Suzanne Ironbiter (2009). Yoga and Nature: Vital Concentration in Atharva Veda. In Christopher Key Chapple (ed.), Yoga and Ecology: Dharma for the Earth: Proceedings of Two of the Sessions at the Fourth Danam Conference, Held on Site at the American Academy of Religion, Washington, Dc, 17-19 November 2006. Deepak Heritage Books.score: 9.0
v. 1. God, religion, and philosophy; a historical retrospect. 2d ed. 1971.--v. 2. Purushka and prakrita (God and nature). 1st ed. 1968.--v. 3. God and man (nara and Narayan). 1st ed. 1974.--v. 4. Thought; gems in verse: sayings of great saints and thinkers of India. 1st ed. 1975.--v. 5. Truths stranger than fiction. 1st ed.
The question as to whether the Vedas have an author is the topic of vivid polemics in Indian philosophy. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the classical Sāṁkhya view on the authorship of the Vedas. The research is based chiefly on the commentaries to the Sāṁkhyakārikā definition of authoritative verbal testimony given by the classical Sāṁkhya writers, for these fragments provide the main evidence (both direct and indirect) for the reconstruction of this view. The textual analysis presented in (...) this paper leads to the following conclusion. According to most classical Sāṁkhya commentaries, the Vedas have no author. Two commentators state directly that the Vedas have no author, and four commentators allude to the authorlessness of the Vedas. Only one commentator seems to hold the opposite view, stating that all the authoritative utterances are based on perception or inference of imperceptible objects by authoritative persons, from which it follows that the Vedas too have an author or authors. (shrink)
The idea of nothingness has been viewed as neither a vital nor a positive element in Western philosophy or theology. With the exception of a handful of mystics, nothingness has been taken to refer to the negation of being, or to some theoretical void. By contrast, the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō gave nothingness a central role in philosophy. The strategy of this essay is to use the German mystic Meister Eckhart as a more familiar thinker who did take nothingness seriously, (...) and then to look closely at Nishida’s philosophy, and at the work of his contemporary Ueda Shizuteru, in exploring the central importance of nothingness in Zen Buddhist thought. Eckhart writes of the nothingness of the godhead, whereas Nishida and Ueda speak of nothingness “pure and simple.” Eckhart remains within the being of the godhead and theology. Nishida moves directly to nothingness. Some have claimed that Nishida is not a mystic, and Nishida himself concurred, yet it is Ueda who explains why Nishida can rightly be read as a mystic and as not a mystic. He argues that Zen includes mysticism, but then goes beyond it to a “non-mysticism.” Mystic or non-mystic, the guidance that Nishida and Ueda offer leads to a compelling outlook on life. (shrink)
One of yoga's most important and influential works, The Yoga Sutras of Patañjali forms a keystone of Indian philosophical and religious thought. This translation by a Harvard professor ranks among the most acclaimed interpretations of Patañjali's work. The eight-step path to Raja Yoga consists of restraint, observances, posture, breath control, sublimation, attention, concentration, and meditation. This volume contains complete sutras, along with a commentary by Veda-Vyasa and explanations by Vachaspati-Miçra, plus background information provided by the translator's introduction and appendixes. (...) Unabridged republication of the classic 1927 edition. (shrink)
Bhartṛhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartṛhari and his thought are situated in their intellectual context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions (...) to existing problems. Indeed, it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to try to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition. (shrink)
V kontextu české filosofie, kde není nouze o vzdělané a chytré lidi, ale kde se to nijak nehemží skutečnými individualitami, představuje Petr Vopěnka zcela zvláštní případ. Je matematik nejenom vzděláním, ale v matematice i leccos dokázal. Jeho knihy o filosofii matematiky, zejména jeho tetralogie Rozprav s geometrií1, jsou velice vyhraněné: Vopěnka v nich předkládá svůj originální obraz a příliš se nestará o to, aby ho konfrontoval s tím, co si o tom myslí jiní. Jak sám připouští, i historické osoby, o (...) kterých ve svých knihách píše, mu slouží spíše jako kompars, na jehož pozadí rozehrává svá barvitá líčení ‚dobrodružství poznání‘. Vopěnka ve svých knihách protestuje proti tomu, že moderní věda do obrazu světa, který buduje, vůbec nevpustila tak zásadní determinanty našeho přirozeného světa, jakými jsou neostrost či existence horizontu, který činní náš obraz světa v jistém smyslu ‘nehomogenní‘. Proti tomu se samozřejmě nabízí námitka, že to je v podstatě věci, že vědecký obraz světa je svou podstatou ostrý a homogenní. Že chtít po něm, aby byl jiný, pramení pouze z nepochopení jeho povahy a hlavně jeho role: neboť svět vykreslovaný vědou má být světem pouze v metaforickém slova smyslu, je jenom jakýmsi ‚orientačním plánkem‘, který nám má pomoci orientovat se ve světě ‚přirozeném‘. (Tím ovšem nechci říci, že by tohle nepochopení nebylo fakticky dosti rozšířené.) Vopěnka však ukazuje, že vědu, zejména matematiku, by bylo možné dělat i jinak, než jak se to považuje za víceméně samozřejmé: že je možné vytvořit matematizovaný obraz světa, ze kterého nejsou neostrost či horizont vymeteny. (I tento obraz si samozřejmě zachovává jistý druh ostrosti a homogenity, která z něj činí něco kvalitativně odlišného od přirozeného světa, avšak k přirozenému světu má blíže než ten standardní.) Tento jeho návrh je velice originální a pozoruhodný a je škoda, že mu není věnována větší pozornost a není předmětem soustavnější diskuse, ve které by se ověřila jeho nosnost. Originalita.. (shrink)
The compound “Hindu philosophy” is ambiguous. Minimally it stands for a tradition of Indian philosophical thinking. However, it could be interpreted as designating one comprehensive philosophical doctrine, shared by all Hindu thinkers. The term “Hindu philosophy” is often used loosely in this philosophical or doctrinal sense, but this usage is misleading. There is no single, comprehensive philosophical doctrine shared by all Hindus that distinguishes their view from contrary philosophical views associated with other Indian religious movements such as Buddhism or Jainism (...) on issues of epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics or cosmology. Hence, historians of Indian philosophy typically understand the term “Hindu philosophy” as standing for the collection of philosophical views that share a textual connection to certain core Hindu religious texts (such as the Vedas), and they do not identify “Hindu philosophy” with a particular comprehensive philosophical doctrine. -/- Hindu philosophy, thus understood, not only includes the philosophical doctrines present in Hindu texts of primary and secondary religious importance, but also the systematic philosophies of the Hindu schools: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In total, Hindu philosophy has made a sizable contribution to the history of Indian philosophy and its role has been far from static: Hindu philosophy was influenced by Buddhist and Jain philosophies, and in turn Hindu philosophy influenced Buddhist philosophy in India in its later stages. In recent times, Hindu philosophy evolved into what some scholars call “Neo-Hinduism,” which can be understood as an Indian response to the perceived sectarianism and scientism of the West. Hindu philosophy thus has a long history, stretching back from the second millennia B.C.E. to the present. (shrink)
Ātman (soul) and Nairātmya (no soul) are, for the Brahmanical schools and the Buddhists respectively, equally fundamental tenets which neither side can concede to the other. Among the 16 formulations presented by Uddyotakara, the fifteenth, which is a proof of Ātman and is originally an indirect proof ( avīta/āvīta ), is presented in a prasaṅga -style, and contains double negation ( na nairātmyam ) in the thesis. However, it is perhaps Dharmakīrti who first transformed it into a normal style ( (...) sātmakam ). He is well aware of the law of excluded middle, and insisits that the negation is paryudāsa . On the Nyāya side, Uddyotakara at least seems to be unaware of the law of the logical equivalence of contraposition concerning pervasion ( vyāpti ). After Uddyotakara, however, Vyoman (Vyomaśiva), Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspatimiśra, all seem to be well aware of it. Dharmakīrti, in his conter-argument against the proof of ātman , discusses the negative expressions ‘‘ nairātmya ” and ‘‘ a-nairātmya ” Dharmakīrti here uses two logical arguments skillfully and tactically. As a critic of both the authenticity of the Veda and the existence of ātman , he insists on the theory of dichotomy and the equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka , whereas as an apologist he denies the application of these theories to the relation between the existence of ātman and the concept of nairātmya , because for him as a Buddhist the latter is not a negative but essentially positive state of affairs. (shrink)
Podíváme-li se na rané Platónovy dialogy, vidíme, že o co v nich jde především, je předvedení toho, že pojmy mají relativně jasné hranice, že zdánlivému chaosu užívání slov vládne jistý pevný řád, který si člověk dokáže i explicitně uvědomit, je-li k tomu vhodným způsobem veden. Snaha o zdůraznění a znázornění tohoto na první pohled neviditelného 'řádu v chaosu' pak podle mého názoru postupně vedla i ke konstituci Platónovy mytologie říše idejí, které, ač neviděny, hrají z hlediska viditelného světa klíčovou roli. (...) Skrytý řád přítomný ve zjevném chaosu je vykreslen jako participace (methexis) věcí zjevného světa na idejích světa neviditelného. A již Aristotelés poukázal na to, že tato mytologie, jakkoli může být její spektakulárnost užitečná v kontextu nedoceňování existence řádu, může být naopak velice zavádějící, jestliže ji začneme brát jako více než právě mytologii; konkrétně jestliže začneme zapomínat, že 'platónský svět idejí' dává smysl pouze jako nástroj porozumění či výkladu toho světa, ve kterém žijeme, a začneme ho vidět jako něco skutečnějšího, než je svět zjevný. Zdá se mi tedy, že platonismus se ve filosofii dostává ke slovu jako antidotum vždy tehdy, když dochází k absolutizaci 'chaotického aspektu' světa (to jest když je svět vykládán jako něco, co jakýkoli řád postrádá - ať už to má podobu herakleitovského absolutizace pomíjivosti, romantického zdůraznění nevázanosti a iracionality, či postmoderní akcentuace různorodosti a nesouměřitelnosti). Na druhé straně platonismus sám svádí k absolutizaci 'řádu' (před Platónem zosobňovaným zejména parmeninovským popřením jakékoli proměnlivosti, a později pak nabývají podob třeba racionalistického výkladu světa jako vtěleného rozumu nebo moderního scientistichého názoru, podle kterého je mírou všech věcí věda). Existují ideje ve své 'platónské říši' doopravdy? Odpověď na tuto otázku je ovšem podstatným způsobem ovlivněna tím, jak rozumíme termínu "existovat" (nemluvě o slově "doopravdy").. (shrink)
How is it possible to say that truth can be of one kind at the conventional level and totally different in the ultimate plane? As Matilal ( 1971 , p. 154) points out, Kumārila (ca. 600–650), a Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, claims that the Buddhist doctrine of two truths is “a kind of philosophical ‘double-talk’.” It is Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), a Buddhist logician, who tries to give a direct answer to this question posed by Kumārila from the Buddhist side. He argues that (...) even a Mīmāṃsaka cannot demonstrate the validity ( prāmāṇya ) of the Veda without accepting two truth levels. His point is this. Consider the proposition to be proved: the Veda is valid. If the Veda is already known as valid, then it is useless to prove this proposition. But if it is already known as invalid, then it is impossible to prove this proposition. Therefore in the argument to prove the proposition, the Veda is not to be regarded either as valid or as invalid. This means that at the first stage of the argument one has the concept of the Veda as neutral in validity. However, as soon as one acquires the knowledge of the Veda as valid through the argument, one has to repudiate such a conception of the Veda. The acceptance of the Veda as neutral in validity is to the acceptance of the Veda as valid as the conventional truth is to the ultimate truth. (shrink)
The apologetic method of the Nyāya is inductive. The subject is distilled from the scripture and the Nyāya investigates it through logical argument. Through this procedure of partial verification, the reliability of the composer is established, and consequently the authority of the entire scripture is justified. The domains of thescripture and rational investigation overlap in significant issues such as the reality of the Self, and therefore, they can cooperate to establish the common truth. In Mīmāṃsā apologetics, the domain of the (...) scripture and that of rational argument are mutually exclusive. Their apologetic program is basically accomplished as a process of purely rational investigation without referring to the content of the scripture. But at the same time, the authority of the Veda is regarded as innate and has no external basis. Working autonomously, the rational investigation imposes its own limitation from within and thereby secures the scriptural domain that is free from the intervention of any other kind of knowledge. The overlap between the domains of the scripture and the ordinary experience including rational investigation constitutes a necessary condition for the Nyāya apologetics, whereas in Mīmāṃsā apologetics, it is the absence of the overlapping domain that assures the unique authority of the Veda. This difference is supposed to be rooted in their disagreement on whether a man is able, or qualified, to examine the content of the scripture or not. (shrink)
Il presente scritto e’ attualmante inedito. Per una versione in lingua inglese si veda Stefano Franchi, "Palomar, The Triviality of Modernity, and the Doctrine of the Void,” New Literary History, 28 (1997), 4, 757-778. Si prega di non citare da questa versione senza previa autorizzazione.
In a rare book published in Trivandrum (1927), entitled Sphoṭasiddhiḥ Bharatamiśrapranītā , we find an interesting argument in defense of sphoṭa -theory, based on āgamic quotations, especially RV X, 71, 4 (the stanza where the poet describes his own activity in perceiving the essence of Speech as like a beloved woman naked). The main idea is that the numerous word sphoṭas , as an atemporal multiplicity, free from any sensuous quality, were the objects of the Ṛṣis’ primordial intuition. So the (...) internal diversity of the Veda is not a mere subjective convention in order to adapt the highest truth to limited human minds. The absolute brahman has an objective cosmogonical power of which the temporal mutiplicity is only the very last result. There is also an intermediate ideal multiplicity, which the Veda, as eternal and transcending the guru-śiṣya transmission, consists in. (shrink)
Television advertisements depicting the use of electronic cigarettes have recently exposed minors to images of smoking behaviors. While these advertisements are currently legal, existing laws should be interpreted or expanded to ban the commercial depiction of smoking behaviors with any product that resembles a cigarette to shield minors from potentially influential advertising.
A collection of classic essays by two highly regarded scholars on the development of yoga and its rapport with other religious traditions._ Georg Feuerstein, one of the world's foremost scholars of yoga, and Jeanine Miller, long recognized for her insightful commentaries on the RgVeda, here pool their considerable talents in a look at the development of yogic thought across the ages and its similarities with the Christian mysticism of Meister Eckhart. Two of their essays included here?one concerning the essence of (...) yoga and the other looking at the meaning of suffering in yoga?have long been singled out by indologists for correcting prevalent misconceptions and providing a conceptual framework for many of the subsequent studies in that field. The reprinting of these important essays in The Essence of Yoga gives new readers a chance to share some of the authors' earliest insights into yoga and their deep conviction that these discoveries are of the highest significance for a proper understanding of the human condition. (shrink)
v. 1. The philosophy of the Veda and of the epic.--The Buddha and the Jina.--The Sāmkhya and the classical Yoga-system.--v. 2. The Nature-philosophical schools and the Vaiśeṣika system.--The system of the Jaina.--The materialism.
Lecture 1. Hinduism in the world and the world of Hinduism -- Lecture 2. The early cultures of India -- Lecture 3. The world of the Veda -- Lecture 4. From the Vedic tradition to classical Hinduism -- Lecture 5. Caste -- Lecture 6. Men, women, and the stages of life -- Lecture 7. The way of action -- Lecture 8. The way of wisdom -- Lecture 9. Seeing God -- Lecture 10. The way of devotion -- Lecture 11. (...) The goddess and her devotees -- Lecture 12. Hinduism in the modern period. (shrink)
This classic work is a general introduction to Indian philosophy that covers the Vedic and Epic periods, including expositions on the hymns of the Rig Veda, the Upanisads, Jainism, Buddhism and the theism of the Bhagvadgita. Long acknowledged as a classic, this pioneering survey of Indian thought charts a fascinating course through an intricate history. From the Rig Veda to Ramanuja, Radhakrishnan traces the development of Indian philosophy as a single tradition of thought through the ages. The author (...) showcases ancient philosophical texts and relates them to contemporary issues of philosophy and religion. This second edition with a new Introduction by eminent philosopher J.N. Mohanty, highlights the continuing relevance of the work and the philosophic tradition it represents. (shrink)
This classic work is a general introduction to Indian philosophy that covers the Vedic and Epic periods, including expositions on the hymns of the Rig Veda, the Upanisads, Jainism, Buddhism and the theism of the Bhagvadgita. Long acknowledged as a classic, this pioneering survey of Indian thought charts a fascinating course through an intricate history. From the Rig Veda to Ramanuja, Radhakrishnan traces the development of Indian philosophy as a single tradition of thought through the ages. The author (...) showcases ancient philosophical texts and relates them to contemporary issues of philosophy and religion. This second edition with a new Introduction by eminent philosopher J.N. Mohanty, highlights the continuing relevance of the work and the philosophic tradition it represents. (shrink)
Descrizione degli obbiettivi, le tecniche ed i primi risultati di una ricerca attualmente in corso all’Università del Paese Basco per applicare il metodo degli invarianti numerici delle classi di equivalenza -già applicato (si veda “Il programma Ars Judicandi”) sul piano di una legislazione nazionale- alla costruzione di un modello matematico per automatizzare le operazioni di analisi logica parallela, confronto e decisione su diverse legislazioni nazionaIi, simultaneamente iscritte nel quadro di una “rete deontica internazionale” che descrive per ciascuna di esse (...) i rapporti validi fra le condizioni, i casi e le soluzioni giuridiche. Il modelle comprende: a) la traduzione in un Iinguaggio aritmetico di base esadecimale delle componenti, le operazioni e le relazioni di una base multinazionale di dati legislativi; b) la formulazione, sotto forma di algoritmi aritmetici, delle regole di utilizzazione della base di dati per gli obbiettivi, classici ed attuali, di analisi e di decisione deI Diritto Comparato e dell’armonizzazione ed integrazione sopranazionale di legisIazioni diverse. (shrink)
Abstract In recent decades scholars in every major religious tradition have been commenting on the relationship between their own tradition and science. The subject in the context of Hinduism is complex because there is no central institutionalized authority to dictate what is acceptable Hindu belief and what is not. This has resulted in a variety of perspectives that are touched upon here. Historical factors in the introduction of modern science in the Hindu world have also influenced the subject. The reflections (...) in this paper are based on these. (shrink)
in Āryadevapāda’s Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi we find a problematic passage in which some Cārvāka theories are expounded. The problem here lies in the fact that, according to Āryadevapāda, the Cārvākas – who did not admit rebirth – would have upheld that happiness in this life can be gaind by worshipping gods and defeating demons. As the Cārvākas were materialists, the reference to gods and demons does not fit so much with their philosophical perspective. In this paper, by taking into account several passages (...) from Pāli and Sanskrit Buddhist sources, I have tried to demonstrate that Āryadevapāda is here probably following the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, where mention is made of some Lokāyatikas who are said to have been able to infatuate gods and demons. In both the Pāli Canon and the Mahāyāna sūtras, however, the term lokāyata does not refer to “materialism”. It rather conveys the meaning of “art of disputation”, and is generally used in the description of brāhmaṇas well versed in the Vedas, in the recitation of mantras and in dialectic methods in general. It is the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that introduces the idea – corroborated also by a passage from the Mahābhārata – that these brāhmaṇas, skilled in lokāyata, would have indulged in some materialistic tenet. When the two terms, Cārvāka and Lokāyata, came both to mean “materialism”, around the IV century CE, it is highly probable that non-Cārvāka thinkers and commentators – as could be the case of Āryadevapāda – had in some occasion assimilated and integrated certain points of view, originally beloging to the ancient lokāyata perspective (for instance, the references to gods and demons), into what they be-lieved Cārvāka philosophy had to be. (shrink)
Vedanta An Overview redanta is one of the world's most ancient religious philosophies and T one of its broadest. Based on the Vedas, the sacred scriptures ...
Bhakti has been an all-pervasive concept in the philosophical and religious traditions of India. The origin of bhakti can be traced in the Vedas wherein the root-word bhaj and various synonyms appear and in that point in time no distinction was made between secular (prema) and religious love (bhakti). Narada Bhakti Sutra (NBS) is a premier treatise on the nature of bhakti that emphasizes the connection between bhakti and prema and treats the age-old enigma about the nature of (...) class='Hi'>love in an original fashion. NBS has usually been interpreted in a theistic manner, often with theistic interpolations into the text. This paper interprets NBS with a philosophical approach to discover its unique insights on the perennial philosophical issue, namely, 'what is love?' and shows that NBS harks back to the age of the Vedas in which secular love and religious love were inter-twined. (shrink)
In this discussion, we ponder the discourse about the ‘body of the Divine’ in the Indian tradition. Beginning with the Vedas, we survey the major eras and thinkers of that tradition, considering various notions of the Supreme Divine Being it produced. For each, we ask: is the Divine embodied? If so, then in what way? What is the nature of the body of the Divine, and what is its relationship to human bodies? What is the value of the body of (...) the Divine to the spiritual aspirant? We consider, where relevant, which views are pantheistic and which might be considered panentheistic. Panentheism is connected with discourse on the world as the body of God. It has origins in medieval Christian theology with anticipatory traces in Plato’s Timeaus. Under pantheism, were the world to end—were it to collapse or disappear irreversibly, perhaps, into a huge black hole—then God would disintegrate without a remainder as well; for in this view the Divine Spirit is the universe. The same is not true under panentheism which posits a more complex relationship between the Divine and the world. According to panentheism, God pervades the world—God is in the world—and at the same time, God sustains the world—the world is in God. This allows that God be greater than, transcendent of and independent of the world. In our conclusion we remark on how the views we have surveyed link to, resonate with, or dis-compare with the current—should one say revivified—interest in intellectual quarters with panentheism. (shrink)
Rāmānuja (ācārya), the eleventh century South Indian philosopher, is the chief proponent of Vishishtādvaita, which is one of the three main forms of the Orthodox Hindu philosophical school, Vedānta. As the prime philosopher of the Vishishtādvaita tradition, Rāmānuja is one of the Indian philosophical tradition’s most important and influential figures. He was the first Indian philosopher to provide a systematic theistic interpretation of the philosophy of the Vedas, and is famous for arguing for the epistemic and soteriological significance of bhakti, (...) or devotion to a personal God. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Rāmānuja defended the reality of a plurality of individual persons, qualities, values and objects while affirming the substantial unity of all. On some accounts, Rāmānuja’s influence on popular Hindu practice is so vast that his system forms the basis for popular Hindu philosophy. His two main philosophical writings (the Shrī Bhāshya and Vedārthasangraha) are amongst the best examples of rigorous and energetic argumentation in any philosophical tradition, and they are masterpieces of Indian scholastic philosophy. (shrink)
EDITORS' INTRODUCTION B he Vedas tell of a conversation between a young man, Shvetaketu, and his father concerning what the son had learned in his education ...
Bhakti marga is one of the three important paths of attaining spiritual advancement. The concept is as old as Vedas, developed and elaborated periodically and gradually. In the medieval India ‘Bhakti’ was spread all over the country through Sant Kabir. This paper aims at describing the concept of Bhakti according to Sant Kabir. The essence of Bhakti is love; the best and appropriate method to unite man with God. It is very subtle in nature. Inculcating love in one’s own heart (...) is a challenging task. Bhakti marga is not a velvet path, though it sounds so sweet. It’s a heroic path. One needs to be desperate enough to follow this path. A passive, timid and lazy person can never attain the great gift of love. In the great adventure of uniting the soul with God, mind plays the role of villain, creating obstacles at every step. Man must be skillful enough in removing those obstacles. Keeping the constant company of true people helps man to strengthen his vision and aim. The need of the Guru (spiritual adept) is insisted in this great endeavour. But, one must be careful enough in choosing a real Guru. Love towards God cultivates love towards fellow beings, which is very much needed in this unfriendly, in secured and ruthless world. It is in the hands of man to choose either to follow the path of love or the world of war. (shrink)
Disc 1. Life's great questions: Asian perspectives ; The Vedas and Upanishads: the beginning -- Disc 2. Mahavira and Jainism: extreme nonviolence ; The Buddha: the middle way -- Disc 3. The Bhagavad Gita: the way of action ; Confucius: in praise of sage-kings -- Disc 4. Laozi and Daoism: the way of nature ; The Hundred Schools of preimperial China -- Disc 5. Mencius and Xunzi: Confucius's successors ; Sunzi and Han Feizi: strategy and legalism -- Disc 6. Zarathustra (...) and Mani: dualistic religion ; Kautilya and Ashoka: Buddhism and empire -- Disc 7. Ishvarakrishna and Patanjali: Yoga ; Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu: Buddhist theories -- Disc 8. Sima Qian and Ban Zhao: history and women ; Dong Zhongshu and Ge Hong: eclecticism -- Disc 9. Xuanzang and Chinese Buddhism ; Prince Shotoku, Lady Murasaki, Sei Shonagon -- Disc 10. Saicho to Nichiren: Japanese Buddhism ; Shankara, Ramanuja, Madhva: Hindu Vedanta -- Disc 11. Al-Biruni: Islam in India ; Nanak and Sirhindi: Sikhism and Sufism -- Disc 12. Han Yu to Zhu Xi: Neo-Confucianism ; Wang Yangming: The study of heart-mind -- Disc 13. Dogen and Hakuin: Zen Buddhism ; Zeami and Sen no Rikyu: Japanese aesthetics -- Disc 14. Wonhyo to King Sejong: Korean philosophy ; Padmasambhava to Tsongkhapa: Tibetan ideas -- Disc 15. Science and technology in premodern Asia ; Muhammad Iqbal and Rabindranath Tagore -- Disc 16. Mohandas Gandhi: Satyagraha, or soul-force ; Fukuzawa Yukichi and Han Yongun -- Disc 17. Kang Youwei and Hu Shi ; Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong -- Disc 18. Modern legacies ; East and West. (shrink)
Most writings on Indian philosophy assume that its central concern is with moska, that the Vedas along with the Upanishadic texts are at its root and that it consists of six orthodox systems knowns as Mimamasa, Vedanta, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, and Yoga, on the one hand and three unorthodox systems: Buddhism, Jainism and Carvaka, on the other. Besides these, they accept generally the theory of Karma and the theory of Purusartha as parts of what the Indian tradition thinks about human (...) action. The essays in this volume question these assumptions and show that there is little ground for accepting them. A new counter-perspective is presented for the articulation of the Indian philosophical tradition that breaks from the traditional frame in which it has usually been presented. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: 1 A Plea for a New History of Philosophy in India -- 2 Towards a Field Theory of Indian Philosophy: -- Suggestions for a New Way of Looking at Indian Philosophy -- II -- 3 Indian Philosophy in the First Millennium A.D.: -- Fact and Fiction -- 4 Where are the Vedas in the First Millennium AD.? -- 5 Vedinta in the First Millennium A.D.: The Case Study -- of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by th Historiography (...) -- of Indian Philosophy -- III -- 6 Prltftyasamutpada-Does it Say Anything New? -- 7 ilow Anekantika is Anekanta? Some Reflections on the -- Jain Theory of Anekfntavada -- IV -- 8 MTmamsa before JaiminT: Some Problems in the -- Interpretation of Rule in the Indian Tradition -- 9 The MTmamsaka versus Yajfiika: Some Further Problem in -- the Interpretation of Sruti in the Indian Tradition -- 10 Syena yaga: The Achilles Heel of Sruti in Indian Tradition -- 11 Is the Doctrine of Arthavada Compatible with the -- Idea of Srut? -- V -- 12 The Myth of the Prasthana TrayF -- 13 Is "Tattvam asi" The Same Type of Identity Statement as -- "The Morning Star is the Evening Star"? -- 14 Can the Analysis of Adhyasa ever Lead to an -- Advaitic Conclusion? -- 15 Was Acarya Samkara Responsible for the Disappearance -- of Buddhist Philosophy from India? -- VI -- 16 Is Nyaya Realist or Idealist? -- 17 Can Navya Nyaya Analysis Make a Distinction -- between Sense and Reference? -- VII -- 18 Did the GopTs Really Love Krsna?: Some Reflections -- on Bhakti as a Purusartha in the Indian Tradition -- 19 The Vamasrama Syndrome of Indian Sociology -- 20 'Shock-proof, 'Evidence-proof, 'Argument-proof -- World of Sampradayika Scholarship of Indian Philosophy -- 21 Nyaya; Realist or Idealist: Is the Debate Ended, the -- Argument Completed? -- Appendix. (shrink)
Since the first half of the nineteenth century in which English was introduced as the language of higher education in India, the word and concept of “philosophy” has played an important role in Indian intellectual life. First the study of philosophy must have meant the study of Western philosophy in Indian universities, butlater various attempts were made to discover the Indian versions of philosophical traditions in Sanskrit literature. Today no one doubts that there has been a rich and very long (...) tradition of such intellectual activities as are fully compatible with what European philosophers have actually been doing. Nevertheless, it is sometimes very difficult to draw a strict line between philosophy and religion in Indian thought. The present study will focus on that passage of the Nyāyamañjarī by a Kashmirian Nyāya scholar Jayanta which deals with the justification of the authority of the Vedas and other religious scriptures. From the analysis of the passage we may detect that there are two different dimensions in his application of logic for this issue. On the one hand he appeals to logical thinking for the defence of the Vedic authority and tries to establish the proper proof. But on the other hand he seems to be conscious of the limitation of reasoning, for he refers to those thinkers without refuting them in the latter half of the passage, according to whom every religious scripture must be accepted as valid insofar as the path of reasoning and argumentation is taken. (shrink)
The manner in which a person views the universe originates from her/his culture. If someone were asked of the predominant element found in every culture that has for centuries given people their perspective of the universe, certainly, the answer would be, Religion! The responsibility of generating and preserving the elements of one’s perspective of the universe has rested with religious institutions such as Methodist, Protestant, or Roman Catholic churches or spiritual leaders such as the Buddha. Whether the element is developed (...) through the teaching of the Holy Bible, Catechism, Vedas, or Koran, people in the universe, including the Garífuna-speaking people of Central America, have always felt the need to .. (shrink)