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Profile: Sharon Street (New York University)
  1. Sharon Street (2012). Coming to Terms with Contingency : Humean Constructivism About Practical Reason. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  2. Sharon Street (2011). Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:1-32.
  3. Sharon Street (2010). What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics? Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.
    Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is (...)
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  4. Sharon Street (2009). Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):213-248.
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  5. Sharon Street (2009). In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.
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  6. Sharon Street (2008). Constructivism About Reasons. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.
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  7. Sharon Street (2008). Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.
  8. Sharon Street (2006). A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.