Search results for 'Self-reference' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.score: 240.0
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity (...)
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  2. Graham Priest (2010). Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):69-84.score: 240.0
    In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues—especially so called "higher order" vagueness.
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  3. Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.) (2001). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.score: 240.0
  4. Jordi Valor Abad (2008). The Inclosure Scheme and the Solution to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. Synthese 160 (2):183 - 202.score: 240.0
    All paradoxes of self-reference seem to share some structural features. Russell in 1908 and especially Priest nowadays have advanced structural descriptions that successfully identify necessary conditions for having a paradox of this kind. I examine in this paper Priest’s description of these paradoxes, the Inclosure Scheme (IS), and consider in what sense it may help us understand and solve the problems they pose. However, I also consider the limitations of this kind of structural descriptions and give arguments against Priest’s (...)
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  5. Arthur E. Falk (1995). Consciousness and Self-Reference. Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.score: 240.0
    Reflection on the self's way of being "in" consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based in any way all all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires even solitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is (...)
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  6. T. Parent, Self-Reference is Sufficient for Paradox.score: 240.0
    This is a much less technical argument for the same conclusion from my “Paradox with just Self-Reference,” viz., that if self-reference is unconstrained, paradox will result. I first show that in classical logic, expressions must be seen as linguistic types rather than tokens. (Otherwise, ‘this very term = this very term’ is a false instance of the Law of Identity.) But then, one can derive a contradiction from the premise ‘This sentence is not derived’, or from the premise (...)
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  7. T. Parent, Paradox with Just Self-Reference.score: 240.0
    If a semantically open language allows self-reference, one can show there is a predicate which is both satisfied and unsatisfied by a self-referring term. The argument requires something akin to diagonalization on substitution instances of a definition-scheme (*): ‘x is Lagadonian iff, in the g(t)th substitution instance of (*), x = t’. (Given a substitution instance of (*), let t be the term replacing 'x' and let g(t) be the Godel code for t.) Assuming an appropriate enumeration of the (...)
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  8. P. Schlenker (2007). The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):251 - 307.score: 240.0
    Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken together, are paradoxical. Yablo's paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k > i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k > i is s(k) true). We generalize (...)
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  9. Damjan Bojadžiev (2004). Arithmetical and Specular Self-Reference. Acta Analytica 19 (33):55-63.score: 240.0
    Arithmetical self-reference through diagonalization is compared with self-recognition in a mirror, in a series of diagrams that show the structure and main stages of construction of self-referential sentences. A Gödel code is compared with a mirror, Gödel numbers with mirror images, numerical reference to arithmetical formulas with using a mirror to see things indirectly, self-reference with looking at one’s own image, and arithmetical provability of self-reference with recognition of the mirror image. The comparison turns arithmetical self-reference (...)
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  10. Philippe Schlenker (2007). How to Eliminate Self-Reference: A Précis. Synthese 158 (1):127 - 138.score: 240.0
    We provide a systematic recipe for eliminating self-reference from a simple language in which semantic paradoxes (whether purely logical or empirical) can be expressed. We start from a non-quantificational language L which contains a truth predicate and sentence names, and we associate to each sentence F of L an infinite series of translations h 0(F), h 1(F), ..., stated in a quantificational language L *. Under certain conditions, we show that none of the translations is self-referential, but that any (...)
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  11. Lucas Rosenblatt (2012). On the Possibility of a General Purge of Self-Reference. Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):53-59.score: 240.0
    My aim in this paper is to gather some evident in favor of the view that a general purge of self-reference is possible. I do this by considering a modal-epistemic version of the Liar Paradox introduced by Roy Cook. Using yabloesque techniques, I show that it is possible to transform this circular paradoxical construction (and other constructions as well) into an infinitary construction lacking any sort of circularity. Moreover, contrary to Cook’s approach, I think that this can be done (...)
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  12. Diego L. Rapoport (2011). Surmounting the Cartesian Cut Through Philosophy, Physics, Logic, Cybernetics, and Geometry: Self-Reference, Torsion, the Klein Bottle, the Time Operator, Multivalued Logics and Quantum Mechanics. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 41 (1):33-76.score: 240.0
    In this transdisciplinary article which stems from philosophical considerations (that depart from phenomenology—after Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Rosen—and Hegelian dialectics), we develop a conception based on topological (the Moebius surface and the Klein bottle) and geometrical considerations (based on torsion and non-orientability of manifolds), and multivalued logics which we develop into a unified world conception that surmounts the Cartesian cut and Aristotelian logic. The role of torsion appears in a self-referential construction of space and time, which will be further related to (...)
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  13. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2013). Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth. Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452.score: 216.0
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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  14. Micah Lott (2002). Reasonably Traditional: Self-Contradiction and Self-Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition-Based Rationality. Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (3):315 - 339.score: 216.0
    Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition-based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of (...)
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  15. Shaun Gallagher (2000). Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. 203--239.score: 216.0
  16. Sydney Shoemaker (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.score: 210.0
  17. Lucy F. O'Brien (1996). Solipsism and Self-Reference. European Journal Of Philosophy 4 (2):175-194.score: 210.0
    In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. The discussion will centre on Wittgenstein.
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  18. Andrea Christofidou (1995). First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference. Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.score: 210.0
  19. Quassim Cassam (1996). Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):276-295.score: 210.0
  20. Lisbeth Rechtin & William L. Todd (1974). Propositional Attitudes and Self-Reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.score: 210.0
  21. Peter Slezak (1984). Minds, Machines and Self-Reference. Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.score: 210.0
  22. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2014). Addendum to “Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth”. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (1):109-110.score: 210.0
  23. Ruth H. Maki & Kevin D. McCaul (1985). The Effects of Self-Reference Versus Other Reference on the Recall of Traits and Nouns. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 23 (3):169-172.score: 198.0
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  24. Steven J. Bartlett (ed.) (1992). Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..score: 198.0
     
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  25. Andrew Brook (2001). Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. 9--30.score: 192.0
  26. Richard Heck (2007). Self-Reference and the Languages of Arithmetic. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.score: 180.0
    I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. Truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of self-reference.
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  27. Robert J. Howell (2006). Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.score: 180.0
    Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and (...)
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  28. Alexandre Billon (2011). My Own Truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth. In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. springer.score: 180.0
    emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence (...)
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  29. Greg Restall (2007). Curry's Revenge: The Costs of Non-Classical Solutions to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    The paradoxes of self-reference are genuinely paradoxical. The liar paradox, Russell’s paradox and their cousins pose enormous difficulties to anyone who seeks to give a comprehensive theory of semantics, or of sets, or of any other domain which allows a modicum of self-reference and a modest number of logical principles. One approach to the paradoxes of self-reference takes these paradoxes as motivating a non-classical theory of logical consequence. Similar logical principles are used in each of the paradoxical (...)
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  30. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Generalizing Detached Self-Reference and the Semantics of Generic 'One'. Mind and Language 25 (4):440-473.score: 180.0
    In this paper I will give an analysis of what I call ‘generalizing detached self-reference’ within a general account of reference to the first person. With generalizing detached self-reference an agent attributes properties to a range of individuals by putting himself into their shoes, or simulating them. I will show that generalizing detached self-reference plays an important role in the semantics of natural language, in particular in the English generic one and in what syntacticians call arbitrary PRO.
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  31. Stefan Wintein (2011). A Framework for Riddles About Truth That Do Not Involve Self-Reference. Studia Logica 98 (3):445-482.score: 180.0
    In this paper, we present a framework in which we analyze three riddles about truth that are all (originally) due to Smullyan. We start with the riddle of the yes-no brothers and then the somewhat more complicated riddle of the da-ja brothers is studied. Finally, we study the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE). We present the respective riddles as sets of sentences of quotational languages , which are interpreted by sentence-structures. Using a revision-process the consistency of these sets is established. (...)
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  32. Raymond M. Smullyan (1985). Uniform Self-Reference. Studia Logica 44 (4):439 - 445.score: 180.0
    Self-referential sentences have played a key role in Tarski's proof [9] of the non-definibility of arithmetic truth within arithmetic and Gödel's proof [2] of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic. In this article we consider some new methods of achieving self-reference in a uniform manner.
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  33. Robert J. Howell (2002). Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.score: 180.0
    Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and (...)
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  34. JIŘÍ PŘIBÁŇ (2010). Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe's Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference. Ratio Juris 23 (1):41-64.score: 180.0
    This article focuses on theoretical reflections on sovereignty and constitutionalism in the context of the globalization and Europeanisation of the nation states, their politics, and legal systems. Starting from a critical assessment of the Kelsen-Schmitt polemic, the author claims that sovereignty needs to be analysed by the sociological method in order to disclose its current structural differentiation. The constitution of society may be imagined as the multitude of self-constituted and functionally differentiated social subsystems. The constitutional pluralism argument subsequently reconceptualizes sovereignty (...)
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  35. Greg Restall (1993). Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self Reference. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):279 - 303.score: 180.0
    The paradoxes of self reference have to be dealt with by anyone seeking to give a satisfactory account of the logic of truth, of properties, and even of sets of numbers. Unfortunately, there is no widespread agreement as to how to deal with these paradoxes. Some approaches block the paradoxical inferences by rejecting as invalid a move that classical logic counts as valid. In the recent literature, this deviant logic analysis of the paradoxes has been called into question.This disagreement motivates (...)
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  36. Diego L. Rapoport (2009). Surmounting the Cartesian Cut with Philosophy, Physics, Cybernetics and Geometry; Self.Reference, Torsion, the Klein Bottle, Multivalued Logics and Quantum Mechanics. foundations of physics 39 (09).score: 180.0
    In this transdisciplinary article which stems from philosophical considerations (that depart from phenomenology -after Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Rosen- and Hegelian dialectics), we develop a conception based on topological (the Moebius surface and the Klein bottle) and geometrical considerations (based on torsion and non-orientability of manifolds), and multivalued logics which we develop into a unified world conception that surmounts the Cartesian cut and Aristotelian logic. The role of torsion appears in a self-referential construction of space and time, which will be further (...)
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  37. András Balázs (2010). Self-Reference, Reality Principles, Marxism, and Social Transformations in the Postmodern Era. World Futures 66 (1):53 – 64.score: 180.0
    Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a _social_ human phenomenon, (...)
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  38. Wendy Lee-Lampshire (1992). Moral "I": The Feminist Subject and the Grammar of Self-Reference. Hypatia 7 (1):34 - 51.score: 180.0
    Much recent feminist theory tacitly subscribes to some version of what cognitive and evolutionary scientists are successfully undermining as untenably Cartesian, namely, the view that moral agency is achieved through the transcendence of physical causality guaranteed by self-consciousness. Appealing to Wittgenstein's insights concerning self-reference, I argue that abandoning Cartesian dualism implies abandoning neither subject nor moral agency but rather opens up nonandrocentric possibilities unavailable to the traditional model of mind.
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  39. Keith Simmons (2005). A Berry and a Russell Without Self-Reference. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):253 - 261.score: 180.0
    In this paper I present two new paradoxes, a definability paradox (related to the paradoxes of Berry, Richard and König), and a paradox about extensions (related to Russell’s paradox). However, unlike the familiar definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, these new paradoxes involve no self-reference or circularity.
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  40. Vincent Hendricks, Self-Reference.score: 180.0
    This is a book that every logician will want to read. The well-worn topics of self-reference and the paradoxes have been given new life in these papers by a distinguished group of logicians.
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  41. Jiri Priban (2012). Self-Reference of the Constitutional State: A Systems Theory Interpretation of the Kelsen-Schmitt Debate. Jurisprudence 2 (2):309-328.score: 180.0
    This article reinterprets the Kelsen-Schmitt debate in the context of social systems theory and rethinks its major concepts as part of legal and political self-reference and systemic differentiation. In Kelsen?s case, it is the exclusion of sovereignty from juridical logic that opens a way to the self-reference of positive law. Similarly, Schmitt constructed his concept of the political as a self-referential system of political operations protected from the social environment by the medium of power. The author argues that (...)
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  42. Colin McLarty (1993). Anti-Foundation and Self-Reference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (1):19 - 28.score: 180.0
    This note argues against Barwise and Etchemendy's claim that their semantics for self-reference requires use of Aczel's anti-foundational set theory, AFA, semantics for self-reference requires use of Aczel's anti-foundational set theory, AFA, ones irrelevant to the task at hand" (The Liar, p. 35). Switching from ZF to AFA neither adds nor precludes any isomorphism types of sets. So it makes no difference to ordinary mathematics. I argue against the author's claim that a certain kind of 'naturalness' nevertheless makes (...)
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  43. Gregory S. Moss (2014). Four Paradoxes of Self-Reference: The Being of the Universal. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28 (2):169-189.score: 180.0
    Herein I investigate how four dogmas underpinning the traditional concepts of universality, the genus, class, and abstract universal, generate four paradoxes of self-reference. The four dogmas are the following: (1) that contradiction entails the total absence of determinacy, (2) the necessary finitude of the concept, (3) the separation of principles of universality and particularity, and (4) the necessity of appealing to foundations. In section III I show how these dogmas underpin the paradoxes of self-reference and how one cannot (...)
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  44. Robert J. Howell (2006). Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.score: 180.0
    Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and (...)
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  45. Steven W. Laycock (1994). The Vietnamese Mode of Self-Reference: A Model for Buddhist Egology. Asian Philosophy 4 (1):53 – 69.score: 180.0
    Abstract Buddhist egology concurs with the Husserlian claim that the enipirical ego is ?constituted?. The Buddhist ?deconstruction? of the ego will not, however, pace Husserl, permit the pronoun ?I? to refer to a purported extra?linguistic entity. The insights here distilled from the unique mode of self?reference functional within the Vietnamese language secure for us an unmistakable confirmation of the Buddhist thesis and have profound consequences for the philosophical problems surrounding the existence and nature of the self and the existence of (...)
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  46. Norman Malcolm (2001). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. 30--81.score: 180.0
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  47. Peter Dayan (2010). Medial Self-Reference Between Words and Music in Erik Satie's Piano Pieces. In Walter Bernhart & Werner Wolf (eds.), Self-Reference in Literature and Other Media. Rodopi.score: 180.0
     
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  48. Thomas Natsoulas (1984). On the Causal Self-Referentiality of Perceptual Experiences and the Problem of Concrete Perceptual Reference. Behaviorism 12:61-80.score: 180.0
     
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  49. Robert Samuels (2010). Mahler Within Mahler : Allusion as Quotation, Self-Reference, and Metareference. In Walter Bernhart & Werner Wolf (eds.), Self-Reference in Literature and Other Media. Rodopi.score: 180.0
     
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  50. Anne Newstead (2004). Self-Conscious Self-Reference: An Approach Based on Agent's Knowledge (DPhil Manuscript). Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 168.0
    This thesis proposes that an account of first-person reference and first-person thinking requires an account of practical knowledge. At a minimum, first-person reference requires at least a capacity for knowledge of the intentional act of reference. More typically, first-person reasoning requires deliberation and the ability to draw inferences while entertaining different 'I' thoughts. Other accounts of first-person reference--such as the perceptual account and the rule-based account--are criticized as inadequate. An account of practical knowledge is provided by an interpretation of GEM (...)
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