Search results for 'Sense Impression' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  3
    Delos D. Wickens, Donald B. Reutener & F. Thomas Eggemeier (1972). Sense Impression as an Encoding Dimension of Words. Journal of Experimental Psychology 96 (2):301.
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  2. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). The Experiential Presence of Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, Sense Impressions, and Perceptual Takings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):293-316.
    Discussion of W. Sellars's rediscovery of experiential presence continues with special reference to J. McDowell's and J.F. Rosenberg's recent articles on Sellars's understanding of perception, and a later effort by Sellars to cast light on the intimate relation between sensing and perceptual taking. Five main sections respectively summarize my earlier discussion of Sellars's account of experiential presence, draw on Rosenberg's explication of two Sellarsian modes of responding to sense impressions, consider McDowell's claim that Sellars's perceptual takings are shapings of (...)
     
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  3.  80
    Willem A. deVries (2006). McDowell, Sellars, and Sense Impressions. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):182–201.
  4. Maurice Charlesworth (1979). Sense-Impressions: A New Model. Mind 88 (January):24-44.
  5.  36
    Wilfrid S. Sellars (1971). Seeing, Sense Impressions, and Sensa: A Reply to Cornman. Review of Metaphysics 24 (March):391-447.
  6.  59
    Robert C. Richardson & G. Muilenberg (1982). Sellars and Sense Impressions. Erkenntnis 17 (March):171-212.
  7.  44
    E. E. Dawson (1961). Sense Experience and Physical Objects. Theoria 27 (2):49-57.
  8. Suresh Chandra (1976). Sensible Awareness of Sense-Objects. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):355-366.
     
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  9.  52
    William Hirstein (2011). The Contribution of Prefrontal Executive Processes to Creating a Sense of Self. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):150-158.
    According to several current theories, executive processes help achieve various mental actions such as remembering, planning and decision-making, by executing cognitive operations on representations held in consciousness. I plan to argue that these executive processes are partly responsible for our sense of self, because of the way they produce the impression of an active, controlling presence in consciousness. If we examine what philosophers have said about the "ego" (Descartes), "the Self" (Locke and Hume), the "self of all selves" (...)
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  10.  35
    David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.
  11.  43
    Joseph Levine (1991). Cool Red. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
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  12. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1973). Givenness and Explanatory Coherence. Journal of Philosophy 70 (October):612-624.
  13. C. L. Hardin (1991). Reply to Levine's 'Cool Red'. Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50.
     
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  14.  20
    Manjulekha Bhattacharya (1972). Ernst Mach: Neutral Monism. Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 4:145-182.
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  15. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1971). Perception. Anchor Books.
     
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  16.  24
    J. Barry Maund (1976). The Non-Sensuous Epistemic Account of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):57-62.
  17.  9
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1987). Perceptual Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:91-106.
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  18.  16
    Paul E. Tibbetts (1972). Feigl on Raw Feels, the Brain, and Knowledge Claims: Some Problems Regarding Theoretical Concepts. Dialectica 26 (3‐4):247-66.
  19.  51
    Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1966). Miss Anscombe on the Intentionality of Sensation. Analysis 26 (March):135-137.
  20.  6
    Hugh R. Wilson (1991). Shadows on the Cave Wall: Philosophy and Visual Science. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):65-78.
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  21.  29
    Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1964). Armstrong on Bodily Sensations. [REVIEW] Philosophy 39 (April):177-181.
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  22.  19
    Clement Dore (1965). Seeming to See. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):312-318.
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  23.  16
    John O. Nelson (1964). An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.
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  24. Castaneda Calderon & Hector Neri (eds.) (1966). Intentionality, Minds, And Perception. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
  25.  14
    Fraser Cowley (1968). A Critique Of British Empiricism. Macmillan.
  26.  15
    P. Thagard & Z. Kunda (1997). Making Sense of People: Coherence Mechanisms. In [Book Chapter].
    When trying to make sense of other people and ourselves, we may rely on several different kinds of cognitive processes. First, we form impressions of other people by integrating information contained in concepts that represent their traits, their behaviors, our stereotypes of the social groups they belong to, and any other information about them that seems relevant. For example, your impression of an acquaintance may be a composite of personality traits (e.g., friendly, independent), behaviors (e.g., told a joke, (...)
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  27.  19
    Moreland Perkins (1971). Sentience. Journal of Philosophy 68 (June):329-37.
  28.  9
    Irving Thalberg (1965). Looks, Impressions and Incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):365-374.
  29.  1
    Jennifer C. Chen, Charles H. Cho & Dennis M. Patten (2013). Initiating Disclosure of Environmental Liability Information: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Choice. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 125 (4):1-12.
    This paper investigates potential motivations for late adopting U.S. companies to begin disclosing environmental liability amounts in their financial statements. Based on a review of 10-K reports filed from 1998 through 2012, inclusive, we identified 55 firms initiating environmental liability disclosure over the period, with all but three doing so by 2006. Focusing on the disclosers up through 2006, we argue that the companies may have used the disclosure as a tool of impression management to avoid potential stakeholder mis-estimation (...)
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  30.  2
    Roy Harrod (1963). Sense and Sensibilia. Philosophy 38 (145):227 - 241.
    The late Professor J. L. Austin was a man of the highest character and considerable intellectual ability. Those who heard him lecture testify that he made a strong and deep impression. He seemed to be completely master of his subject, his mind moved with great rapidity and he manifested a rare integrity of spirit. His death in early middle age is not only mourned by his colleagues; it is one of those events that make a deep gash, causing people (...)
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  31. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in (...)
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  32.  95
    Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589–613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in (...)
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  33.  44
    Carl B. Sachs (2014). Discursive and Somatic Intentionality: Merleau-Ponty Contra 'McDowell or Sellars'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):199-227.
    Here I show that Sellars’ radicalization of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions is vulnerable to a challenge grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment. Sellars argues that Kant’s concept of ‘intuition’ is ambiguous between singular demonstrative phrases and sense-impressions. In light of the critique of the Myth of the Given, Sellars argues, in the ‘Myth of Jones’, that sense-impression are theoretical posits. I argue that Merleau-Ponty offers a way of understanding perceptual activity which successfully avoids both (...)
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  34. Craig Callender (1998). The View From No-When. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):135 - 159.
    In Philip K. Dick’s Counter-Clock World the direction of time flips in 1986, putting the Earth into what its inhabitants call the ‘Hogarth Phase’. Named after the scientist who predicted that ‘time’s arrow' would change direction, the Hogarth Phase is a period in which entropy decreases instead of increases. During this time the dead call from their graves to be excavated, people clean their lungs by ‘smoking’ stubs that grow into mature cigarettes, coffee separates from cream, and so on. Although (...)
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  35.  48
    Michael Thompson, Roots and Role of Imagination in Kant: Imagination at the Core.
    Kant's critical philosophy promises to overturn both Empiricism and Rationalism by arguing for the necessity of a passive faculty, sensibility, and an active faculty, understanding, in order for cognition to obtain. Kant argues in favor of sense impression found in standard empirical philosophies while advocating conceptual necessities like those found in rational philosophies. It is only in the synthesis of these two elements that cognition and knowledge claims are possible. However, by affirming such a dualism, Kant has created (...)
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  36.  51
    Leslie Stevenson (2000). Synthetic Unities of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.
    Inspired by Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Sellars, I illustrate and identify certain kinds of unity which are typical (if not universal) features of our conscious experience, and argue that Kant was right to claim that such unities are produced by unconscious processes of synthesis: A perceptual experience of succession is not reducible to a succession of perceptual experiences. The experience of perceiving one object as having several features is not reducible to a conjunction of perceptual experiences of those features. A cross-modal (...)
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  37. Nicholas Evans & Stephen C. Levinson (2009). The Myth of Language Universals: Language Diversity and its Importance for Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (5):429-448.
    Talk of linguistic universals has given cognitive scientists the impression that languages are all built to a common pattern. In fact, there are vanishingly few universals of language in the direct sense that all languages exhibit them. Instead, diversity can be found at almost every level of linguistic organization. This fundamentally changes the object of enquiry from a cognitive science perspective. This target article summarizes decades of cross-linguistic work by typologists and descriptive linguists, showing just how few and (...)
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  38.  78
    Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). Participatory Sense-Making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
    As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition (...)
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  39. Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. (...)
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  40. Thomas Fuchs & Hanne de Jaegher (2009). Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
    Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...)
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  41. Evan Thompson & Stephen Batchelor (2014). Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy. Cup.
    A renowned philosopher of the mind, also known for his groundbreaking work on Buddhism and cognitive science, Evan Thompson combines the latest neuroscience research on sleep, dreaming, and meditation with Indian and Western philosophy of the mind, casting new light on the self and its relation to the brain. Thompson shows how the self is a changing process, not a static thing. When we are awake we identify with our body, but if we let our mind wander or daydream, we (...)
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  42. Susanna Rinard (2013). Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4. Oxford University Press 185.
    In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every scientific argument, I argue, relies on philosophical assumptions. If the scientific argument succeeds, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means there could be a philosophical argument against common sense, each of whose premises (...)
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  43. Christian Thomas Kohl (2012). Pratityasamutpada in Eastern and Western Modes of Thought. International Association of Buddhist Universities 4 (2012):68-80.
    Nagarjuna and Quantum physics. Eastern and Western Modes of Thought. Summary. The key terms. 1. Key term: ‘Emptiness’. The Indian philosopher Nagarjuna is known in the history of Buddhism mainly by his keyword ‘sunyata’. This word is translated into English by the word ‘emptiness’. The translation and the traditional interpretations create the impression that Nagarjuna declares the objects as empty or illusionary or not real or not existing. What is the assertion and concrete statement made by this interpretation? That (...)
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  44. Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton (2009). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi 28 (1):23-30.
    This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
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  45. Guy Kahane (2013). Our Cosmic Insignificance. Noûs 47 (2):745-772.
    The universe that surrounds us is vast, and we are so very small. When we reflect on the vastness of the universe, our humdrum cosmic location, and the inevitable future demise of humanity, our lives can seem utterly insignificant. Many philosophers assume that such worries about our significance reflect a banal metaethical confusion. They dismiss the very idea of cosmic significance. This, I argue, is a mistake. Worries about cosmic insignificance do not express metaethical worries about objectivity or nihilism, and (...)
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  46. Saul A. Kripke (2008). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes. Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving (...)
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  47.  56
    Radu J. Bogdan (ed.) (1991). Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine current controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind. Common sense provides a familiar and friendly psychological scheme by which to talk about the mind. Its categories (belief, desire, intention, consciousness, emotion, and so on) tend to portray the mind as quite different from the rest of nature, and thus irreducible to physical matters and its laws. In this volume a variety of positions on common (...)
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  48. Glenn Carruthers (2012). The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that (...)
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  49.  48
    Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney (2013). Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new (...)
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  50. Pietro Salis (2015). Grasp of Concepts: Common Sense and Expertise in an Inferentialist Framework. In M. Bianca P. Piccari (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 289-297.
    The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.
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