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  1. Shelly Kagan (2013). Why Study Philosophy? Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (2):258-265.
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  2. Shelly Kagan (2012). Death. Yale University Press.
    Thinking about death -- Dualism vs. physicalism -- Arguments for the existence of the soul -- Descartes' argument -- Plato on the immortality of the soul -- Personal identity -- Choosing between the theories -- The nature of death -- Two surprising claims about death -- The badness of death -- Immortality -- The value of life -- Other aspects of death -- Living in the face of death -- Suicide -- Conclusion: an invitation.
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  3. Shelly Kagan (2012). The Geometry of Desert. Oxford University Press.
    Moral desert -- Fault forfeits first -- Desert graphs -- Skylines -- Other shapes -- Placing peaks -- The ratio view -- Similar offense -- Graphing comparative desert -- Variation -- Groups -- Desert taken as a whole -- Reservations.
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  4. Shelly Kagan (2011). Do I Make a Difference? Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2):105-141.
  5. Shelly Kagan (2009). The Grasshopper, Aristotle, Bob Adams, and Me. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press.
     
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  6. Shelly Kagan (2009). Well-Being as Enjoying the Good. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):253-272.
  7. Shelly Kagan (2005). Rethinking Intrinsic Value. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Journal of Ethics. Springer. 97--114.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object's intrinsic value may sometimes depend on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast between intrinsic (...)
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  8. Shelly Kagan (2003). Comparative Desert. In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Oxford University Press. 93--122.
  9. Shelly Kagan (2001). Thinking About Cases. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):44-.
    Anyone who reflects on the way we go about arguing for or against moral claims is likely to be struck by the central importance we give to thinking about cases. Intuitive reactions to cases—real or imagined—are carefully noted, and then appealed to as providing reason to accept various claims. When trying on a general moral theory for size, for example, we typically get a feel for its overall plausibility by considering its implications in a range of cases. Similarly, when we (...)
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  10. Shelly Kagan (1999). 30. Equality and Desert. In Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod (eds.), What Do We Deserve?: A Reader on Justice and Desert. Oxford University Press. 298.
     
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  11. Shelly Kagan (1998). Normative Ethics. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  12. Shelly Kagan (1998). Rethinking Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast (...)
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  13. Peter Vallentyne & Shelly Kagan (1997). Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory. Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):5-26.
    000000001. Introduction Call a theory of the good—be it moral or prudential—aggregative just in case (1) it recognizes local (or location-relative) goodness, and (2) the goodness of states of affairs is based on some aggregation of local goodness. The locations for local goodness might be points or regions in time, space, or space-time; or they might be people, or states of nature.1 Any method of aggregation is allowed: totaling, averaging, measuring the equality of the distribution, measuring the minimum, etc.. Call (...)
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  14. Shelly Kagan (1994). Defending Options. Ethics 104 (2):333-351.
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  15. Shelly Kagan (1994). Me and My Life. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:309 - 324.
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  16. Shelly Kagan (1994). The Argument From Liberty. In Joel Feinberg, Jules L. Coleman & Allen E. Buchanan (eds.), In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg. Cambridge University Press. 16--41.
     
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  17. Shelly Kagan (1993). The Unanimity Standard. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (2):129-154.
  18. Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-Being. Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (02):169-189.
    What are the limits of well-being? This question nicely captures one of the central debates concerning the nature of the individual human good. For rival theories differ as to what sort of facts directly constitute a person's being well-off. On some views, well-being is limited to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. But other views push the boundaries of well-being beyond this, so that it encompasses a variety of mental states, not merely pleasure alone. Some theories then (...)
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  19. Shelly Kagan (1992). The Structure of Normative Ethics. Philosophical Perspectives 6:223-242.
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  20. Shelly Kagan (1991). Precis of The Limits of Morality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):897-901.
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  21. Shelly Kagan (1991). Review: Replies to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):919 - 928.
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  22. Shelly Kagan (1991). Replies to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):919-928.
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  23. Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press.
    Most people believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand. Although it would often be meritorious, we are not, in fact, morally required to do all that we can to promote overall good. What's more, most people also believe that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, morally off limits, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. In this provocative analysis Kagan maintains that despite the intuitive appeal of these views, they cannot be adequately defended. (...)
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  24. Shelly Kagan (1988). Causation and Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):293 - 302.
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  25. Shelly Kagan (1988). The Additive Fallacy. Ethics 99 (1):5-31.
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  26. Shelly Kagan (1987). Donagan on the Sins of Consequentialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):643 - 653.
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  27. Shelly Kagan (1986). Causation, Liability, and Internalism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):41-59.
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  28. Shelly Kagan (1986). The Present-Aim Theory of Rationality. Ethics 96 (4):746-759.
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  29. Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (3):239-254.