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  1. Seth Crook (2008). Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the 'Physical'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):333-359.
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  2. Seth Crook (2003). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2):209–219.
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  3. Seth Crook (2002). Callicott's Land Communitarianism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):175–184.
  4. Seth Crook (2002). Stephen Clark's Green Holism. Heythrop Journal 43 (4):444–462.
    S.R.L. Clark is a prominent defender of environmental holism and an advocate of the better treatment of other species. Not coincidentally, he is also a defender of a Neoplatonic Theism which holds that the presuppositions of reason have theistic implications and the point of the world is to exemplify beauty, or all the forms of beauty. Here I examine certain aspects of his view. I do so because I’m drawn to his main holist conclusion: we should live according to those (...)
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  5. Seth Crook (2001). The Ideal of Companionship. Social Theory and Practice 27 (1):149-168.
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  6. Seth Crook (2001). Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the 'Physical': Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):333-359.
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  7. Seth Crook (2000). The Millian Case for Orthodox Epistemic Conservatism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):549-573.
  8. Seth Crook (1994). Contingency, Coincidence, Bruteness and the Correlation Challenge: Some Issues in the Area of Mathematical Platonism. Dissertation, University of Southern California
    My thesis is devoted to an attempt to offer, on behalf of mathematical Platonism, a reply to what may seem to be a powerful objection to it. The objection is this: If there is, as the Platonist supposes, mathematical knowledge of abstract objects, then there is a correlation between our beliefs and the mathematical facts. However, how is such a correlation to be explained given that mathematical objects are a-causal? The worry is that no explanation is possible and that this (...)
     
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