Search results for 'Sense Impression' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Delos D. Wickens, Donald B. Reutener & F. Thomas Eggemeier (1972). Sense Impression as an Encoding Dimension of Words. Journal of Experimental Psychology 96 (2):301.score: 210.0
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  2. Willem A. deVries (2006). McDowell, Sellars, and Sense Impressions. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):182–201.score: 130.0
  3. Robert C. Richardson & G. Muilenberg (1982). Sellars and Sense Impressions. Erkenntnis 17 (March):171-212.score: 130.0
  4. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1971). Seeing, Sense Impressions, and Sensa: A Reply to Cornman. Review of Metaphysics 24 (March):391-447.score: 130.0
  5. Maurice Charlesworth (1979). Sense-Impressions: A New Model. Mind 88 (January):24-44.score: 130.0
  6. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). The Experiential Presence of Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, Sense Impressions, and Perceptual Takings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):293-316.score: 130.0
  7. E. E. Dawson (1961). Sense Experience and Physical Objects. Theoria 27 (2):49-57.score: 90.0
  8. Suresh Chandra (1976). Sensible Awareness of Sense-Objects. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):355-366.score: 90.0
     
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  9. William Hirstein (2011). The Contribution of Prefrontal Executive Processes to Creating a Sense of Self. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):150.score: 66.0
    According to several current theories, executive processes help achieve various mental actions such as remembering, planning and decision-making, by executing cognitive operations on representations held in consciousness. I plan to argue that these executive processes are partly responsible for our sense of self, because of the way they produce the impression of an active, controlling presence in consciousness. If we examine what philosophers have said about the "ego" (Descartes), "the Self" (Locke and Hume), the "self of all selves" (...)
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  10. David Beisecker (2005). Phenomenal Consciousness, Sense Impressions, and the Logic of 'What It's Like'. In Ralph D. (Ed) Ellis & Natika (Ed). Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.score: 60.0
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  11. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1973). Givenness and Explanatory Coherence. Journal of Philosophy 70 (October):612-624.score: 60.0
  12. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1966). Miss Anscombe on the Intentionality of Sensation. Analysis 26 (March):135-137.score: 60.0
  13. Joseph Levine (1991). Cool Red. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.score: 60.0
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  14. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1964). Armstrong on Bodily Sensations. [REVIEW] Philosophy 39 (April):177-181.score: 60.0
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  15. J. Barry Maund (1976). The Non-Sensuous Epistemic Account of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):57-62.score: 60.0
  16. John O. Nelson (1964). An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.score: 60.0
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  17. Clement Dore (1965). Seeming to See. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):312-318.score: 60.0
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  18. Michael J. Pendlebury (1987). Perceptual Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:91-106.score: 60.0
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  19. Fraser Cowley (1968). A Critique Of British Empiricism. Macmillan.score: 60.0
  20. Hugh R. Wilson (1991). Shadows on the Cave Wall: Philosophy and Visual Science. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):65-78.score: 60.0
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  21. Paul E. Tibbetts (1972). Feigl on Raw Feels, the Brain, and Knowledge Claims: Some Problems Regarding Theoretical Concepts. Dialectica 26 (3‐4):247-66.score: 60.0
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  22. Manjulekha Bhattacharya (1972). Ernst Mach: Neutral Monism. Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 4:145-182.score: 60.0
  23. David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.score: 60.0
     
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  24. Castaneda Calderon & Hector Neri (eds.) (1966). Intentionality, Minds, And Perception. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.score: 60.0
     
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  25. C. L. Hardin (1991). Reply to Levine's 'Cool Red'. Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50.score: 60.0
     
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  26. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1971). Perception. Anchor Books.score: 60.0
     
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  27. Irving Thalberg (1965). Looks, Impressions and Incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):365-374.score: 58.0
  28. P. Thagard & Z. Kunda (1997). Making Sense of People: Coherence Mechanisms. In [Book Chapter].score: 54.0
    When trying to make sense of other people and ourselves, we may rely on several different kinds of cognitive processes. First, we form impressions of other people by integrating information contained in concepts that represent their traits, their behaviors, our stereotypes of the social groups they belong to, and any other information about them that seems relevant. For example, your impression of an acquaintance may be a composite of personality traits (e.g., friendly, independent), behaviors (e.g., told a joke, (...)
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  29. Gisela Striker (1977). Epicurus on the Truth of Sense Impressions. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59 (2):125-142.score: 50.0
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  30. H. Von Helmholtz (1971). The Origin and Correct Interpretation of Our Sense Impressions. In Russell Kahl (ed.), Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz. Wesleyan University Press. 501--512.score: 50.0
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  31. Moreland Perkins (1971). Sentience. Journal of Philosophy 68 (June):329-37.score: 48.0
  32. Jennifer C. Chen, Charles H. Cho & Dennis M. Patten (2013). Initiating Disclosure of Environmental Liability Information: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Choice. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics:1-12.score: 36.0
    This paper investigates potential motivations for late adopting U.S. companies to begin disclosing environmental liability amounts in their financial statements. Based on a review of 10-K reports filed from 1998 through 2012, inclusive, we identified 55 firms initiating environmental liability disclosure over the period, with all but three doing so by 2006. Focusing on the disclosers up through 2006, we argue that the companies may have used the disclosure as a tool of impression management to avoid potential stakeholder mis-estimation (...)
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  33. J. L. Austin (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.
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  34. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.score: 30.0
    Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence (...)
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  35. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Noûs 41 (1):589 - 613.score: 30.0
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in (...)
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  36. Craig Callender (1998). The View From No-When. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):135 - 159.score: 30.0
    In Philip K. Dick’s Counter-Clock World the direction of time flips in 1986, putting the Earth into what its inhabitants call the ‘Hogarth Phase’. Named after the scientist who predicted that ‘time’s arrow' would change direction, the Hogarth Phase is a period in which entropy decreases instead of increases. During this time the dead call from their graves to be excavated, people clean their lungs by ‘smoking’ stubs that grow into mature cigarettes, coffee separates from cream, and so on. Although (...)
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  37. Carl B. Sachs (2014). Discursive and Somatic Intentionality: Merleau-Ponty Contra 'McDowell or Sellars'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):199-227.score: 30.0
    Here I show that Sellars’ radicalization of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions is vulnerable to a challenge grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment. Sellars argues that Kant’s concept of ‘intuition’ is ambiguous between singular demonstrative phrases and sense-impressions. In light of the critique of the Myth of the Given, Sellars argues, in the ‘Myth of Jones’, that sense-impression are theoretical posits. I argue that Merleau-Ponty offers a way of understanding perceptual activity which successfully avoids both (...)
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  38. Michael Thompson, Roots and Role of Imagination in Kant: Imagination at the Core.score: 30.0
    Kant's critical philosophy promises to overturn both Empiricism and Rationalism by arguing for the necessity of a passive faculty, sensibility, and an active faculty, understanding, in order for cognition to obtain. Kant argues in favor of sense impression found in standard empirical philosophies while advocating conceptual necessities like those found in rational philosophies. It is only in the synthesis of these two elements that cognition and knowledge claims are possible. However, by affirming such a dualism, Kant has created (...)
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  39. Mark Siebel (1999). Truth and Intra-Personal Concept Stability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):632-633.score: 26.0
    I criticize three claims concerning simulators: (1) That a simulator provides the best-fitting simulation of the perceptual impression one has of an object does not guarantee, pace Barsalou, that the object belongs to the simulator's category. (2) The people described by Barsalou do not acquire a concept of truth because they are not sensitive about the potential inadequacy of their sense impressions. (3) Simulator update prevents Barsalou's way of individuating concepts (i.e., identifying them with simulators) from solving the (...)
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  40. Saul A. Kripke (2008). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes. Theoria 74 (3):181-218.score: 24.0
    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving (...)
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  41. Guy Kahane (2013). Our Cosmic Insignificance. Noûs 47 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 24.0
    The universe that surrounds us is vast, and we are so very small. When we reflect on the vastness of the universe, our humdrum cosmic location, and the inevitable future demise of humanity, our lives can seem utterly insignificant. Many philosophers assume that such worries about our significance reflect a banal metaethical confusion. They dismiss the very idea of cosmic significance. This, I argue, is a mistake. Worries about cosmic insignificance do not express metaethical worries about objectivity or nihilism, and (...)
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  42. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.score: 24.0
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of (...)
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  43. Gideon Makin (2010). Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.score: 24.0
    The article presents Frege's distinction between Sense and Reference. After a short introduction, it explains the puzzle which gave rise to the distinction; Frege's earlier solution, and his reasons for its later repudiation. The distinction, which embodies Frege's second solution, is then discussed in two phases. The first, which is restricted to proper names, sets out its most basic features. The second discusses 'empty' names; indirect speech, and the distinction for predicates and for complete sentences. Finally, two criticisms, by (...)
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  44. Richard Gray (2005). On the Concept of a Sense. Synthese 147 (3):461-475.score: 24.0
    Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated (...)
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  45. Nicholas Maxwell (1966). Physics and Common Sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.score: 24.0
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
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  46. Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton (2009). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi 28 (1):23-30.score: 24.0
    This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
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  47. Nikolay Milkov (2001). The History or Russell's Concepts 'Sense-Data' and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance'. Archiv Fuer Begriffsgeschichte 43:221-231.score: 24.0
    Two concepts of utmost importance for the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century, “sense-data” and “knowledge by acquaintance”, were introduced by Bertrand Russell under the influence of two idealist philosophers: F. H. Bradley and Alexius Meinong. This paper traces the exact history of their introduction. We shall see that between 1896 and 1898, Russell had a fully-elaborated theory of “sense-data”, which he abandoned after his analytic turn of the summer of 1898. Furthermore, following a subsequent turn of August (...)
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  48. Glenn Carruthers (2012). The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.score: 24.0
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that (...)
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  49. Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.score: 24.0
    The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it will focus on (...)
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