24 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Seth Lazar [22]Seth R. M. Lazar [1]Seth R. . M. Lazar [1]
  1. Seth Lazar (2012). Scepticism About Jus Post Bellum. In Larry May & Andrew Forcehimes (eds.), Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law. Cambridge University Press
    The burgeoning literature on jus post bellum has repeatedly reaffirmed three positions that strike me as deeply implausible: that in the aftermath of wars, compensation should be a priority; that we should likewise prioritize punishing political leaders and war criminals even in the absence of legitimate multilateral institutions; and that when states justifiably launch armed humanitarian interventions, they become responsible for reconstructing the states into which they have intervened – the so called “Pottery Barn” dictum, “You break it, you own (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Seth Lazar (2010). The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay. Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (2):180-213.
    Killing in War presents the Moral Equality of Combatants with serious, and in my view insurmountable problems. Absent some novel defense, this thesis is now very difficult to sustain. But this success is counterbalanced by the strikingly revisionist implications of McMahan’s account of the underlying morality of killing in war, which forces us into one of two unattractive positions, contingent pacifism, or near-total war. In this article, I have argued that his efforts to mitigate these controversial implications fail. The reader (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  3. Seth Lazar (2013). Associative Duties and the Ethics of Killing in War. Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):3-48.
    this paper advances a novel account of part of what justifies killing in war, grounded in the duties we owe to our loved ones to protect them from the severe harms with which war threatens them. It discusses the foundations of associative duties, then identifies the sorts of relationships, and the specific duties that they ground, which can be relevant to the ethics of war. It explains how those associa- tive duties can justify killing in theory—in particular how they can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  4. Seth Lazar (2009). Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self‐Defense. Ethics 119 (4):699-728.
    I try to show that agent responsibility is an inadequate basis for the attribution of liability, by discrediting the Risk Argument and showing how the Responsibility Argument in fact collapses into the Risk Argument. I have concentrated on undermining these as philosophical theories of self-defense, although I at times note that our theory of self-defense should not be predicated on assumptions that are inapplicable to the context of war. The potential combatant, I conclude, should not look to the agency view (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  5. Seth Lazar (2012). The Morality and Law of War. In Andrei Marmor (ed.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law. Routledge 364.
    The revisionist critique of conventional just war theory has undoubtedly scored some important victories. Walzer’s elegantly unified defense of combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity has been seriously undermined. This critical success has not, however, been matched by positive arguments, which when applied to the messy reality of war would deprive states and soldiers of the permission to fight wars that are plausibly thought to be justified. The appeal to law that is sought to resolve this objection by casting it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  22
    Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar (eds.) (2014). The Morality of Defensive War. OUP Oxford.
    International law and conventional morality grant that states may stand ready to defend their borders with lethal force. But what grounds the permission to kill for the sake of political sovereignty and territorial integrity? In this book leading theorists address this vexed issue, and set the terms of future debate over national defence.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  7.  5
    Seth Lazar (2015). Sparing Civilians. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. If any moral principle commands near universal assent, this one does. Few moral principles have been more widely and more viscerally affirmed. And yet, in recent years it has faced a rising tide of dissent. Political and military leaders seeking to slip the constraints of the laws of war have cavilled and qualified. Their complaints have been unwittingly aided by philosophers who, rebuilding just war theory from its foundations, have concluded that this principle (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Seth Lazar (2012). Necessity in Self-Defense and War. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (1):3-44.
    It is generally agreed that using lethal or otherwise serious force in self-defense is justified only when three conditions are satisfied: first, there are some grounds for the defender to give priority to his own interests over those of the attacker (whether because the attacker has lost the protection of his right to life, for example, or because of the defender’s prerogative to prefer himself to others); second, the harm used is proportionate to the threat thereby averted; third, the harm (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9.  29
    Seth Lazar (2014). The Justification of Associative Duties. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):28-55.
    People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Seth Lazar (2013). Necessity and Non-Combatant Immunity. Review of International Studies (Firstview Online) 1 (1).
    The principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour – Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of necessity. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Seth Lazar (forthcoming). National Defence, Self Defence, and the Problem of Political Aggression. In Seth Lazar & Cécile Fabre (eds.), The Morality of Defensive War. Oxford University Press 10-38.
    Wars are large-scale conflicts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve suffering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justified only if we have some compel- ling account of what is worth fighting for, which can justify contributing, as individu- als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. Although this question should obviously be central (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  22
    Seth Lazar (2016). Complicity, Collectives, and Killing in War. Law and Philosophy 35 (4):365-389.
    Recent work on the ethics of war has struggled to simultaneously justify two central tenets of international law: the Permission to kill enemy combatants, and the Prohibition on targeting enemy noncombatants. Recently, just war theorists have turned to collectivist considerations as a way out of this problem. In this paper, I reject the argument that all and only unjust combatants are liable to be killed in virtue of their complicity in the wrongful war fought by their side, and that noncombatants (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  63
    Seth Lazar (2015). Authority, Oaths, Contracts, and Uncertainty in War. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):52-58.
    Soldiers sign contracts to obey lawful orders; they also swear oaths to this end. The enlistment contract for the Armed Forces of the United States combines both elements: -/- '9a. My enlistment is more than an employment agreement. As a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, I will be: (1) Required to obey all lawful orders and perform all assigned duties … (4) Required upon order to serve in combat or other hazardous situations.' -/- We standardly think (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Seth Lazar (2009). Debate: Do Associative Duties Really Not Matter? Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (1):90-101.
    Associative duties are non-contractual duties owed in virtue of a valuable relationship. They hold between lovers, family members, friends, and perhaps compatriots. General duties, by contrast, are owed to people simply in virtue of their humanity: they are grounded in each person's great and equal moral worth. In this paper, I ask what should be done when we can perform either an associative duty or a general duty, but not both.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Seth Lazar (2010). A Liberal Defence of (Some) Duties to Compatriots. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (3):246-257.
    This paper asks whether we can defend associative duties to our compatriots that are grounded solely in the relationship of liberal co-citizenship. The sort of duties that are especially salient to this relationship are duties of justice, duties to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship, and a duty to favour the interests of compatriots over those of foreigners. Critics have argued that the liberal conception of citizenship is too insubstantial to sustain these duties — indeed, that it (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16.  27
    Seth Lazar (2015). Risky Killing and the Ethics of War. Ethics 126 (1):91-117.
    Killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. Although this principle is widely affirmed, recent military practice and contemporary just war theory have undermined it. This article argues that killing an innocent person is worse the likelier it was, when you acted, that he would be innocent: riskier killings are worse than less risky killings. In war, killing innocent civilians is almost always riskier than killing innocent soldiers. So killing innocent civilians is worse than killing innocent soldiers. Since almost all civilians (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Seth R. M. Lazar (2008). Corrective Justice and the Possibility of Rectification. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):355 - 368.
    In this paper, I ask how – and whether – the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately. First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  51
    Seth Lazar (2011). Introduction. Ethics 122 (1):8-9.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  86
    Seth Lazar (2009). The Nature and Disvalue of Injury. Res Publica 15 (3):289-304.
    This paper explicates a conception of injury as right-violation, which allows us to distinguish between setbacks to interests that should, and should not, be the concern of theories of justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  7
    Seth Lazar (2016). Authorization and The Morality of War. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):211-226.
    Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  21
    Seth R. M. Lazar (2008). Corrective Justice and the Possibility of Rectification. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):355-368.
    In this paper, I ask how - and whether - the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately. First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  15
    Seth Lazar (2015). Authorization and The Morality of War. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):211-226.
    Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  3
    Seth Lazar (2013). Associative Duties and the Ethics of Killing in War. Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):3-48.
    This paper advances a novel account of part of what justifies killing in war, grounded in the duties we owe to our loved ones to protect them from the severe harms with which war threatens them. It discusses the foundations of associative duties, then identifies the sorts of relationships, and the specific duties that they ground, which can be relevant to the ethics of war. It explains how those associative duties can justify killing in theory—in particular how they can justify (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  38
    Seth Lazar (2011). War: Essays in Political Philosophy, Edited by Larry May with Emily Crookston. Mind 120 (479):895-901.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography