Search results for 'Self-reference' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Lucas Rosenblatt (2012). On the Possibility of a General Purge of Self-Reference. Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):53-59.
    My aim in this paper is to gather some evident in favor of the view that a general purge of self-reference is possible. I do this by considering a modal-epistemic version of the Liar Paradox introduced by Roy Cook. Using yabloesque techniques, I show that it is possible to transform this circular paradoxical construction (and other constructions as well) into an infinitary construction lacking any sort of circularity. Moreover, contrary to Cook’s approach, I think that this can be done (...)
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  2. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity (...)
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  3. Graham Priest (2010). Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):69-84.
    In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues—especially so called "higher order" vagueness.
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  4.  81
    T. Parent, Self-Reference is Sufficient for Paradox.
    This is a relatively non-technical, short experiment (about 4 pages) where I try to derive a contradiction from a self-referential literal, and a true identity-statement (all occurring in a semantically open language). As a preliminary matter, it is shown that in a classical formal system, expressions must be seen as linguistic types rather than tokens. (Otherwise, ‘this very term = this very term’ is a false instance of the Law of Identity.) Under that supposition, however, a contradiction results from the (...)
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  5.  23
    Philippe Schlenker (2007). How to Eliminate Self-Reference: A Précis. Synthese 158 (1):127 - 138.
    We provide a systematic recipe for eliminating self-reference from a simple language in which semantic paradoxes (whether purely logical or empirical) can be expressed. We start from a non-quantificational language L which contains a truth predicate and sentence names, and we associate to each sentence F of L an infinite series of translations h 0(F), h 1(F), ..., stated in a quantificational language L *. Under certain conditions, we show that none of the translations is self-referential, but that any (...)
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  6.  34
    P. Schlenker (2007). The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):251 - 307.
    Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken together, are paradoxical. Yablo's paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k > i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k > i is s(k) true). We generalize (...)
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  7.  69
    T. Parent, Paradox with Just Self-Reference.
    If a semantically open language allows self-reference, one can show there is a predicate which is both satisfied and unsatisfied by a self-referring term. The argument requires something akin to diagonalization on substitution instances of a definition-scheme for the predicate "x is Lagadonian." (The term 'Lagadonian' is adapted from David Lewis). Briefly, a self-referring term is counted as “Lagadonian” if the initial variable in the schema is replaced with the term itself. But the same term is not counted as (...)
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  8.  71
    Diego L. Rapoport (2011). Surmounting the Cartesian Cut Through Philosophy, Physics, Logic, Cybernetics, and Geometry: Self-Reference, Torsion, the Klein Bottle, the Time Operator, Multivalued Logics and Quantum Mechanics. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 41 (1):33-76.
    In this transdisciplinary article which stems from philosophical considerations (that depart from phenomenology—after Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Rosen—and Hegelian dialectics), we develop a conception based on topological (the Moebius surface and the Klein bottle) and geometrical considerations (based on torsion and non-orientability of manifolds), and multivalued logics which we develop into a unified world conception that surmounts the Cartesian cut and Aristotelian logic. The role of torsion appears in a self-referential construction of space and time, which will be further related to (...)
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  9.  98
    Jordi Valor Abad (2008). The Inclosure Scheme and the Solution to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. Synthese 160 (2):183 - 202.
    All paradoxes of self-reference seem to share some structural features. Russell in 1908 and especially Priest nowadays have advanced structural descriptions that successfully identify necessary conditions for having a paradox of this kind. I examine in this paper Priest’s description of these paradoxes, the Inclosure Scheme (IS), and consider in what sense it may help us understand and solve the problems they pose. However, I also consider the limitations of this kind of structural descriptions and give arguments against Priest’s (...)
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  10.  67
    Arthur E. Falk (1995). Consciousness and Self-Reference. Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.
    Reflection on the self's way of being "in" consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based in any way all all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires even solitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is (...)
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  11. Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.) (2001). Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11. John Benjamins.
  12.  29
    Damjan Bojadžiev (2004). Arithmetical and Specular Self-Reference. Acta Analytica 19 (33):55-63.
    Arithmetical self-reference through diagonalization is compared with self-recognition in a mirror, in a series of diagrams that show the structure and main stages of construction of self-referential sentences. A Gödel code is compared with a mirror, Gödel numbers with mirror images, numerical reference to arithmetical formulas with using a mirror to see things indirectly, self-reference with looking at one’s own image, and arithmetical provability of self-reference with recognition of the mirror image. The comparison turns arithmetical self-reference (...)
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  13.  65
    Shaun Gallagher (2000). Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins 203--239.
  14. Sydney Shoemaker (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
  15. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2013). Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth. Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (4):445-452.
    This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.
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  16. Steven James Bartlett & Peter Suber (eds.) (1987). Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    From the Editor’s Introduction: -/- THE INTERNAL LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING -/- We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. -/- (...)
     
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  17.  70
    Steven J. Bartlett (ed.) (1992). Reflexivity: A Source-Book in Self-Reference. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
    From the Editor’s Introduction: -/- -/- The Internal Limitations of Human Understanding -/- -/- We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of (...)
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  18.  36
    Achille C. Varzi (2004). Self-Reference Self-Explained. PhiNews 6:36–39.
    A dialogue among statements that try to explain to each other the mechanisms and peculiarities of self-referential assertions and, particularly, of their context-dependence.
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  19.  23
    Micah Lott (2002). Reasonably Traditional: Self-Contradiction and Self-Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition-Based Rationality. Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (3):315 - 339.
    Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition-based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of (...)
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  20. Lucy F. O'Brien (1996). Solipsism and Self-Reference. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):175-194.
    In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. The discussion will centre on Wittgenstein.
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  21.  67
    Andrea Christofidou (1995). First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference. Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.
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  22.  42
    Quassim Cassam (1996). Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):276-295.
  23.  37
    Lisbeth Rechtin & William L. Todd (1974). Propositional Attitudes and Self-Reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.
  24.  16
    Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2014). Addendum to “Self-Reference and the Divorce Between Meaning and Truth”. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (1):109-110.
  25.  21
    Peter Slezak (1984). Minds, Machines and Self-Reference. Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.
    SummaryJ.R. Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusion. In (...)
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  26.  10
    Ruth H. Maki & Kevin D. McCaul (1985). The Effects of Self-Reference Versus Other Reference on the Recall of Traits and Nouns. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 23 (3):169-172.
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  27. Andrew Brook (2001). Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins 9--30.
  28.  79
    Lucy F. O'Brien (1994). Anscombe and the Self-Reference Rule. Analysis 54 (4):277 - 281.
    This paper argues that Anscombe's arguments against appealing to the self-reference rule that 'I" refers to its producer are ineffective.
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  29. Richard Heck (2007). Self-Reference and the Languages of Arithmetic. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.
    I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. Truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of self-reference.
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  30.  10
    Bernd Buldt, On Fixed Points, Diagonalization, and Self-Reference.
    We clarify the respective roles fixed points, diagonalization, and self- reference play in proofs of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.
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  31.  75
    Robert J. Howell (2006). Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.
    Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and (...)
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  32.  53
    Friederike Moltmann (2010). Generalizing Detached Self-Reference and the Semantics of Generic 'One'. Mind and Language 25 (4):440-473.
    In this paper I will give an analysis of what I call ‘generalizing detached self-reference’ within a general account of reference to the first person. With generalizing detached self-reference an agent attributes properties to a range of individuals by putting himself into their shoes, or simulating them. I will show that generalizing detached self-reference plays an important role in the semantics of natural language, in particular in the English generic one and in what syntacticians call arbitrary PRO.
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  33.  23
    Robert J. Howell (2002). Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.
    Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and (...)
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  34.  51
    Haim Gaifman (1999). Self-Reference and the Acyclicity of Rational Choice. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):117-140.
    Self-reference in semantics, which leads to well-known paradoxes, is a thoroughly researched subject. The phenomenon can appear also in decision theoretic situations. There is a structural analogy between the two and, more interestingly, an analogy between principles concerning truth and those concerning rationality. The former can serve as a guide for clarifying the latter. Both the analogies and the disanalogies are illuminating.
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  35.  14
    Damjan Bojadziev (2000). Perlis on Strong and Weak Self-Reference--A Mirror Reversal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):60-66.
    The kind of self-reference which Perlis characterizes as strong, as opposed to formal self-reference which he characterizes as weak, is actually already present in standard forms of formal self-reference. Even if formal self-reference is weak because it is delegated, there is no specific delegation of reference for self-referential sentences, and their ‘self’ part is strong enough. In particular, the structure of self-reference in Godel's sentence, with its application of a self-referential process to itself, provides a (...)
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  36.  57
    Greg Restall (2007). Curry's Revenge: The Costs of Non-Classical Solutions to the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press
    The paradoxes of self-reference are genuinely paradoxical. The liar paradox, Russell’s paradox and their cousins pose enormous difficulties to anyone who seeks to give a comprehensive theory of semantics, or of sets, or of any other domain which allows a modicum of self-reference and a modest number of logical principles. One approach to the paradoxes of self-reference takes these paradoxes as motivating a non-classical theory of logical consequence. Similar logical principles are used in each of the paradoxical (...)
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  37.  27
    Gregory S. Moss (2014). Four Paradoxes of Self-Reference: The Being of the Universal. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28 (2):169-189.
    Herein I investigate how four dogmas underpinning the traditional concepts of universality, the genus, class, and abstract universal, generate four paradoxes of self-reference. The four dogmas are the following: (1) that contradiction entails the total absence of determinacy, (2) the necessary finitude of the concept, (3) the separation of principles of universality and particularity, and (4) the necessity of appealing to foundations. In section III I show how these dogmas underpin the paradoxes of self-reference and how one cannot (...)
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  38.  33
    Greg Restall (1993). Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self Reference. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):279 - 303.
    The paradoxes of self reference have to be dealt with by anyone seeking to give a satisfactory account of the logic of truth, of properties, and even of sets of numbers. Unfortunately, there is no widespread agreement as to how to deal with these paradoxes. Some approaches block the paradoxical inferences by rejecting as invalid a move that classical logic counts as valid. In the recent literature, this deviant logic analysis of the paradoxes has been called into question.This disagreement motivates (...)
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  39.  50
    Alexandre Billon (2011). My Own Truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth. In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. Springer
    emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence (...)
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  40.  19
    Colin McLarty (1993). Anti-Foundation and Self-Reference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (1):19 - 28.
    This note argues against Barwise and Etchemendy's claim that their semantics for self-reference requires use of Aczel's anti-foundational set theory, AFA, semantics for self-reference requires use of Aczel's anti-foundational set theory, AFA, ones irrelevant to the task at hand" (The Liar, p. 35). Switching from ZF to AFA neither adds nor precludes any isomorphism types of sets. So it makes no difference to ordinary mathematics. I argue against the author's claim that a certain kind of 'naturalness' nevertheless makes (...)
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  41.  12
    José Martínez Fernández & Jordi Valor Abad (2014). Eliminating Self-Reference From Grelling’s and Zwicker’s Paradoxes. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (1):85-97.
    The goal of this paper is to present Yabloesque versions of Grelling’s and Zwicker’s paradoxes concerning the notions of “heterological” and “hypergame” respectively. We will offer counterparts of these paradoxes that do not seem to involve self-reference or vicious circularity.El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer versiones de las paradojas de Grelling y de Zwicker inspiradas en la paradoja de Yablo. Nuestras versiones de estas paradojas no parecen involucrar ni autorreferencia ni circularidad viciosa.
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  42.  31
    Keith Simmons (2005). A Berry and a Russell Without Self-Reference. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):253 - 261.
    In this paper I present two new paradoxes, a definability paradox (related to the paradoxes of Berry, Richard and König), and a paradox about extensions (related to Russell’s paradox). However, unlike the familiar definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, these new paradoxes involve no self-reference or circularity.
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  43.  48
    András Balázs (2010). Self-Reference, Reality Principles, Marxism, and Social Transformations in the Postmodern Era. World Futures 66 (1):53 – 64.
    Three distinct turning points (“bottleneck breakings”) in universal evolution are discussed at some length in terms of “self-reference” and (corresponding) “Reality Principles.” The first (origin and evolution of animate Nature) and second (human consciousness) are shown to necessarily precede a third one, that of Marxist philosophy. It is pointed out that while the previous two could occupy a natural (so in a sense neutral) place as parts of human science, the self-reference of Marxism, as a _social_ human phenomenon, (...)
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  44.  35
    Stefan Wintein (2011). A Framework for Riddles About Truth That Do Not Involve Self-Reference. Studia Logica 98 (3):445-482.
    In this paper, we present a framework in which we analyze three riddles about truth that are all (originally) due to Smullyan. We start with the riddle of the yes-no brothers and then the somewhat more complicated riddle of the da-ja brothers is studied. Finally, we study the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE). We present the respective riddles as sets of sentences of quotational languages , which are interpreted by sentence-structures. Using a revision-process the consistency of these sets is established. (...)
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  45.  1
    G. Restall, Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self Reference.
    The paradoxes of self reference have to be dealt with by anyone seeking to give a satisfactory account of the logic of truth, of properties, and even of sets of numbers. Unfortunately, there is no widespread agreement as to how to deal with these paradoxes. Some approaches block the paradoxical inferences by rejecting as invalid a move that classical logic counts as valid. In the recent literature, this 'deviant logic' analysis of the paradoxes has been called into question. This disagreement (...)
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  46.  31
    Raymond M. Smullyan (1985). Uniform Self-Reference. Studia Logica 44 (4):439 - 445.
    Self-referential sentences have played a key role in Tarski's proof [9] of the non-definibility of arithmetic truth within arithmetic and Gödel's proof [2] of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic. In this article we consider some new methods of achieving self-reference in a uniform manner.
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  47.  25
    JIŘÍ PŘIBÁŇ (2010). Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe's Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference. Ratio Juris 23 (1):41-64.
    This article focuses on theoretical reflections on sovereignty and constitutionalism in the context of the globalization and Europeanisation of the nation states, their politics, and legal systems. Starting from a critical assessment of the Kelsen-Schmitt polemic, the author claims that sovereignty needs to be analysed by the sociological method in order to disclose its current structural differentiation. The constitution of society may be imagined as the multitude of self-constituted and functionally differentiated social subsystems. The constitutional pluralism argument subsequently reconceptualizes sovereignty (...)
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  48. G. E. Hughes (1985). John Buridan on Self-Reference: Chapter Eight of Buridan's Sophismata: With a Translation, an Introduction, and a Philosophical Commentary. Philosophical Review 94 (3):406-408.
    John Buridan was a fourteenth-century philosopher who enjoyed an enormous reputation for about two hundred years, was then totally neglected, and is now being 'rediscovered' through his relevance to contemporary work in philosophical logic. The final chapter of Buridan's Sophismata deals with problems about self-reference, and in particular with the semantic paradoxes. He offers his own distinctive solution to the well-known 'Liar Paradox' and introduces a number of other paradoxes that will be unfamiliar to most logicians. Buridan also moves (...)
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  49.  13
    Robert J. Howell (2006). Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.
    Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and (...)
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  50.  18
    Thomas Bolander, Self-Reference. Studia Logica.
    An anthology of previously unpublished essays from some of the most outstanding scholars working in philosophy, mathematics, and computer science today, _Self-Reference_ reexamines the latest theories of self-reference, including those that attempt to explain and resolve the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. With a thorough introduction that contextualizes the subject for students, this book will be important reading for anyone interested in the general area of self-reference and philosophy.
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