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Profile: Shelley Weinberg (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
  1. Shelley Weinberg (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.
    Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own (...)
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  2. Shelley Weinberg (2012). The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. (...)
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  3. Shelley Weinberg (2008). The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's Essay. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1):21-40.
    Locke has been accused of failing to have a coherent understanding of consciousness, since it can be identical neither to reflection nor to ordinary perception without contradicting other important commitments. I argue that the account of consciousness is coherent once we see that, for Locke, perceptions of ideas are complex mental acts and that consciousness can be seen as a special kind of self-referential mental state internal to any perception of an idea.
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    Shelley Weinberg (2013). Locke's Reply to the Skeptic. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):389-420.
    Given his representationalism how can Locke claim we have sensitive knowledge of the external world? We can see the skeptic as asking two different questions: how we can know the existence of external things, or more specifically how we can know inferentially of the existence of external things. Locke's account of sensitive knowledge, a form of non-inferential knowledge, answers the first question. All we can achieve by inference is highly probable judgment. Because Locke's theory of knowledge includes both first order (...)
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    Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are (...)
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    Shelley Weinberg (2010). Review of K. Joanna S. Forstrom, John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12).