0
    How are we to distinguish between appropriate emotional responses that reveal morally salient reasons and inappropriate emotional responses that reflect our prejudices? It is often assumed that reason – considered as distinct from emotion – will make the distinction. I argue that this view is false, and that the process by which emotional responses are vetted involves ‘emotional self-awareness’. By this, I mean feeling an emotion, being aware of so doing, and feeling some usually subtle emotional response, often of (...)
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  10. Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.) (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
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  11. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.score: 240.0
    When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for (...)
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  12. Alain Morin (2005). Possible Links Between Self-Awareness and Inner Speech: Theoretical Background, Underlying Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):115-134.score: 240.0
    been recently proposed (Morin, 2003; 2004). The model takes into account most known mechanisms and processes leading to self-awareness, and examines their multiple and complex interactions. Inner speech is postulated to play a key-role in this model, as it establishes important connections between many of its ele- ments. This paper first reviews past and current references to a link between self-awareness and inner speech. It then presents an analysis of the nature of the relation between these two concepts. (...)
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  13. Roy W. Perrett (2003). Intentionality and Self-Awareness. Ratio 16 (3):222-235.score: 240.0
    In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional (object-directed, exhibit ‘aboutness’). The other is the Self-Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the (...)
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  14. Cam Caldwell (2009). Identity, Self-Awareness, and Self-Deception: Ethical Implications for Leaders and Organizations. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 90 (3):393 - 406.score: 240.0
    The ability of leaders to be perceived as trustworthy and to develop authentic and effective relationships is largely a function of their personal identities and their self-awareness in understanding and making accommodations for their weaknesses. The research about self-deception confirms that we often practice denial regarding our identities without being fully aware of the ethical duties that we owe to ourselves and to others. This article offers insights about the nature of identity and selfawareness, specifically examining how self-deception can (...)
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  15. Dan Arnold (2010). Self-Awareness ( Svasaṃvitti ) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dignāga: Philosophical Characterizations of Some of the Main Issues. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):323-378.score: 240.0
    Framed as a consideration of the other contributions to the present volume of the Journal of Indian Philosophy , this essay attempts to scout and characterize several of the interrelated doctrines and issues that come into play in thinking philosophically about the doctrine of svasaṃvitti , particularly as that was elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the issues thus considered are the question of how mānasapratyakṣa (which is akin to manovijñāna ) might relate to svasaṃvitti ; how those related doctrines (...)
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  16. Hans Bernhard Schmid (2014). Plural Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.score: 240.0
    It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) (...)
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  17. Ingar Brinck & G. (1999). Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents. Synthese 118 (1):89-104.score: 240.0
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for (...)
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  18. Chien-Hsing Ho (2007). Consciousness and Self-Awareness. Asian Philosophy 17 (3):213 – 230.score: 240.0
    In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. (...)
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  19. Birgit Kellner (2010). Self-Awareness ( Svasaṃvedana ) in Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya and - Vṛtti : A Close Reading. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):203-231.score: 240.0
    The concept of “self-awareness” ( svasaṃvedana ) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and - vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the (...)
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  20. Alex Watson (2010). Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Elaboration of Self-Awareness ( Svasaṃvedana ), and How It Differs From Dharmakīrti's Exposition of the Concept. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):297-321.score: 240.0
    The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) when it was appropriated by Śaiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition ( ahampratyaya ). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakaṇṭha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by (...)
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  21. Susan A. J. Stuart (2002). A Radical Notion of Embeddedness: A Logically Necessary Precondition for Agency and Self-Awareness. Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):98-109.score: 240.0
    The aim of this paper is to establish the logically necessary preconditions for the existence of self-awareness in an artificial or a natural agent. We examine the terms, agent, situated, embodied, embedded, and representation, as employed ubiquitously in cognitive science, attempting to clarify their meaning and the limits of their use. We discuss the minimal conditions for an agent’s environment constituting a ‘world’ and reject most, though not all, types of virtual world. We argue that to qualify as genuinely (...)
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  22. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Unwitting Self-Awareness? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.score: 240.0
    This is a contribution to a book symposium on Joëlle Proust's The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness (OUP).
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  23. Shinya Moriyama (2010). On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):261-277.score: 240.0
    This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form ( sākārajñānavāda ). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form ( grāhakākāra/svābhāsa ) grasps the objective mental (...)
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  24. Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 240.0
  25. David A. Silbersweig David R. Vago (2012). Self-Awareness, Self-Regulation, and Self-Transcendence (S-ART): A Framework for Understanding the Neurobiological Mechanisms of Mindfulness. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.score: 240.0
    Mindfulness - as a state, trait, process, type of meditation, and intervention has proven to be beneficial across a diverse group of psychological disorders as well as for general stress reduction. Yet, there remains a lack of clarity in the operationalization of this construct, and underlying mechanisms. Here, we provide an integrative theoretical framework and systems-based neurobiological model that explains the mechanisms by which mindfulness reduces biases related to self-processing and creates a sustainable healthy mind. Mindfulness is described through systematic (...)
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  26. Kristin Zeiler (2010). A Phenomenological Analysis of Bodily Self-Awareness in the Experience of Pain and Pleasure: On Dys-Appearance and Eu-Appearance. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):333-342.score: 240.0
    The aim of this article is to explore nuances within the field of bodily self-awareness. My starting-point is phenomenological. I focus on how the subject experiences her or his body, i.e. how the body stands forth to the subject. I build on the phenomenologist Drew Leder’s distinction between bodily dis-appearance and dys-appearance. In bodily dis-appearance, I am only prereflectively aware of my body. My body is not a thematic object of my experience. Bodily dys-appearance takes place when the body (...)
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  27. Kevin Guise, Karen Kelly, Jennifer Romanowski, Kai Vogeley, Steven M. Platek, Elizabeth Murray & Julian Paul Keenan (2007). The Anatomical and Evolutionary Relationship Between Self-Awareness and Theory of Mind. Human Nature 18 (2):132-142.score: 240.0
    Although theories that examine direct links between behavior and brain remain incomplete, it is known that brain expansion significantly correlates with caloric and oxygen demands. Therefore, one of the principles governing evolutionary cognitive neuroscience is that cognitive abilities that require significant brain function (and/or structural support) must be accompanied by significant fitness benefit to offset the increased metabolic demands. One such capacity is self-awareness (SA), which (1) is found only in the greater apes and (2) remains unclear in terms (...)
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  28. Dan Zahavi (ed.) (1998). Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer.score: 240.0
    Focusing on the topics of self-awareness, temporality, and alterity, this anthology contains contributions by prominent phenomenologists from Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, USA, Canada and Denmark, all addressing questions very much in the center of current phenomenological debate. What is the relation between the self and the Other? How are self-awareness and intentionality intertwined? To what extent do the temporality and corporeality of subjectivity contain a dimension of alterity? How should one account for the intersubjectivity, interculturality and historicity of (...)
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  29. Tomis Kapitan (1999). The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:17-43.score: 234.0
    Two claims have been prominent in recent discussion of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible {Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that awareness of self accompanies at least all those conscious states through which one refers to something. The latter {Ubiquity Thesis) has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano and Sartre, but recently variants have been defended by D. Henrich and M. Frank. Facing criticism from three arguments which nevertheless cannot decisively refute the (...)
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  30. Andrew Brook (2001). Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. 9--30.score: 228.0
  31. Greg Janzen (2006). Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.score: 228.0
    One of the more refractory problems in contemporary discussions of consciousness is the problem of determining what a mental state's being conscious consists in. This paper defends the thesis that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has a certain reflexive character, i.e., if and only if it has a structure that includes an awareness of itself. Since this thesis finds one of its clearest expressions in the work of Brentano, it is his treatment of the thesis (...)
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  32. Alarik T. Arenander & Frederick T. Travis (2004). Brain Patterns of Self-Awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 112-126.score: 228.0
  33. Alain Morin (2004). A Neurocognitive and Socioecological Model of Self-Awareness. Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.score: 228.0
    In the past, researchers have focused mainly on the effects and consequences of self-awareness; however, they have neglected a more basic issue pertaining to the specific mechanisms that initiate and sustain self-perception. The author presents a model of self-awareness that proposes the existence of 3 sources of self-information. First, the social milieu includes early face-to-face interactions, self-relevant feedback, a social comparison mechanism that leads to perspective taking, and audiences. Second, contacts with objects and structures in the physical environment (...)
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  34. Talia Welsh (2006). Do Neonates Display Innate Self-Awareness? Why Neonatal Imitation Fails to Provide Sufficient Grounds for Innate Self-and Other-Awareness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):221-238.score: 228.0
    Until the 1970s, models of early infancy tended to depict the young child as internally preoccupied and incapable of processing visual-tactile data from the external world. Meltzoff and Moore's groundbreaking studies of neonatal imitation disprove this characterization of early life: They suggest that the infant is cognizant of its external environment and is able to control its own body. Taking up these experiments, theorists argue that neonatal imitation provides an empirical justification for the existence of an innate ability to engage (...)
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  35. Laura A. Flashman (2004). Disorders of Insight, Self-Awareness, and Attribution in Schizophrenia. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 129-158.score: 228.0
     
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  36. Bernard D. Beitman, Jyotsna Nair & George I. Viamontes (2004). Why Self-Awareness? In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 3-23.score: 228.0
     
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  37. Richard J. Burch (2004). Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: A Disorder of Self-Awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 229-254.score: 228.0
     
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  38. Jyotsna Nair (2004). Knowing Me, Knowing You: Self-Awareness in Asperger's and Autism. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. WW Norton & Co. 159-183.score: 228.0
     
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  39. George I. Viamontes, Bernard D. Beitman, Claudia T. Viamontes & Jorge A. Viamontes (2004). Neural Circuits for Self-Awareness: Evolutionary Origins and Implementation in the Human Brain. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. 24-111.score: 228.0
  40. Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Phenomenological Critique of Representational Theory. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 5-6.score: 216.0
  41. Dan Zahavi (2004). The Embodied Self-Awareness of the Infant: A Challenge to the Theory-Theory of Mind. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins.score: 216.0
    This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim (...)
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  42. Monima Chadha (2011). Self-Awareness: Eliminating the Myth of the “Invisible Subject”. Philosophy East and West 61 (3):453-467.score: 216.0
    In the sixth century a.d., in a debate with the Buddhists about the nature of Self, the well-known Naiyāyika Uddyotakara declared that there is no need prove that the Self or what is referred to by the pronoun “I” exists, for on that score there cannot be any significant disagreement.1 It is only this or that specific metaphysical nature of the self that is the subject of controversy. To limit the scope of the debate at issue here, we employ the (...)
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  43. E. Fivaz-Depeursinge, N. Favez & F. Frascarolo (2004). Threesome Intersubjectivity in Infancy: A Contribution to the Development of Self-Awareness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.score: 216.0
  44. P. Rochat (2004). The Emergence of Self Awareness as Co-Awareness in Early Child Development. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.score: 216.0
  45. Sydney Shoemaker (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.score: 210.0
  46. Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.score: 210.0
    The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations. When Michael Hinton first introduced the idea, he suggested that the burden of (...)
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  47. Gilberto Gomes (1995). Self-Awareness and the Mind-Brain Problem. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.score: 210.0
    The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serious objection to psychoneural identity thesis, according to many authors, from Leibniz to Popper. It is argued that this objection can be superseded by a different conception of consciousness. Consciousness, while being conscious of something, is always unconscious of itself . Consciousness of being conscious is not immediate, it involves another, second-order, conscious state. The appearance of mental states to second-order consciousness does not reveal their true nature. (...)
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  48. Josef Parnas (2004). Belief and Pathology of Self-Awareness: A Phenomenological Contribution to the Classification of Delusions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):148-161.score: 210.0
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  49. Victoria McGeer (2004). Autistic Self-Awareness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3):235-251.score: 210.0
  50. Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 210.0
    The everyday capacity to understand the mind, or 'mindreading', plays an enormous role in our ordinary lives. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich provide a detailed and integrated account of the intricate web of mental components underlying this fascinating and multifarious skill. The imagination, they argue, is essential to understanding others, and there are special cognitive mechanisms for understanding oneself. The account that emerges has broad implications for longstanding philosophical debates over the status of folk psychology. Mindreading is another trailblazing volume (...)
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