34 found
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  1. Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press.
    Most people believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand. Although it would often be meritorious, we are not, in fact, morally required to do all that we can to promote overall good. What's more, most people also believe that certain types of acts are simply forbidden, morally off limits, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. In this provocative analysis Kagan maintains that despite the intuitive appeal of these views, they cannot be adequately defended. (...)
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  2. Shelly Kagan (1998). Normative Ethics. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  3. Shelly Kagan (2011). Do I Make a Difference? Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2):105-141.
  4.  51
    Shelly Kagan (2016). What's Wrong with Speciesism? Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):1-21.
    Peter Singer famously argued in Animal Liberation that almost all of us are speciesists, unjustifiably favoring the interests of humans over the similar interests of other animals. Although I long found that charge compelling, I now find myself having doubts. This article starts by trying to get clear about the nature of speciesism, and then argues that Singer's attempt to show that speciesism is a mere prejudice is unsuccessful. I also argue that most of us are not actually speciesists at (...)
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  5. Shelly Kagan (2012). Death. Yale University Press.
    Thinking about death -- Dualism vs. physicalism -- Arguments for the existence of the soul -- Descartes' argument -- Plato on the immortality of the soul -- Personal identity -- Choosing between the theories -- The nature of death -- Two surprising claims about death -- The badness of death -- Immortality -- The value of life -- Other aspects of death -- Living in the face of death -- Suicide -- Conclusion: an invitation.
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  6. Shelly Kagan (1998). Rethinking Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast (...)
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  7. Shelly Kagan (2009). Well-Being as Enjoying the Good. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):253-272.
  8. Shelly Kagan (1988). The Additive Fallacy. Ethics 99 (1):5-31.
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  9.  53
    Shelly Kagan (2012). The Geometry of Desert. Oxford University Press.
    Moral desert -- Fault forfeits first -- Desert graphs -- Skylines -- Other shapes -- Placing peaks -- The ratio view -- Similar offense -- Graphing comparative desert -- Variation -- Groups -- Desert taken as a whole -- Reservations.
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  10. Shelly Kagan (2001). Thinking About Cases. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):44.
    Anyone who reflects on the way we go about arguing for or against moral claims is likely to be struck by the central importance we give to thinking about cases. Intuitive reactions to cases—real or imagined—are carefully noted, and then appealed to as providing reason to accept various claims. When trying on a general moral theory for size, for example, we typically get a feel for its overall plausibility by considering its implications in a range of cases. Similarly, when we (...)
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  11. Peter Vallentyne & Shelly Kagan (1997). Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory. Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):5-26.
    000000001. Introduction Call a theory of the good—be it moral or prudential—aggregative just in case (1) it recognizes local (or location-relative) goodness, and (2) the goodness of states of affairs is based on some aggregation of local goodness. The locations for local goodness might be points or regions in time, space, or space-time; or they might be people, or states of nature.1 Any method of aggregation is allowed: totaling, averaging, measuring the equality of the distribution, measuring the minimum, etc.. Call (...)
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  12. Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-Being. Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):169-189.
    What are the limits of well-being? This question nicely captures one of the central debates concerning the nature of the individual human good. For rival theories differ as to what sort of facts directly constitute a person's being well-off. On some views, well-being is limited to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. But other views push the boundaries of well-being beyond this, so that it encompasses a variety of mental states, not merely pleasure alone. Some theories then (...)
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  13. Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (3):239-254.
  14. Shelly Kagan (1994). Me and My Life. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:309 - 324.
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  15.  23
    Shelly Kagan (2005). Rethinking Intrinsic Value. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Journal of Ethics. Springer 97--114.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object's intrinsic value may sometimes depend on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast between intrinsic (...)
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  16.  19
    Shelly Kagan (2015). The Costs of Transitivity: Thoughts on Larry Temkin’s Rethinking the Good. Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (4):462-478.
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  17. Shelly Kagan (1999). 30. Equality and Desert. In Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod (eds.), What Do We Deserve?: A Reader on Justice and Desert. Oxford University Press 298.
     
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  18.  78
    Shelly Kagan (2013). Why Study Philosophy? Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (2):258-265.
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  19. Shelly Kagan (1992). The Structure of Normative Ethics. Philosophical Perspectives 6:223-242.
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  20. Shelly Kagan (2003). Comparative Desert. In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Oxford University Press 93--122.
  21. Shelly Kagan (1994). Defending Options. Ethics 104 (2):333-351.
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  22. Shelly Kagan (2015). An Introduction to Ill-Being. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 4:261-88.
    Typically, discussions of well-being focus almost exclusively on the positive aspects of well-being, those elements which directly contribute to a life going well, or better. It is generally assumed, without comment, that there is no need to explicitly discuss ill-being as well—that is, the part of the theory of well-being that specifies the elements which directly contribute to a life going badly, or less well—since (or so it is thought) this raises no special difficulties or problems. But this common assumption (...)
     
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  23.  31
    Shelly Kagan (1991). Review: Replies to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):919 - 928.
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  24. Shelly Kagan (2009). The Grasshopper, Aristotle, Bob Adams, and Me. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press
     
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  25.  40
    Shelly Kagan (1991). Precis of The Limits of Morality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):897-901.
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  26.  33
    Shelly Kagan (1991). Replies to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):919-928.
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  27.  35
    Shelly Kagan (1988). Causation and Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):293 - 302.
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  28. Shelly Kagan (1994). The Argument From Liberty. In Joel Feinberg, Jules L. Coleman & Allen E. Buchanan (eds.), In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg. Cambridge University Press 16--41.
     
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  29.  59
    Shelly Kagan (1986). The Present-Aim Theory of Rationality. Ethics 96 (4):746-759.
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  30.  53
    Shelly Kagan (1986). Causation, Liability, and Internalism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):41-59.
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  31. Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, Dale E. Miller, D. W. Haslett, Shelly Kagan, Sanford S. Levy, David Lyons, Phillip Montague, Tim Mulgan, Philip Pettit, Madison Powers, Jonathan Riley, William H. Shaw, Michael Smith & Alan Thomas (2000). Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    What determines whether an action is right or wrong? Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader explores for students and researchers the relationship between consequentialist theory and moral rules. Most of the chapters focus on rule consequentialism or on the distinction between act and rule versions of consequentialism. Contributors, among them the leading philosophers in the discipline, suggest ways of assessing whether rule consequentialism could be a satisfactory moral theory. These essays, all of which are previously unpublished, provide students in (...)
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  32.  35
    Shelly Kagan (1993). The Unanimity Standard. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (2):129-154.
  33.  16
    Shelly Kagan (1987). Donagan on the Sins of Consequentialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):643 - 653.
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    Shelly Kagan (2015). The Geometry of Desert. Oxford University Press Usa.
    People differ in terms of how morally deserving they are. And it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. Accordingly, it is important to work out an adequate theory of moral desert. But while certain aspects of such a theory have been frequently discussed in the philosophical literature, many others have been surprisingly neglected. For example, if it is indeed true that it is morally good for people to get what they deserve, does it always do the (...)
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