Search results for 'Self-consciousness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Monica Meijsing (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Body. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):34-50.score: 246.0
    Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they (...)
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  2. Kristina Musholt (2012). Concepts or Metacognition - What is the Issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness”. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):721-722.score: 246.0
    The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here (...)
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  3. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.score: 240.0
    In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that (...)
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  4. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.score: 240.0
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.
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  5. Corey W. Dyck (2011). A Wolff in Kant's Clothing: Christian Wolff's Influence on Kant's Accounts of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Psychology. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):44-53.score: 240.0
    In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics in Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible: consciousness, self-consciousness, and psychology. I argue that we can better understand Kant’s particular arguments and positions within this context, but also gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kant’s accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which (...)
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  6. Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). The Sources of Self-Consciousness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):87-107.score: 240.0
    This paper explores the relation between two ways of thinking about the sources of self-consciousness. We can think about the sources of self-consciousness either in genetic terms (as the origins or precursors of self-conscious thoughts) or in epistemic terms (as the grounds of self-conscious judgements). Using Christopher Peacocke's account of self-conscious judgements in Being Known as a foil, this paper brings out some important ways in which we need to draw upon the sources of self-consciousness in the (...)
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  7. Joseph K. Schear (2009). Experience and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105.score: 240.0
    Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.
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  8. Gregory R. Peterson (2003). Being Conscious of Marc Bekoff: Thinking of Animal Self-Consciousness. Zygon 38 (2):247-256.score: 240.0
    The preceding article by Marc Bekoff reveals much about our current understanding of animal self-consciousness and its implications. It also reveals how much more there is to be said and considered. This response briefly examines animal self-consciousness from scientific, moral, and theological perspectives. As Bekoff emphasizes, self-consciousness is not one thing but many. Consequently, our moral relationship to animals is not simply one based on a graded hierarchy of abilities. Furthermore, the complexity of animal self-awareness can serve (...)
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  9. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 240.0
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience (OBE) may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case (...)
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  10. Dorothée Legrand (2006). The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.score: 240.0
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
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  11. Kristina Musholt (2012). Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):63-89.score: 240.0
    This paper distinguishes between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation and argues that the latter is required for self-consciousness. It is further argued that self-consciousness requires an awareness of other minds and that this awareness develops over the course of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation, during which information about self and other that is implicit in early forms of social interaction becomes redescribed into an explicit format.
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  12. Sebastian Rödl (2007). Self-Consciousness. Harvard University Press.score: 240.0
    The topic of this book is self-consciousness, which is a kind of knowledge, namely knowledge of oneself as oneself, or self-knowledge.
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  13. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). The Difference That Self-Consciousness Makes. In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons: Metaphysical Research, Volume 1. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.score: 240.0
    With all the attention given to the study of consciousness recently, the topic of self-consciousness has been relatively neglected. “It is of course [phenomenal] consciousness rather than...self-conscious that has seemed such a scientific mystery,” a prominent philosopher comments.1 Phenomenal consciousness concerns the aspect of a state that feels a certain way: roses smell like this; garlic tastes like that; middle C sounds like this, and so on. Although phenomenal consciousness is surely a fruitful area of scientific investigation, I hope (...)
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  14. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.score: 240.0
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I (...)
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  15. José Luis Bermúdez (2001). Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science. Synthese 129 (1):129 - 149.score: 240.0
    This paper explores some of the areas where neuroscientific and philosophical issues intersect in the study of self-consciousness. Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, the paper illustrates how the highly conceptual forms of self-consciousness emerge from a rich foundation of nonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention is paid in particular to the primitive forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in visual perception, somatic proprioception, spatial (...)
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  16. George Bealer (2001). The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.score: 240.0
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties canbe defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction ofontologically prior realizations. Ideological (or nonreductive)functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only bedefined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of theirinteraction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argumentestablishes: (1) ontological functionalism is mistaken because itsproposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mentalproperties) into the contents of self-consciousness; (2)ideological (nonreductive) functionalism is the only viable alternativefor functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique (...)
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  17. Gregory Nixon (2011). Editor's Introduction: Transcending Self-Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (7):889-1022.score: 240.0
    What is this thing we each call “I” and consider the eye of consciousness, that which beholds objects in the world and objects in our minds? This inner perceiver seems to be the same I who calls forth memories or images at will, the I who feels and determines whether to act on those feelings or suppress them, as well as the I who worries and makes plans and attempts to avoid those worries and act on those plans. Am I (...)
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  18. Alva Noë (2002). Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual? Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185 - 194.score: 240.0
    As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self-consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self-consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
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  19. Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.) (2004). The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.score: 240.0
    This volume presents essays on self-consciousness by prominent psychologists, cognitive neurologists, and philosophers.
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  20. Kristina Musholt (2013). Self-Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.score: 240.0
    Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. (...)
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  21. Andy Hamilton (2009). Memory and Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. [REVIEW] Synthese 171 (3):409 - 417.score: 240.0
    In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection to (...)
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  22. Rocco J. Gennaro (1992). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Episodic Memory. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.score: 240.0
    My aim in this paper is to show that consciousness entails self-consciousness by focusing on the relationship between consciousness and memory. More specifically, I addreess the following questions: (1) does consciousness require episodic memory?; and (2) does episodic memory require self-consciousness? With the aid of some Kantian considerations and recent empirical data, it is argued that consciousness does require episodic memory. This is done after defining episodic memory and distinguishing it from other types of memory. An affirmative answer (...)
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  23. Mark McCullagh (2000). Functionalism and Self-Consciousness. Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.score: 240.0
    I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could (...)
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  24. Brian J. Garrett (2003). Bermudez on Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.score: 240.0
    I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.
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  25. Joel Smith (2011). Review of Radu Bogdan, Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).score: 240.0
    Our Own Minds presents an account of the nature and development of self-consciousness. Bogdan describes the mind of the infant as outward looking, turning in on itself only at a relatively late stage of development. This it does as a response to the increasingly sophisticated sociocultural pressures it faces throughout infancy and early childhood. The book is difficult to follow (about which, more later) but the main line of argument is this: to begin with, infants are attuned to their (...)
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  26. Greg Janzen (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 (4):707-733.score: 240.0
    This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves self-consciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a (...)
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  27. Lawrence H. Davis (1989). Self-Consciousness in Chimps and Pigeons. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):249-59.score: 240.0
    Chimpanzee behaviour with mirrors makes it plausible that they can recognise themselves as themselves in mirrors, and so have a 'self-concept'. I defend this claim, and argue that roughly similar behaviour in pigeons, as reported, does not in fact make it equally plausible that they also have this mental capacity. But for all that it is genuine, chimpanzee self-consciousness may differ significantly from ours. I describe one possibility I believe consistent with the data, even if not very plausible: that (...)
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  28. Andy Lamey (2012). Primitive Self-Consciousness and Avian Cognition. The Monist 95 (3):486-510.score: 240.0
    Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the cognitive abilities (...)
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  29. Pirooz Fatoorchi (2008). Avicenna on the Human Self‐Consciousness. In Mehmet Mazak & Nevzat Ozkaya (eds.), International Ibn Sina Symposium Papers (vol.2). FSF Printing House.score: 240.0
    In recent years, philosophers have shown a rapidly increasing interest in the problem of consciousness and it is arguably the central issue in current interdisciplinary discussions about the mind. Any convincing theory of consciousness has to account for the perplexing aspects of human self-consciousness. This paper deals with Ibn Sina’s view on the human self-consciousness with special reference to his well-known “Flying Man” thought experiment. In a brief comparative discussion, we will consider some of the parallels between Ibn (...)
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  30. James M. Dow (2012). On the Joint Engagement of Persons: Self-Consciousness, the Symmetry Thesis and Person Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):1-27.score: 240.0
    In The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Jose Luis Bermúdez presents an abductive argument for what he calls ‘the Symmetry Thesis’ about self-ascription: in order to have the ability to self-ascribe psychological predicates to oneself, one must be able to ascribe psychological predicates to other subjects like oneself. Bermúdez discusses joint engagement as a key phenomenon that underwrites his abductive argument for the Symmetry Thesis. He argues that the ability to self-ascribe is “constituted” by the intersubjective relations that are realized in (...)
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  31. Italo Testa (2009). Recognition, Skepticism and Self-Consciousness in the Young Hegel. Fenomenologia E Società 32 (2):117-132.score: 240.0
    The theory of recognition arises within Hegel's confrontation with epistemological skepticism and aims at responding to the questions raised by modern skepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. This is possible to the extent that the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern foundational theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. In this article I will dwell (...)
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  32. Gal Yehezkel (2008). Self-Consciousness, Objectivity, and Time. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):591-611.score: 240.0
    Abstract: This article considers the conceptual connections between self-consciousness, objectivity, and time. The model of conceptual analysis employed examines the necessary conditions of the meaningfulness of expressions in language. In the course of this analysis two distinct options for the explanation of self-consciousness are identified and examined. According to the first (Strawsonian) view, self-consciousness is based upon the distinction between the self and other subjects of consciousness; according to the second (Kantian) view, self-consciousness is based upon (...)
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  33. Toru Tani (1998). Inquiry Into the I, Disclosedness, and Self-Consciousness: Husserl, Heidegger, Nishida. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 31 (3):239-253.score: 240.0
    Consciousness – Bewußtsein – was one of the key concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. In contrast to this, Heidegger – regarded as Husserl’s most outstanding pupil – placed Dasein at the center of his own phenomenology. This change in key concepts may be seen as an upheaval in the phenomenology that purports to study the “things themselves”: as a shift of focus from the activity of a Bewußtsein that constitutes the Being of objects, to the passivity of a Dasein that receives (...)
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  34. Edward T. Bartlett (1983). The Subjectlessness of Self-Consciousness. Philosophy Research Archives 9:675-682.score: 240.0
    On the surface the concept of self-consciousness would seem to be understandable as consciousness of oneself. It is commonplace to resist this temptation by arguing that the self cannot properly be construed as the object of this form of consciousness. It is the subject. However, in this paper I show that any effort to see the self as the subject of consciousness converts it, willy nilly, into an object.Self-consciousness is not to be understood by determining the logically appropriate (...)
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  35. Udo Thiel (2011). The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity From Descartes to Hume. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    The Early Modern Subject explores the understanding of self-consciousness and personal identity--two fundamental features of human subjectivity--as it developed in early modern philosophy. Udo Thiel presents a critical evaluation of these features as they were conceived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He explains the arguments of thinkers such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume, as well as their early critics, followers, and other philosophical contemporaries, and situates them within their historical contexts. Interest in the issues of (...) and personal identity is in many ways characteristic and even central to early modern thought, but Thiel argues here that this is an interest that continues to this day, in a form still strongly influenced by the conceptual frameworks of early modern thought. In this book he attempts to broaden the scope of the treatment of these issues considerably, covering more than a hundred years of philosophical debate in France, Britain, and Germany while remaining attentive to the details of the arguments under scrutiny and discussing alternative interpretations in many cases. (shrink)
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  36. Brian O'Shaughnessy (1972). Mental Structure and Self-Consciousness. Inquiry 15 (1-4):30-63.score: 240.0
    Mental health, in one awake, guarantees that person knowledge of the central phenomenon-contents of his own mind, under an adequate classificatory heading. This is the primary thesis of the paper. That knowledge is not itself a phenomenon-content, and usually is achieved in no way. Rather, it stems from the natural accessibility of mental phenomenon-contents to wakeful consciousness. More precisely, when mental normality obtains, such knowledge necessarily obtains in wakeful consciousness. This thesis conjoins a version of Cartesianism with the concepts of (...)
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  37. Ralf Busse (2014). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker, Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? [REVIEW] Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.score: 240.0
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly (...)
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  38. Isabella Pasqualini, Joan Llobera & Olaf Blanke (2013). “Seeing” and “Feeling” Architecture: How Bodily Self-Consciousness Alters Architectonic Experience and Affects the Perception of Interiors. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 240.0
    Over the centuries architectural theory evolved several notions of embodiment, proposing in the 19th and 20th century that architectonic experience is related to physiological responses of the observer. Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of embodiment (or bodily self-consciousness) enable empirical studies of architectonic embodiment. Here, we investigated how architecture modulates bodily self-consciousness by adapting a video-based virtual reality setup previously used to investigate visuo-tactile mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. While standing in two different interiors, participants were filmed (...)
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  39. S. Ionta, R. Gassert & O. Blanke (2010). Multi-Sensory and Sensorimotor Foundation of Bodily Self-Consciousness - an Interdisciplinary Approach. Frontiers in Psychology 2:383-383.score: 240.0
    Scientific investigations on the nature of the self have so far focused on high-level mechanisms. Recent evidence, however suggests that low-level, bottom-up, mechanisms of multisensory integration play a fundamental role in encoding some specific components of bodily self-consciousness, such as self-location and first-person perspective (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Self-location and the first-person perspective are abnormal in neurological patients suffering from out-of body experiences (Blanke et al., 2004), and can be experimentally manipulated in healthy subjects by multisensory conflicts (Lenggenhager et (...)
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  40. John V. Canfield (2007). Becoming Human: The Development of Language, Self, and Self-Consciousness. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 240.0
    This book is a philosophical examination of the main stages in our journey from hominid to human. It deals with the nature and origin of language, the self, self-consciousness, and the religious ideal of a return to Eden. It approaches these topics through a philosophical anthropology derived from the later writings of Wittgenstein. The result is an account of our place in nature consistent with both a hard-headed empiricism and a this-worldy but religiously significant mysticism.
     
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  41. Jonathan Cole (2004). Tetraplegia and Self-Consciousness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.score: 240.0
  42. James M. Dow (forthcoming). Mindreading, Mindsharing, and the Evolution of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Topics.score: 240.0
    Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally understood folk psychology to emerge in one of two ways: either first through the origin of the function of self-consciousness or first through the origin of the function of mindreading. The aim of this paper is to provide reasons to doubt that those options exhaust the possibilities. In particular, I will argue that in the discussion about whether self-consciousness or mindreading evolved first, we have lost sight of a viable third option. I will (...)
     
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  43. Thor Gruenbaum & Dan Zahavi (2004). The Ambiguity of Self-Consciousness: A Preface. In Thor Gruenbaum, Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.score: 240.0
  44. Marc Jeannerod (2004). From Self-Recognition to Self-Consciousness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.score: 240.0
  45. Pierre Keller (1998). Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.score: 240.0
    In Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness, Pierre Keller examines Kant's theory of self-consciousness and argues that it succeeds in explaining how both subjective and objective experience are possible. Previous interpretations of Kant's theory have held that he treats all self-consciousness as knowledge of objective states of affairs, and also that self-consciousness can be interpreted as knowledge of personal identity. By developing this striking new interpretation Keller is able to argue that transcendental self-consciousness underwrites a (...)
     
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  46. Simeon Locke (2008). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Science of Being Human. Praeger.score: 240.0
    In the beginning: introduction -- This I believe: preview -- This they believe: other views -- Where it begins: anatomy and environment -- Where it began: evolution -- What is it?: consciousness -- There was the word: self-consciousness and language -- See here: attention -- Perhaps to dream: sleep -- x=2y: representation -- The dance of life: movement -- They all fall down: dissolution of function -- Been there, done that: experience -- Which have eyes and see not: stimulus (...)
     
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  47. Wolfgang Fasching (2008). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Meditation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):463-483.score: 234.0
    Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence (...)
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  48. Klaus Brinkmann (2005). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Modern Self. History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):27-48.score: 228.0
    The concept of the self is embedded in a web of relationships of other concepts and phenomena such as consciousness, self-consciousness, personal identity and the mind–body problem. The article follows the ontological and epistemological roles of the concept of selfconsciousness and the structural co-implication of consciousness and self-consciousness from Descartes and Locke to Kant and Sartre while delineating its subject matter from related inquiries into the relationship between the mind and the body, personal identity, and the question whether (...)
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  49. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States. Open Neuroimaging Journal 6:55-68.score: 228.0
    The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, (...)
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  50. Selmer Bringsjord (2010). Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.score: 224.0
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to (...)
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