In his “Spinoza’s TTP , Maimonides, and Kant” (1968), Pines compared Spinoza’s dogmas of universal faith ( TTP , 14) with Kant’s postulates of practical reason ( Critique of Practical Reason , part 1). According to him, Spinoza’s dogmas, like Maimonides’ “necessary beliefs” ( Guide 3:28), are postulates necessary for political welfare, and do not fall under the jurisdiction of theoretical reason. They define the faith of the common person, not that of the philosopher. Kant, in his remarks about Spinoza (...) as an “upright skeptic,” mistakenly thought his dogmas were true beliefs, not necessary ones; and his notion of postulates of practical reason seems to have been in part influenced by his mistaken view of Spinoza’s dogmas. The transformation of Maimonides’ “necessary beliefs” into Kant’s “postulates of practical reason,” as narrated by Pines, recalls the similar transformation of “Averroism” into “Christian Averroism” in the thirteenth century. In essays written from the late 1970s until his death in 1990, Pines returned to the theme of Maimonides and Kant, and argued convincingly that Maimonides’ epistemology was “critical” in the Kantian sense. However, his related argument that Maimonides’ religious sensibility was similar to Kant’s is less convincing. Unlike Kant, Maimonides did not think that critical epistemology made room for faith, but held that it caused one to tremble in awe. Like Spinoza, he identified true faith with intellectual knowledge, not something beyond it. His distinctiveness as a philosopher is that he was a God-intoxicated Knower like Spinoza, but a critical epistemologist like Kant. (shrink)
Peter Hare and Edward Madden's collaborative book Evil and the Concept of God (968) has become a staple in literature about the problem of evil and remains frequently cited by supporters and critics alike. The major concepts of the work arose out of earlier papers in which they first began to formulate their arguments about the problem of evil. Their article "Evil and Unlimited Power" embodies many of their arguments against quasi-theist attempts to resolve the problem of evil.1 Assembled from (...) these and other papers, their compendium frames a thorough synthesis of the long history of debate regarding the problem of evil, and contributes their own exhaustive, point-by-point attack on modern defenders of three main .. (shrink)
This paper discusses the argument for preference utilitarianism proposed by Richard Hare in Moral Thinking(Hare, 1981). G. F. Schueler (1984) and Ingmar Persson (1989) identified a serious gap in Hare’s reasoning, which might be called the No-Conflict Problem. The paper first tries to fill the gap. Then, however, starting with an idea of Zeno Vendler, the question is raised whether the gap is there to begin with. Unfortunately, this Vendlerian move does not save Hare from criticism. Paradoxically, it instead endangers (...) the whole argumentative enterprise. (shrink)
Peter Hare's writings on civil disobedience suggest that he was not a "quiet man," though he was indeed soft-spoken. He was certainly earnest about matters of conscience, about doing the right thing and doing things right. He was a model of intellectual integrity for several generations of American philosophers. Moreover, when he saw a need he seldom hesitated to take it on himself: sitting on many, many dissertation committees, editing a major philosophical journal, helping found new professional associations. Time after (...) time, he generously committed himself to make things happen. He was an engaged intellectual, tuned in and ready to act in his soft-spoken, earnest, and effective way.The depth of Peter Hare's .. (shrink)
Peter Hare took a belle-lettriste pleasure in hopping from one philosophical topic to another. Not carelessly but lightheartedly enough. I mean by that, not that there is no deeper interlocking linkage among his many papers—there is—but rather that the center of gravity of each piece rests with the special patience and affection Peter spends on the specific topic some chanced-upon author or authors bring into view. He pursues each such topic intensively in a deliberately narrow-gauged way, testing its best possibilities (...) in its own terms seconded by his own wider reading, as if he were loyal to opposed doctrines. He usually runs through a rather tight, well-informed set of occasional readings and reflections .. (shrink)
Ethics of Richard M. Hare is widely considered as a classical example of the strong internalistic theory of motivation: he is thought to believe that having a moral motive is a sufficient condition to act accordingly. However, strong internalism has difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of acrasia and amoralism. For this reason some critics charge him with developing a false theory of moral motivation. In the article I present Hare's answer to these questions by dividing the discussion about motivation into (...) three levels: semantical, epistemological, and ontological. I also explain his concept of internal motivation and argue that his theory, contrary to what his critics assume, may be called a weak motivational internalism. (shrink)
The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually have rested on (...) some kind of “logic of attitudes,” Ridge argues that it is the expressed belief in the ecumenical machinery that holds the key. Although Ridge’s ecumenical expressivism is promising, this essay argues that his solution is flawed. However, this does not mean that every form of ecumenical expressivism is a failure. Ridge briefly contrasts his view with the kind of view Hare advanced but argues that Hare cannot make use of the ecumenical machinery.2 I argue that this is incorrect. Not only is an ecumenical reading of Hare very plausible and something that establishes him as an important forerunner of today’s ecumenical trend in metaethics, but, more important, it offers guidance where Ridge goes wrong. It solves the Frege‐Geach problem in a way that meets the criticism of more standard solutions head‐on, and it seems to be able to handle the most pressing problems for ecumenical theories. The ecumenical theory that emerges is therefore powerful enough to establish itself as one of the most (if not the most) plausible form of ecumenism on the market. The first part of this article is largely concerned with advancing an ecumenical reading of Hare’s The Language of Morals and the kind of solution it offers in response to the Frege‐Geach problem. Some of the problems such a reading encounters will be addressed as we outline the theory. The most serious worries, however, are addressed in the final part of the essay. (shrink)
InMoral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic proof of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable from his proof. In the (...) second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is too demanding. The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is too demanding. (shrink)
R. M. Hare's Nora/ Thinking is surely one of the most compelling defenses of utilitarianism to appear in many years. Hare defends utilitarianism at some length against the objection that it has consequences that are inconsistent with our common-sense or intuitive moral judgments. Hare also offers a positive argument for utiTitarianism. In this paper I shall only concern myself with the latter argument. In the first part of the paper, I shall set out Hare's argument in some detail. In the (...) second part of the paper, I shall suggest criticisms of Hare's argument. I shall argue that two of the assumptions upon.. (shrink)
In Moral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against "intuitive" objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic "proof" of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable from his "proof". In (...) the second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is "too demanding". The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is "too.. (shrink)
Davidson poses the problem via three propositions p1-P3, Each persuasive but apparently inconsistent. His solution, That the three are consistent, Merely re-Phrases the problem. We should rather reject p2; if an agent judges that it would be better to do "x" than to do "y", Then he wants to do "x" more than he wants to do "y". Plato accepts p2 because he thinks all agents predominantly self-Interested, And hare because he thinks that evaluative judgments imply desires; both are criticized. (...) An alternative to p2, Consistent with p1 and p3, Makes a subtler connection between judgment, Desire and behaviour. (shrink)
The article goes into hare's attempt to refute objections to his account of morality which seemingly allows for the nazis' judgment to exterminate the jews. The author suggests that hare's defense rests on his demonstrating that if the principles of universalizability and prescriptivism are granted and their implications imaginatively grasped, Then "nobody but a madman" could hold that all jews ought to be exterminated. He argues that this defense rests on sociological and biological absurdities. (staff).
Hare used his thesis of universalizability to generate specific normative results and a defense of utilitarianism. To accomplish the latter task, he enjoined that one consider oneself in various roles in a given situation, and that the concluding judgment must be one that is affirmable in any of the various roles. In effect this means that one must, says Hare, give equal weight to the interests of all involved parties, an axiom of utilitarianism. The paper argues that he did not (...) succeed. (shrink)
Hare’s analysis of moral language have been either obviated in contemporary meta-ethical debates or straightforwardly sided with dated forms of humean noncognitivism. It is assumed that Hare´s conceptual analysis is subject to the same critique that threatens these last positions and is in the same way inadequate. I believe this misrepresents his position and distracts us from his more important contributions to the understanding of moral language. The present paper attempts to show that, even if some miss-adjustments in Hare’s position (...) favour these assumptions, a reformulation of his account may confront such critics posing a new understanding model of the relation between descriptive and evaluative aspects in the moral case that differs from both realist and humean non-cognitivist accounts. (shrink)
Peter H. Hare (1935-2008) developed informed, original views about the proposition: some published (Hare 1969 and Hare-Madden 1975); some expressed in conversations at scores of meetings of the Buffalo Logic Colloquium and at dinners following. The published views were expository and critical responses to publications by Curt J. Ducasse (1881-1969), a well-known presence in American logic, a founder of the Association for Symbolic Logic and its President for one term.1Hare was already prominent in the University of Buffalo's Philosophy Department in (...) 1969 when I was appointed. Soon after, he became Chair. As his Associate Chair from 1971to 1975, I spent many hours with him in Buffalo and on professional trips .. (shrink)
In "moral arguments" ("mind", 1958), Philippa foot displayed what she claimed to be a deduction of an evaluative conclusion from a non-Evaluative premise. In "freedom and reason", R m hare attacks foot-Style deductions on two grounds: he first offers a "reductio", Comparing them to a racist deduction; he then offers an explanation of where all of these arguments go awry. I argue in my paper's first part that hare's explanation rests upon a defective criterion of entailment. In passing I show (...) how this counts against certain noncognitivist arguments that purport to show that moral judgments cannot be factual. In the second part I show that foot-Style deductions--And the racist deduction as well--Are either unsound or else superfluous to the naturalist's enterprise. From this I draw certain morals as to what conditions a successful naturalism must satisfy. (shrink)
Cet essai se concentre sur les tentatives de Hare de résoudre le problème du profiteur (free-rider) dans les termes de la théorie oú il distingue les niveaux intuitif et critique de la pensée morale. Hare fait valoir que la pensée critique correcte en utilitarisme des actes endosse les régles qui serviront a la pensée intuitive, règles enjoignant à un individu de s’acquitter de ses responabilités sociales, par exemplevoter ou recycler ses ordures. Je lais valoir que Hare propose ou suggère implicitement (...) divers critères de sélection des règles, critères que j’entreprends de désambiguïser. Je soutiens en outre qu’aucun de ces critères n’arrive à rèsoudre complètement le problème du profiteur. (shrink)
Peter Hare published two books about philosophy, both co-authored with his colleague Edward Madden. The first was Evil and the Problem of God, while the second was titled Causing, Perceiving and Believing: An Examination of the Philosophy of C. J. Ducasse (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel), published in 97 . Hare's choice of Ducasse for extended study tells us a great deal about Hare's own interests. Ducasse was a confessedly analytic philosopher who advocated several views extending classical American themes. From metaphysics (...) and epistemology to ethics and aesthetics, Ducasse struck Hare as a philosopher worthy of promotion and preservation.Hare and Madden had an interest in Ducasse for some years.1 However, there .. (shrink)
This paper compares the attempts of hare, Singer and gewirth to provide the trivially true universalizability principle with normative content. The programs of hare and singer share an inability to convict the sincere fanatic ( the servant of an immoral but aesthetically compelling ideal) of moral inconsistency. Gewirth avoids the "fanatic" pitfall by adding some purely logical footwork; but his system too admits of important indeterminacies which may or may not prove fatal, E.G., The handling of morally tolerable coercion and (...) of the occasional duty to repair damage caused by someone else. (shrink)
Gewirth and hare claim amoralism is contrary to reason. Gewirth believes amoralism to be logically inconsistent. Hare believes amoralism to be imprudent and hence irrational. By defining the problem as one of amoralism rather than 'non'moralism, Gewirth and hare assume illegitimate moral presuppositions. I show their arguments fail by comparing their arguments to the arguments given by someone who accepts the language and presuppositions of magic. I suggest that what is wrong with amoralism is that it leads to immoralism. If (...) this is so, Morality ultimately must be based upon basic moral insights or intuitions. (shrink)
To those of us who appreciated Peter Hare a systematic exploration of the themes of his work is sorely overdue. However, when considering the difficulty of providing a genuine intellectual narrative, one finds it hard to deny that the main problem arises in trying to bring his many intellectual strands together. Hare's self-styled "irenic impulse" and his affinity for uncovering relations suggest a figure best described in terms of the pluralism he so often defended. But fundamental to Hare's appreciation for (...) plurality was the idea that even with it unity is a hidden reward. His understanding and hope in this is what allowed him to navigate between opposed philosophical systems so frequently. It is also what led .. (shrink)
John Hare’s paper successfully exposes philosophical naïvéties and reductive pretensions in the evolutionary research he surveys. But he fails to clarify how ‘God’, on a view such as Dominic Johnson’s, could not be seen merely as a dispensable projection of ‘primitive’ societies, and thus how his own continuing commitment to a Kantian ethic might need to be bolstered by a concomitant form of ‘natural theology’ attentive to evolutionary dynamics.
A História atesta diferentes abordagens da “proposição”. A proposição tem sido considerada como objeto de crença, descrença e de dúvida: geralmente como objeto de atitudes proposicionais , aquilo do qual pode se dizer ser acreditado, desacreditado, entendido, etc. Também tem sido tomada como sendo o objeto de apreensão, julgamento, suposição, afirmação, denegação, e de investigação: geralmente como o objeto das ações proposicionais , aquilo que pode ser dito ser apreendido, ser julgado verdadeiro ou falso, ser assumido para fins de raciocínio, (...) etc. A proposição tem sido tomada como sujeito da verdade e da falsidade: geralmente como o sujeito de propriedades proposicionais , aquilo que pode ser dito verdadeiro, falso, tautológico, informativo, inconsistente, etc. Ela também tem sido tomada como sujeito e objeto das relações lógicas , e.g., aquilo que pode ser dito implicar, ser implicado, contradizer, ser contradito, etc. Prima facie , tais propriedades e relações são não-mentais e objetivas. Também tem sido tomada como sendo a resultante ou o produto das operações proposicionais , usualmente mental ou linguística; e.g., julgar, afirmar, e denegar tem sido vistas como produtoras de proposições chamadas julgamentos, afirmações, e negações, respectivamente. As Proposições tem também sido tomadas como sendo certas sentenças declarativas . Finalmente, as proposições tem sido tomadas como sendo o significado de certas sentenças declarativas. Este ensaio é uma exame informal, seletivo, e incompleto de abordagens alternativas a “a proposição” com especial atenção aos pontos de vista do falecido filósofo americano Peter Hare (1935–2008) e daqueles que o influenciaram. DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n1p51. (shrink)
The author criticises chapter 5 of r m hare's "the language of morals" in which hare tries to show why naturalism is "untenable." the author concludes that hare's analysis as well as the naturalists' "keep us from saying what we do say and want to say." (staff).
This article examines the relationship between reason and language, based on two meta-ethics thesis of Richard Hare. The way in wich Hare relates these two themes is shown to consolidates his own point of view of Ethics, bringinging about the discussion on moral language and, furthermore, rejecti.
This essay present a critical analysis of Hare's article 'Contrasting Methods in Environmental Planning' . It argues that Hare has drawn an important distinction between two 'methods' used in both urban and environmental planning, and that Hare is correct in the conclusion of his argument that one of these methods, 'the trial-design method', is superior to the other, 'the means-end method'. However, this paper presents a new argument in support of that conclusion. This new argument is important for two reasons. (...) First, it points to the existence of at least two different kinds of preference schedule. Second, it supports a type of decision making procedure to be used in 'multiple-client situations' different from the one envisioned by Hare. This procedure, oddly enough, resembles the procedures outlined by both Habermas and Rawls. However, it can be defended on recognisably utilitarian grounds. (shrink)