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  1. Serena Olsaretti (2009). Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.
    Contemporary egalitarian theories of justice constrain the demands of equality by responsibility, and do not view as unjust inequalities that are traceable to individuals' choices. This paper argues that, in order to make non-arbitrary determinate judgements of responsibility, any theory of justice needs a principle of stakes , that is, an account of what consequences choices should have. The paper also argues that the principles of stakes seemingly presupposed by egalitarians are implausible, and that adopting alternative principles of stakes amounts (...)
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  2. Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (2003). Desert and Justice. Oxford University Press.
    Does justice require that individuals get what they deserve? Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers examining the relation between desert and justice; they also illuminate the nature of distributive justice, and the relationship between desert and other values, such as equality and responsibility.
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  3.  37
    Serena Olsaretti (2004). Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge University Press.
    Are inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, however, that neither argument (...)
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  4.  66
    Serena Olsaretti (1998). Freedom, Force and Choice: Against the Rights-Based Definition of Voluntariness. Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1):53–78.
  5.  68
    Serena Olsaretti (2005). Endorsement and Freedom in Amartya Sen's Capability Approach. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):89-108.
    A central question for assessing the merits of Amartya Sen's capability approach as a potential answer to the “distribution of what”? question concerns the exact role and nature of freedom in that approach. Sen holds that a person's capability identifies that person's effective freedom to achieve valuable states of beings and doings, or functionings, and that freedom so understood, rather than achieved functionings themselves, is the primary evaluative space. Sen's emphasis on freedom has been criticised by G. A. Cohen, according (...)
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  6.  15
    Serena Olsaretti (2016). Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature of Discrimination By K. Lippert-Rasmussen. Analysis 76 (1):111-113.
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  7.  63
    Serena Olsaretti (2009). Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equal Opportunity and its Place in Egalitarian Thought. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1):133-136.
  8.  69
    Serena Olsaretti (2007). Review: The Limits of Hedonism: Feldman on the Value of Attitudinal Pleasure. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 136 (3):409 - 415.
  9.  83
    Paul Bou-Habib & Serena Olsaretti (2004). Land Disputes and Auctions: A Response to Steiner and Wolff. Analysis 64 (3):284–287.
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  10.  59
    Serena Olsaretti (2002). Unmasking Equality? Kagan on Equality and Desert. Utilitas 14 (3):387.
  11. Serena Olsaretti (2003). Review: Making Moral Sense: Beyond Habermas and Gauthier. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):142-145.
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  12.  38
    Paul Bou-Habib & Serena Olsaretti (2004). Liberal Egalitarianism and Workfare. Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (3):257-270.
  13.  21
    Serena Olsaretti (2013). Rescuing Justice and Equality From Libertarianism. Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):43-63.
    One of the central motifs of G. A. Cohen's work was his opposition to capitalism in the name of justice. This motif was fully in view in Cohen's work on Robert Nozick's libertarianism: Cohen carefully reconstructed and relentlessly criticized Nozick's apologetics of the free market, which, he thought, was internally coherent but unconvincing. This article suggests that Cohen's opposition to libertarianism did not, however, go far enough, and identifies two respects in which Cohen's position could and should have been more (...)
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  14.  27
    Serena Olsaretti (2013). Children as Public Goods? Philosophy and Public Affairs 41 (3):226-258.
  15.  18
    Serena Olsaretti (2013). Scanlon on Responsibility and the Value of Choice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):465-483.
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  16.  40
    Serena Olsaretti (2011). Mark Stein, Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism Against Egalitarianism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), Pp. X + 304. Utilitas 23 (03):355-358.
  17.  25
    Paul Bou-Habib & Serena Olsaretti (2012). Equality of Resources and the Demands of Authenticity. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
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  18.  8
    Paul Bou-Habib & Serena Olsaretti, Autonomy and Children's Well-Being.
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  19. Serena Olsaretti (2014). Freedom's Value: Some Persisting Questions for Amartya Sen's Capability Approach. Jurisprudence 5 (2):369-375.
     
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  20.  19
    Serena Olsaretti (2012). Mark Stein, Distributive Justice and Disability: Utilitarianism Against Egalitarianism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), Pp. X + 304. – CORRIGENDUM. [REVIEW] Utilitas 24 (02):313-.
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  21.  10
    Paul Bou‐Habib & Serena Olsaretti (2013). Equality, Autonomy, and the Price of Parenting. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (4):420-438.
  22.  9
    Serena Olsaretti (2012). Measuring Justice. Social Theory and Practice 38 (1):180-186.
  23.  10
    Serena Olsaretti (2006). Introduction. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (59):1-.
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  24.  2
    Serena Olsaretti (2003). Eguaglianza e merito: valori in conflitto? Rivista di Filosofia 94 (2):285-304.
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  25. Serena Olsaretti (2009). Choice, Circumstance and the Costs of Children. In Stephen de Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice. Routledge
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  26. Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (2003). Desert and Justice. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values. Does justice require that individuals get what they deserve? What exactly is involved in giving people what they deserve? Does treating people as responsible agents require that we make room for desert in the economic sphere, as well as in the attribution of moral praise and blame and in the dispensing of punishment? (...)
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  27. Serena Olsaretti (2003). Distributive Justice and Compensatory Desert. In Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press
     
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  28. Serena Olsaretti (2006). Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge University Press.
    Are inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, however, that neither argument (...)
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  29. Serena Olsaretti (2009). Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge University Press.
    Are inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, however, that neither argument (...)
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  30. Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (forthcoming). Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
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  31. Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (2010). Preferences and Well-Being. Cambridge University Press.
    Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of (...)
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  32. Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (2011). Preferences and Well-Being. Cambridge University Press.
    Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of (...)
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  33. Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (2006). Preferences and Well-Being. Cambridge University Press.
    Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of (...)
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